

1. (3 points) Sign your UČO using:
 - (a) the RSA signature with $(d; e, n) = (303703; 7, 1065023)$
 - (b) the ElGamal signature with $(x; q, p, y) = (60221; 2, 555557, 552508)$ and a random component $r = 12345$.
2. (3 points) Consider the RSA signature scheme with public key $(n, e) = (581, 17)$. Malicious Eve captured the following messages signed by Alice: $(m_1, \text{sig}(m_1)) = (33, 192)$, $(m_2, \text{sig}(m_2)) = (6, 454)$. Show that Eve can forge the signatures of messages $m_3 = 198$, $m_4 = 508$ and $m_5 = 97$ without using brute force.
3. (3 points) Consider the Ong-Schnorr-Shamir subliminal channel with $n = 29737$ and $k = 13$. Compute in detail the public key and the signature of the message $w' = 2020$ containing the secret subliminal message $w = 111$. Demonstrate that the signature is valid and that the secret message can be recovered.
4. (4 points) Consider the following (t, n) threshold signature scheme based on RSA signatures:
 - (a) A trusted dealer T selects an RSA modulus N with keys e and d , makes (N, e) public.
 - (b) T gives every party i of the threshold scheme a secret share d_i , such that $d = d_1 + d_2 + \dots + d_n$.
 - (c) To sign a message m every party i first computes partial signature $s_i = m^{d_i} \bmod N$.

Find (and prove its correctness) the final step of the scheme so that the parties can together obtain the signature $s = m^d \bmod N$ of the message m . What are the possible t (in terms of n) for which this scheme is correct?

5. (5 points) Consider the Lamport one-time signature scheme for signing a 4-bit message, ie. the signer creates a list of private keys y_{ij} and publishes the corresponding public keys z_{ij} , $1 \leq i \leq 4$, $0 \leq j \leq 1$. Is it possible to securely sign any 6-bit message with such scheme? Explain your answer.
6. (7 points) At the end of the semester Professor Gruska regularly receives a list of 5 students with the highest achieved points for homework exercises, so that he can award them with final mark A. This takes the following form:

UČO₁, $\text{sig}(\text{UČO}_1)$
 UČO₂, $\text{sig}(\text{UČO}_2)$
 UČO₃, $\text{sig}(\text{UČO}_3)$
 UČO₄, $\text{sig}(\text{UČO}_4)$
 UČO₅, $\text{sig}(\text{UČO}_5)$

In order to protect this list from being tampered with, the ElGamal signature with public information $(q, p, y) = (2, 567899, 300210)$ was used. You have intercepted the following list:

172459, (226741, 13448)
 172519, (331901, 326010)
 359406, (390725, 78981)
 456149, (144902, 184381)
 459379, (43870, 540485)

Additionally, you have learned that in order to save on randomness, the signatures were calculated with r_1, r_2, r_3, r_4, r_5 , where for all $i \in \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$, $r_i = 3 * r_{i-1} \bmod 567898$. Without using brute force, modify the list such that it contains your signed UČO. Explain your answer.