	QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
Part I	Quantum cryptography is an area of science and technology that explores and utilizes potential of quantum phenomena for getting higher quality (security) for cryptography tasks.
Quantum cryptography	A new and important feature of quantum cryptography is that security of quantum cryptographical protocols is based on the laws of nature – of quantum physics, and not on the unproven assumptions of computational complexity. Quantum cryptography is the first area of information processing and communication in which quantum physics laws were directly exploited to bring an essential advantage in information processing.
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MAIN OUTCOMES – so far	BASICS of QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING
 MAIN OUTCOMES – so far It has been shown that with quantum computers, we could design absolutely secure quantum generation of shared and secret random classical keys. It has been proven that even without quantum computers unconditionally secure quantum generation of classical secret and shared keys is possible (in the sense that any eavesdropping is detectable). Unconditionally secure basic quantum cryptography primitives, such as bit commitment and oblivious transfer, are impossible. Quantum teleportation and pseudo-telepathy are possible. Quantum cryptography and quantum networks are already in the developmental stages. Quantum communication between satellites and ground stations were already demonstrated for 2000 km in 2019 in China. That indicates that quantum internet seems possible. 	As an introduction to quantum cryptography the very basic motivations, experiments, principles, concepts and results of quantum information processing and communication will be presented in the next few slides.

BASIC MOTIVATION	QUANTUM PHYSICS
In quantum information processing we witness an interaction between the two most important areas of science and technology of 20-th century, between quantum physics and informatics. This is very likely to have important consequences for 21th century.	 Quantum physics deals with fundamental entities of physics – particles (waves?) like protons, electrons and neutrons (from which matter is built); photons (which carry electromagnetic radiation) various "elementary particles" which mediate other interactions in physics. We call them particles in spite of the fact that some of their properties are totally unlike the properties of what we call particles in our ordinary classical world. For example, a quantum particle "can go through two places at the same time" and can interact with itself. Quantum physics is full of counter-intuitive, weird, mysterious and even paradoxical events.
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FEYNMAN's VIEW	CLASSICAL versus QUANTUM INFORMATION
I am going to tell you what Nature behaves like However, do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly avoid it, BUT HOW CAN IT BE LIKE THAT? Because you will get "down the drain" into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped NOBODY KNOWS HOW IT CAN BE LIKE THAT Richard Feynman (1965): The character of physical law.	 Main properties of classical information: It is easy to store, transmit and process classical information in time and space. It is easy to make (unlimited number of) copies of classical information One can measure classical information without disturbing it. Main properties of quantum information: It is difficult to store, transmit and process quantum information There is no way to copy perfectly unknown quantum information Measurement of quantum information destroys it, in general.


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CLASSICAL versus QUANTUM COMPUTING	CLASSICAL versus QUANTUM REGISTERS
The essence of the difference between classical computers and quantum computers is in the way information is stored and processed. In classical computers, information is represented on macroscopic level by bits, which can take one of the two values 0 or 1 In quantum computers, information is represented on microscopic level using qubits, (quantum bits) which can take on any from the following uncountable many values $\alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle$ where α, β are arbitrary complex numbers such that $ \alpha ^2 + \beta ^2 = 1.$	 An n bit classical register can store at any moment exactly one n-bit string. An n-qubit quantum register can store at any moment a superposition of all 2ⁿ n-bit strings. Consequently, on a quantum computer one can "compute' in a single step all 2ⁿ values of a function defined on <i>n</i>-bit inputs. This enormous massive parallelism is one reason why quantum computing can be so powerful.
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BASIC EXPERIMENTS	CLASSICAL EXPERIMENTS
BASIC EXPERIMENTS	$i_{a} = 1: Experiment with bullets$



TWO-SLIT EXPERIMENT with OBSERVATION

detector light source $P_1(x)$ H_1 $P_{12}(x)$ H_2 source $P_2(x)$ of electrons wall wall (b) (a) (c) IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 17/76

QUANTUM SYSTEMS = HILBERT SPACE

Hilbert space H_n is an n-dimensional complex vector space with

scalar product

$$\langle \psi | \phi \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_i \psi_i^* \text{ of vectors } | \phi \rangle = \begin{vmatrix} \phi_1 \\ \phi_2 \\ \vdots \\ \phi_n \end{vmatrix}, |\psi \rangle = \begin{vmatrix} \psi_1 \\ \psi_2 \\ \vdots \\ \psi_n \end{vmatrix}$$

This allows to define the norm of vectors as

$$\|\phi\| = \sqrt{|\langle \phi | \phi \rangle|}.$$

Two vectors $|\phi\rangle$ and $|\psi\rangle$ are called **orthogonal** if $\langle\phi|\psi\rangle = 0$.

A basis B of H_n is any set of n vectors $|b_1\rangle, |b_2\rangle, \ldots, |b_n\rangle$ of the norm 1 which are mutually orthogonal.

Given a basis $B = \{|b_i\rangle\}_{i=1}^n$, any vector $|\psi\rangle$ from H_n can be uniquely expressed in the form:

$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i |b_i\rangle.$$

THREE BASIC PRINCIPLES of QUANTUM WORLD

 $\mathbf{P1}$ To each transfer from a quantum state ϕ to a state ψ a complex number

 $\langle \psi | \phi \rangle$

is associated. This number is called the $\ensuremath{\text{probability amplitude}}$ of the transfer and

 $|\langle \psi | \phi \rangle|^2$

is then the **probability** of the transfer.

 ${\bf P2}$ If a transfer from a quantum state ϕ to a quantum state ψ can be decomposed into two subsequent transfers

 $\psi \leftarrow \phi' \leftarrow \phi$

then the resulting amplitude of the transfer is the product of amplitudes of subtransfers: $\langle \psi | \phi \rangle = \langle \psi | \phi' \rangle \langle \phi' | \phi \rangle$

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 $\mbox{P3}$ If a transfer from a state ϕ to a state ψ has two independent alternatives

then the resulting amplitude is the sum of amplitudes of two subtransfers.

BRA-KET NOTATION

Dirac introduced a very handy notation, so called bra-ket notation, to deal with amplitudes, quantum states and linear functionals $f : H \rightarrow C$.

If $\psi, \phi \in H$, then

 $\langle \psi | \phi \rangle$ - scalar product of ψ and ϕ (an amplitude of going from ϕ to ψ).

 $|\phi\rangle$ – ket-vector (a column vector) - an equivalent to ϕ

 $\langle\psi|$ – bra-vector (a row vector) a linear functional on H

such that $\langle \psi | (|\phi \rangle) = \langle \psi | \phi
angle$

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QUANTUM EVOLUTION / COMPUTATION

Example For states $\phi = (\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n)$ and $\psi = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n)$ we have $\begin{aligned} (\phi) &= \begin{pmatrix} \phi_1 \\ \cdots \\ \phi_n \end{pmatrix}, \langle \phi = (\phi_1^*, \dots, \phi_n^*); \langle \phi \psi \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n \phi_i^* \psi_i; \\ (\phi) &= \begin{pmatrix} \phi_1 \psi_1^* & \cdots & \phi_1 \psi_n^* \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \phi_n \psi_1^* & \cdots & \phi_n \psi_n^* \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$	EVOLUTION in QUANTUM SYSTEMCOMPUTATION in
UNITARY MATRICES	QUANTUM (PROJECTION) MEASUREMENTS
	A quantum state is always observed (measured) with respect to an observable $O - a$ decomposition of a given Hilbert space into orthogonal subspaces (where each vector can be uniquely represented as a sum of vectors of these subspaces).
A matrix A is unitary if $A \cdot A^{\dagger} = A^{\dagger} \cdot A = I$ where the matrix A^{\dagger} is obtained from the matrix A by revolving A around the main diagonal and changing all elements by their complex conjugates.	 There are two outcomes of a projection measurement of a state φ⟩ with respect to O: Into classical world comes information into which subspace projection of φ⟩ was made. In the classical world projection of the measured state (as a new state) φ'⟩ stays in one of the above subspaces. The subspace into which projection is made is chosen randomly and the corresponding probability is uniquely determined by the amplitudes at the representation of φ⟩ as a sum of states of the subspaces.

QUBITS QUANTUM STATES and PROJECTION MEASUREMENT A **qubit** is a quantum state in H_2 In case an orthonormal basis $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$ is chosen in a Hilbert space H_n , then any state where $\alpha, \beta \in C$ are such that $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$ and $|\phi\rangle \in H_n$ can be expressed in the form $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ is a (standard) basis of H_2 $|\phi\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i |\beta_i\rangle, \qquad \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i|^2 = 1$ **EXAMPLE:** Representation of gubits by a electron in a Hydrogen atom **(b)** a spin-1/2 particle where Basis states $a_i = \langle \beta_i | \phi \rangle$ are called probability amplitudes and their squares provide probabilities that if the state $|\phi\rangle$ is measured with respect to the basis $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$, then the state $|\phi\rangle$ General state collapses into the state $|\beta_i\rangle$ with probability $|a_i|^2$. amplitudes The classical "outcome" of the measurement of the state $|\phi\rangle$ with respect to the basis (a) $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$ is the index i of that state $|\beta_i\rangle$ into which the state $|\phi\rangle$ collapses. Figure 5: Qubit representations by energy levels of an electron in a hydrogen atom and by a spin-1/2 particle. The condition $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$ is a legal one if $|\alpha|^2$ and $|\beta|^2$ are to be the probabilities of being in one of two basis states (of electrons or photons) IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 25/76 **HILBERT SPACE** H₂ **PAULI MATRICES** STANDARD BASIS DUAL BASIS $|0'\rangle, |1'\rangle$ $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$ expressed in the standard basis as follows; $\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$ $\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)$ Hadamard matrix $H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$ follows |H|0' angle=|0 angle $|H|0\rangle = |0'\rangle$ $H|1'\rangle = |1\rangle$ $|H|1\rangle = |1'\rangle$ transforms one of the basis into another one. General form of a unitary matrix of degree 2 bit-sign error. $U = e^{i\gamma} \begin{pmatrix} e^{i\alpha} & 0\\ 0 & e^{-i\alpha} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \cos\theta & i\sin\theta\\ i\sin\theta & \cos\theta \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} e^{i\beta} & 0\\ 0 & e^{-i\beta} \end{pmatrix}$

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Very important one-qubit unary operators are the following Pauli operators,

$$\sigma_{x} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \sigma_{y} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \sigma_{z} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$

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 $|\phi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$

 $\alpha |0>+\beta |1>$

 $|\alpha|^2+|\beta|^2=1$

Basis states

 $|0>=|\uparrow>$ $(1>=|\downarrow>$ $(1>=|\downarrow>$ General state

 $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$

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 $= \alpha + \beta$

Observe that Pauli matrices transform a qubit state $|\phi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$ as

 $\sigma_{\mathbf{x}}(\alpha|\mathbf{0}\rangle + \beta|\mathbf{1}\rangle) = \beta|\mathbf{0}\rangle + \alpha|\mathbf{1}\rangle$ $\sigma_{z}(\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) = \alpha|0\rangle - \beta|1\rangle$ $\sigma_{y}(\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) = \beta|0\rangle - \alpha|1\rangle$

Operators σ_x, σ_z and σ_y represent therefore a bit error, a sign error and a

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QUANTUM MEASUREMENT of QUBITS

MIXED STATES – DENSITY MATRICES

of a qubit state

A qubit state can "contain" unboundly large amount of classical information. However, an unknown quantum state cannot be identified.


By a **measurement** of the qubit state

 $\alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$

with respect to the basis

$\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$

we can obtain only classical information and only in the following random way:



MAXIMALLY MIXED STATES

To the maximally mixed state,

$$\Bigl(\frac{1}{2},|0\rangle\Bigr),\Bigl(\frac{1}{2},|1\rangle\Bigr)$$

representing a random bit, corresponds the density matrix

$$\frac{1}{2}\begin{pmatrix}1\\0\end{pmatrix}(1,0)+\frac{1}{2}\begin{pmatrix}0\\1\end{pmatrix}(0,1)=\frac{1}{2}\begin{pmatrix}1&0\\0&1\end{pmatrix}=\frac{1}{2}I_2$$

Surprisingly, many other mixed states have density matrix that is the same as that of the maximally mixed state.

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A probability distribution $\{(p_i, |\phi_i\rangle)\}_{i=1}^k$ on pure states is called a mixed state to which it is assigned a density operator

$$\rho = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i |\phi\rangle \langle \phi_i|.$$

One interpretation of a mixed state $\{(p_i, |\phi_i\rangle)\}_{i=1}^k$ is that a source X produces the state $|\phi_i\rangle$ with probability p_i .

Any matrix representing a density operator is called density matrix.

Density matrices are exactly Hermitian, positive matrices with trace 1.

To two different mixed states can correspond the same density matrix.

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Two mixes states with the same density matrix are physically undistinguishable.

QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

CLASSICAL ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem

plaintext an n-bit string p shared key an n-bit string k cryptotext an n-bit string c encoding $c = p \oplus k$ decoding $p = c \oplus k$

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QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem

plaintext: an n-qubit string $|p\rangle = |p_1\rangle \dots |p_n\rangle$ shared key: two n-bit strings k,k' cryptotext: an n-qubit string $|c\rangle = |c_1\rangle \dots |c_n\rangle$ encoding: $|c_i\rangle = \sigma_x^{k_i} \sigma_z^{k'_i} |p_i\rangle$ decoding: $|\mathbf{p}_i\rangle = \sigma_z^{k'_i} \sigma_x^{k_i} |\mathbf{c}_i\rangle$

where $|p_i\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} a_i \\ b_i \end{pmatrix}$ and $|c_i\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} d_i \\ e_i \end{pmatrix}$ are qubits and $\sigma_x = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$ with $\sigma_z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$ are Pauli matrices.

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UNCONDITIONAL SECURITY of QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD	SHANNON's THEOREMS
In the case of encryption of a qubit $\begin{split} \phi\rangle &= \alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle \\ \text{by QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem, what is being transmitted} \\ \text{is the mixed state} \\ & \left(\frac{1}{4}, \phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{\mathrm{x}} \phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{\mathrm{z}} \phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{\mathrm{x}} \sigma_{\mathrm{z}} \phi\rangle\right) \\ \text{whose density matrix is} \\ & \frac{1}{2}h_2 \\ \text{This density matrix is identical to the density matrix corresponding to that} \\ & \left(\frac{1}{2}, 0\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{2}, 1\rangle\right) \end{split}$	Shannon classical encryption theorem says that n bits are necessary and sufficient to encrypt securely n bits. Quantum version of Shannon encryption theorem says that 2n classical bits are necessary and sufficient to encrypt securely n qubits.
IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 33/76 COMPOSED QUANTUM SYSTEMS (1)	IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 34/76 COMPOSED QUANTUM SYSTEMS II
Tensor product of vectors $(x_{1},, x_{n}) \otimes (y_{1},, y_{m}) = (x_{1}y_{1},, x_{1}y_{m}, x_{2}y_{1},, x_{2}y_{m},, x_{2}y_{m},, x_{n}y_{1},, x_{n}y_{m})$ Tensor product of matrices $A \otimes B = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11}B & & a_{1n}B \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{n1}B & & a_{nn}B \end{pmatrix}$ where $A = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & & a_{1n} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{n1} & & a_{nn} \end{pmatrix}$ Example $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} & 0 & 0 \\ a_{21} & a_{22} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & a_{11} & a_{12} \\ 0 & 0 & a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & 0 & a_{12} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{11} & 0 & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & 0 & a_{22} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{21} & 0 & a_{22} \end{pmatrix}$	Tensor product of Hilbert spaces $H_1 \otimes H_2$ is the complex vector space spanned by tensor products of vectors from H_1 and H_2 . That corresponds to the quantum system composed of the quantum systems corresponding to Hilbert spaces H_1 and H_2 . An important difference between classical and quantum systems A state of a compound classical (quantum) system can be (cannot be) always composed from the states of the subsystem.
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QUANTUM REGISTERS

A general state of a 2-qubit register is:

 $|\phi\rangle = \alpha_{00}|00\rangle + \alpha_{01}|01\rangle + \alpha_{10}|10\rangle + \alpha_{11}|11\rangle$

where

 $|\alpha_{00}|^2 + |\alpha_{01}|^2 + |\alpha_{10}|^2 + |\alpha_{11}|^2 = 1$

and $|00\rangle, |01\rangle, |10\rangle, |11\rangle$ are vectors of the "standard" basis of $H_4,$ i.e.

$$|00
angle = egin{pmatrix} 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \end{pmatrix} |01
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \end{pmatrix} |10
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \end{pmatrix} |11
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

An important unitary matrix of degree 4, to transform states of 2-qubit registers:

$$CNOT = XOR = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

It holds:

CNOT :
$$|x, y\rangle \Rightarrow |x, x \oplus y\rangle$$

BELL STATES

States

$$egin{aligned} |\Phi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle+|11
angle), & |\Phi^-
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle-|11
angle) \ |\Psi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle+|10
angle), & |\Psi^-
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle-|10
angle) \end{aligned}$$

form an orthogonal (so called Bell) basis in H_4 and play an important role in quantum computing.

Theoretically, there is an observable for this basis. However, no one has been able to construct a device for Bell measurement using linear elements only.

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NO-CLONING THEOREM

INFORMAL VERSION: Unknown quantum state cannot be cloned.

FORMAL VERSION: There is no unitary transformation U such that for any qubit state $|\psi\rangle$

$$U(|\psi
angle|0
angle)=|\psi
angle|\psi
angle$$

PROOF: Assume U exists and for two different states $|\alpha\rangle$ and $|\beta\rangle$

$$U(|lpha
angle|0
angle) = |lpha
angle \qquad U(|eta
angle|0
angle) = |eta
angle|eta
angle$$

Let

$$|\gamma
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|lpha
angle + |eta
angle)$$

Then

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$$U(|\gamma\rangle|0\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\alpha\rangle|\alpha\rangle + |\beta\rangle|\beta\rangle) \neq |\gamma\rangle|\gamma\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\alpha\rangle|\alpha\rangle + |\beta\rangle|\beta\rangle + |\alpha\rangle|\beta\rangle + |\beta\rangle|\alpha\rangle)$$

However, CNOT can make copies of the basis states $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$: Indeed, for $x \in \{0, 1\}$,

 $CNOT(|x\rangle|0\rangle) = |x\rangle|x\rangle$

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QUANTUM n-qubit REGISTERS

A general state of an n-qubit register has the form:

$$|\phi
angle = \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} lpha_i |i
angle = \sum_{i\in\{0,1\}^n} lpha_i |i
angle$$
, where $\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |lpha_i|^2 = 1$

and $|\phi\rangle$ is a vector in H_{2^n} .

Operators on n-qubits registers are unitary matrices of degree 2^n .

Is it difficult to create a state of an n-qubit register?

In general yes, in some important special cases not. For example, if n-qubit Hadamard transformation

$$H_n = \otimes_{i=1}^n H.$$

is used then

$$H_n |0^{(n)}\rangle = \otimes_{i=1}^n H |0\rangle = \otimes_{i=1}^n |0'\rangle = |0'^{(n)}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |i\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} |x\rangle$$

and, in general, for $x \in \{0,1\}^n$

$$H_n |x
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x\in\{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{x\cdot y} |y
angle. \ ^1$$

¹The dot product is defined as follows: $x \cdot y = \bigotimes_{i=1}^{n} x_i y_i$. IV054 1. Quantum cryptography

QUANTUM PARALLELISM

IN WHAT LIES POWER OF QUANTUM COMPUTING?

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$$f:\{0,1,\ldots,2^n-1\}\Rightarrow\{0,1,\ldots,2^n-1\}$$

then the mapping

 $f':(x,0)\Rightarrow(x,f(x))$

is one-to-one and therefore there is a unitary transformation U_f such that.

$$U_f(|x\rangle|0\rangle) \Rightarrow |x\rangle|f(x)\rangle$$

Let us now have the state

$$|\Psi
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}|i
angle|0
angle$$

With a single application of the mapping U_f we then get

$$U_f |\Psi
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} U_f (|i
angle |0
angle) = rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |i
angle |f(i)$$

OBSERVE THAT IN A SINGLE COMPUTATIONAL STEP 2" VALUES OF f ARE COMPUTED!

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In quantum superposition or in quantum parallelism?

NOT, in QUANTUM ENTANGLEMENT!

Let
$$|\psi
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle + |11
angle)$$

be a state of two very distant particles, **for example** on two planets Measurement of one of the particles, with respect to the standard basis, makes the above state to collapse to one of the states

$$|00
angle$$
 or $|11
angle.$

This means that subsequent measurement of other particle (on another planet) provides the same result as the measurement of the first particle. This indicate that in quantum world non-local influences, correlations, exist.

IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 41/76 IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 42/76 **POWER of ENTANGLEMENT CLASSICAL** versus QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY Security of classical cryptography is based on unproven assumptions of Quantum state $|\Psi\rangle$ of a composed bipartite quantum system $A \otimes B$ is computational complexity (and it can be jeopardize by progress in called entangled if it cannot be decomposed into tensor product of the algorithms and/or technology). states from A and B. Security of quantum cryptography is based on laws of quantum physics Quantum entanglement is an important quantum resource that allows that allow to build systems where undetectable eavesdropping is To create phenomena that are impossible in the classical world (for impossible. example teleportation) Since classical cryptography is vulnerable to technological To create quantum algorithms that are asymptotically more efficient improvements it has to be designed in such a way that a secret is than any classical algorithm known for the same problem. secure with respect to **future technology**, during the whole period in To create communication protocols that are asymptotically more which the secrecy is required. efficient than classical communication protocols for the same task Quantum key generation, on the other hand, needs to be designed only ■ To create, for two parties, shared secret binary keys to be secure against technology available at the moment of key To increase capacity of quantum channels generation.

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QUANTUM KEY GENERATION

QUANTUM KEY GENERATION – EPR METHOD

Quantum protocols for using quantum systems to achieve unconditionally secure generation of secret (classical) keys by two parties are one of the main theoretical achievements of quantum information processing and communication research.

Moreover, experimental systems for implementing such protocols are one of the main achievements of experimental quantum information processing research.

It is believed and hoped that it will be

quantum key generation (QKG)

another term is


quantum key distribution (QKD)

where one can expect the first

transfer from the experimental to the application stage.

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Let Alice and Bob share n pairs of particles in the entangled EPR-state.



n pairs of particles in EPR state

If both of them measure their particles in the standard basis, then they get, as the classical outcome of their measurements the same random, shared and secret binary key of length n.

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POLARIZATION of PHOTONS	LINEAR POLARIZATION - visualization
	You can think of light as traveling in waves. One way to visualize these waves is to imagine taking a long rope and tying one end in a fixed place and to move the free end in some way.
Polarized photons are currently mainly used for experimental quantum key generation.	Moving the free end of the rope up and down sets up a "wave" along the rope which also moves up and down. If you think of he rope as as representing a beam of light, the light would be a "vertically polarized".
Photon, or light quantum, is a particle composing light and other forms of electromagnetic radiation.	If the free end of the rope is moved from side to side a wave that moves from from side to side is set up. If this way moves a light beam, it is called "horizontally polarized".
Photons are electromagnetic waves and their electric and magnetic fields are perpendicular to the direction of propagation and also to each other.	y A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
An important property of photons is polarization – it refers to the bias of the electric field in the electromagnetic field of the photon.	Z Z

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Figure: Linearly polarized photons - visualization Both vertical and horizontal polarizations are examples of " linear polarizations". IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 4

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CIRCULAR POLARIZATION

POLARIZATION of PHOTONS III

If the free end of the rope is moved around in a circle, then we would get a wave that looks like a corkscrew. This would visualize circular polarization"	Generation of orthogonally polarized photons. $\begin{array}{c} & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & $
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QUANTUM GENERATION of CLASSICAL KEYS – PROLOGUE	BB84 QUANTUM GENERATION of CLASSICAL RANDOM KEY
 Very basic setting Alice tries to send a quantum system to Bob and an eavesdropper tries to learn, or to change, as much as possible, without being detected. Eavesdroppers have this time especially hard time, because quantum states cannot be copied and cannot be measured without causing, in general, a disturbance. Key problem: If Alice prepares a quantum system in a specific way, unknown fully to the eavesdropper Eve, and sends it to Bob 	Quantum key generation protocol BB84 (due to Bennett and Brassard), for generation of a key of length n, has several phases: Preparation phase Alice is assumed to have four transmitters of photons in one of the following four polarizations 0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees
then the question is how much information can Eve extract of that quantum system and how much it costs in terms of the disturbance of the system. Three special cases Eve has no information about the state $ \psi\rangle$ Alice sends. Eve knows that $ \psi\rangle$ is one of the states of an orthonormal basis $\{ \phi_i\rangle\}_{i=1}^n$.	$ 1' >= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (0 > - 1 >)$ (a) Figure 8: Polarizations of photons for BB84 and B92 protocols Expressed in a more general form, Alice uses for encoding states from the set
Eve knows that $ \psi\rangle$ is one of the states of an orthonormal basis $\{ \psi_i\rangle\}_{i=1}^{i=1}$. Solution Eve knows that $ \psi\rangle$ is one of the states $ \phi_1\rangle, \dots, \phi_n\rangle$ that are not mutually orthonormal and that p_i is the probability that $ \psi\rangle = \phi_i\rangle$.	Expressed in a more general form, Ance uses for encoding states from the set $\{ 0\rangle, 1\rangle, 0'\rangle, 1'\rangle\}$. Bob has a detector that can be set up to distinguish between rectilinear polarizations (0 and 90 degrees) or can be quickly reset to distinguish between diagonal polarizations (45 and 135 degrees).

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BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL III	BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL III
An example of an encoding – decoding process is in the Figure 10. Raw key extraction Bob makes public the sequence of bases he used to measure the photons he received – but not the results of the measurements – and Alice tells Bob, through a classical channel, in which cases he has chosen the same basis for measurement as she did for encoding. The corresponding bits then form the basic raw key. $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Test for eavesdroppingAlice and Bob agree on a sequence of indices of the raw key and make the corresponding bits of their raw keys public.Case 1. Noiseless channel. If the subsequences chosen by Alice and Bob are not completely identical eavesdropping is detected. Otherwise, the remaining bits are taken as creating the final key.Case 2. Noisy channel. If the subsequences chosen by Alice and Bob contains more errors than the admitable error of the channel (that has to be determined from channel characteristics), then eavesdropping is assumed. Otherwise, the remaining bits are taken as the next result of the raw key generation process.Error correction phaseIn the case of a noisy channel for transmission it may happen that Alice and Bob have different raw keys after the key generation phase.A way out is to use a special error correction techniques and at the end of this stage both Alice and Bob share identical keys.
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BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL IV	EXPERIMENTAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL IV Privacy amplification phase One problem remains. Eve can still have quite a bit of information about the key both Alice and Bob share. Privacy amplification is a tool to deal with such a case. Privacy amplification is a method how to select a short and very secret binary string s from a longer but less secret string s'. The main idea is simple. If $ s = n$, then one picks up n random subsets S_1, \ldots, S_n of bits of s' and let s_i , the i-th bit of S, be the parity of S_i . One way to do it is to take a random binary matrix of size $ s \times s' $ and to perform multiplication Ms'^T , where s'^T is the binary column vector corresponding to s'. The point is that even in the case where an eavesdropper knows quite a few bits of s', she will have almost no information about s. More exactly, if Eve knows parity bits of k subsets of s', then if a random subset of bits of s' is chosen, then the probability that Eve has any information about its parity bit is less than $\frac{2^{-(n-k-1)}}{\ln 2}$.	EXPERIMENTAL CRYPTOGRAPHY Successes Transmissions using optical fibers to the distance of 200 km. Open air transmissions to the distance 144 km at day time (from one pick of Canary Islands to another in 2014). Next goal: earth to satellite transmissions was met in 2019. All current systems use optical means for quantum state transmissions Problems and tasks No single photon sources are available. Weak laser pulses currently used contains in average 0.1 - 0.2 photons. Loss of signals in the fiber. (Current error rates: 0,5 - 4%) To move from the experimental to the developmental stage.

QUANTUM TELEPORTATION - BASIC SETTING

QUANTUM TELEPORTATION - BASIC SETTING I

2 classical bits Quantum teleportation allows to transmit unknown quantum information to a very Alice Bob gets destroyed distant place in spite of impossibility to measure or to broadcast information to be by measurement unitary transformation measurement transmitted. EPR channel $|\Psi>$ Alice and Bob share two particles in the EPR-state $|EPR_{pair}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$ unidentified EPR-pair quantum state $|\textit{EPR}-\textit{pair}
angle=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle+|11
angle)$ $|\psi
angle = lpha |0
angle + eta |1
angle$ and then Alice receives another particle in an unknown qubit state $\begin{array}{c} \text{Total state} \\ |\psi\rangle|\textit{EPR}-\textit{pair}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|000\rangle + \alpha|011\rangle + \beta|100\rangle + \beta|111\rangle) \end{array}$ $|\psi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$ Alice then measure her two particles in the Bell basis. Alice measures her two qubits with respect to the "Bell basis": $egin{aligned} |\Phi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle+|11
angle) & |\Phi^angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle-|11
angle) \ |\Psi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle+|10
angle) & |\Psi^angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle-|10
angle) \end{aligned}$ IV054 1. Quantum cryptograph 57/76 IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 58/76 **QUANTUM TELEPORTATION III. QUANTUM TELEPORTATION II** Since the total state of all three particles is: If the first two particles of the state $|\psi\rangle|EPR - pair\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|000\rangle + \alpha|011\rangle + \beta|100\rangle + \beta|111\rangle)$ $|\psi\rangle|$ EPR - pair $\rangle = |\Phi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) + |\Psi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\beta|0\rangle + \alpha|1\rangle) + |\Phi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|0\rangle - \beta|1\rangle) + |\Phi^-\rangle +$ and can be expressed also as follows: $\beta |1\rangle + |\Psi^{-}\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (-\beta |0\rangle + \alpha |1\rangle)$ $|\psi\rangle|EPR-pair
angle=|\Phi^{+}
anglerac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(lpha|0
angle+eta|1
angle)+|\Psi^{+}
anglerac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(eta|0
angle+lpha|1
angle)+|\Phi^{-}
anglerac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(lpha|0
angle$ are measured with respect to the Bell basis then Bob's particle gets into the mixed state $\beta |1\rangle + |\Psi^{-}\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (-\beta |0\rangle + \alpha |1\rangle)$

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then the Bell measurement of the first two particles projects the state of Bob's particle into a "small modification" $|\psi_1\rangle$ of the state $|\psi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$,

$$|\Psi_1
angle=$$
 either $|\Psi
angle$ or $\sigma_x|\Psi
angle$ or $\sigma_z|\Psi
angle$ or $\sigma_x\sigma_z|\psi
angle$

The unknown state $|\psi\rangle$ can therefore be obtained from $|\psi_1\rangle$ by applying one of the four operations

 $\sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_z, I$

and the result of the Bell measurement provides two bits specifying which of the above four operations should be applied.

These four bits Alice needs to send to Bob using a classical channel (by email, for example).

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$$\left(\frac{1}{4},\alpha|\mathbf{0}\rangle+\beta|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\alpha|\mathbf{0}\rangle-\beta|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\beta|\mathbf{0}\rangle+\alpha|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\beta|\mathbf{0}\rangle-\alpha|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)$$

to which corresponds the density matrix

$$\frac{1}{4}\binom{\alpha^*}{\beta^*}(\alpha,\beta) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\alpha^*}{-\beta^*}(\alpha,-\beta) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\beta^*}{\alpha^*}(\beta,\alpha) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\beta^*}{-\alpha^*}(\beta,-\alpha) = \frac{1}{2}I$$

The resulting density matrix is identical to the density matrix for the mixed state

 $\left(\frac{1}{2}, |0
ight) \oplus \left(\frac{1}{2}, |1
ight)$

Indeed, the density matrix for the last mixed state has the form

$$rac{1}{2}inom{1}{0}(1,0)+rac{1}{2}inom{0}{1}(0,1)=rac{1}{2}I$$

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QUANTUM TELEPORTATION – COMMENTS	
 Alice can be seen as dividing information contained in ψ⟩ into quantum information - transmitted through EPR channel classical information - transmitted through a classical channel In a quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state φ⟩ can be disassembled into, and later reconstructed from, two classical bit-states and an maximally entangled pure quantum state. Using quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state can be teleported from one place to another by a sender who does need to know - for teleportation itself - neither the state to be teleported nor the location of the intended receiver. The teleportation procedure can not be used to transmit information faster than light but it can be argued that quantum information presented in unknown state is transmitted instantaneously (except two random bits to be transmitted at the speed of light at most). EPR channel is irreversibly destroyed during the teleportation process. 	
	IV054 1. Quantum cryntogranhy 62/76
IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 61/76	IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 62/76 UNIVERSAL SETS of QUANTUM GATES
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 QIPC has been shown to be more efficient in interesting/important cases.

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FUNDAMENTAL RESULTS

DESIGN of QUANTUM PROCESSORS

The first really satisfactory results, concerning universality of gates, have been due to Barenco et al. (1995)

Theorem 0.1 CNOT gate and all one-qubit gates form a universal set of gates.

The proof is in principle a simple modification of the RQ-decomposition from linear algebra. Theorem 0.1 can be easily improved:

Theorem 0.2 CNOT gate and elementary rotation gates

$$R_{\alpha}(heta) = \cos rac{ heta}{2}I - i\sin rac{ heta}{2}\sigma_{lpha}$$
 for $lpha \in \{x, y, z\}$

form a universal set of gates.

- For years attempts to implement a quantum processor ended at 8 tor 10 qubits processors.
- Cnadian company D-WAVE? ofered in 2007 a 16-qubist processor, later, step by step, a 28-qubits, then 128-qubits later 128-qubits ubits and finally a 512- qubit processor. In 2008? they offered 1024-qubits processor and in 2018 2048 qubits processors. They also claimed superiority of their processors for solving optimization problem in comparison wit current classical processorss. However, there was a lot of acontroversy how much are their processors fully quantum. e
- In 2016 IBM INTEL announced a 49-qubits processor, in 2018 IBM 53-qubits processors and in 2019 GOOOLE a 72-qubits processors. All of them had to be supperior with respect to classical supercomputers in solving a variety of optimization problems. In 100-authors paper from Google they claimeed the existence of 53 qubit processor (with qubits arrenged in a net where each qubit was coonected with 4 neibour. They claim to be compatible with current supercomputers for solving a variety of optimization problems.

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QUANTUM ALGORITHMS		EXAMPLES of QUANTUM ALGORITHMS	
 Quantum algorithms are methods of using quantum circuits to solve algorithmic problems. On a more technical level, a design of a quantum algorithm a process of an efficient decomposition of a complex unitary into products of elementary unitary operations (or gates), persimple local changes. The four main features of quantum mechanics that are explored quantum computation: Superposition; Interference; Entanglement; Measurement. 	can be seen as transformation erforming bited in	Deutsch problem: Given is a black-box function f: $\{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, how n needed to find out whether f is constant or balanced: Classically: 2 Quantumly: 1 Deutsch-Jozsa Problem: Given is a black-box function $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ that f is either constant or balanced, how many queries are needed to find is constant or balanced. Classically: n Quantumly 1 Factorization of integers: all classical algorithms are exponential. Peter Shor developed polynomial time quantum algorithm Search of an element in an unordered database of n elements: Classically n queries are needed in the worst case Lov Grover showed that quantumly \sqrt{n} queries are enough	} and a promise
IV054 1. Quantum cryptography	66/76	IV054 1. Quantum cryptography	67/76

FACTORIZATION on QUANTUM COMPUTERS	REDUCTIONS
In the following we present the basic idea behind a polynomial time algorithm for quantum computers to factorize integers. Quantum computers works with superpositions of basic quantum states on which very special (unitary) operations are applied and and very special quantum features (non-locality) are used. Quantum computers work not with bits, that can take on any of two values 0 and 1, but with qubits (quantum bits) that can take on any of infinitely many states $\alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle$, where α and β are complex numbers such that $ \alpha ^2 + \beta ^2 = 1$.	 Shor's polynomial time quantum factorization algorithm is based on an understanding that factorization problem can be reduced ■ first on the problem of solving a simple modular quadratic equation; ■ second on the problem of finding periods of functions f(x) = a^x mod n.
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FIRST REDUCTION	SECOND REDUCTION
FIRST REDUCTION Lemma If there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to find a nontrivial solution of the modular quadratic equations $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, then there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to factorize integers. Proof. Let $a \neq \pm 1$ be such that $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Since $a^2 - 1 = (a+1)(a-1)$, if <i>n</i> is not prime, then a prime factor of <i>n</i> has to be a prime factor of either $a + 1$ or $a - 1$. By using Euclid's algorithm to compute $gcd(a+1, n)$ and $gcd(a-1, n)$	SECOND REDUCTION The second key concept is that of the period of functions $f_{n,x}(k) = x^k \mod n.$ Period is the smallest integer r such that $f_{n,x}(k+r) = f_{n,x}(k)$ for any k , i.e. the smallest r such that $x^r \equiv 1 \pmod{n}.$ AN ALGORITHM TO SOLVE EQUATION $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}.$ Choose randomly $1 < a < n.$ Choose randomly $1 < $

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
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EXAMPLE	EFFICIENCY of REDUCTION
Let $n = 15$. Select $a < 15$ such that $gcd(a, 15) = 1$. {The set of such a is {2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14}} Choose $a = 11$. Values of 11^{x} mod 15 are then 11, 1, 11, 1, 11, 1 which gives $r = 2$.	Lemma If $1 < a < n$ satisfying $gcd(n, a) = 1$ is selected in the above algorithm randomly and n is not a power of prime, then $Pr\{r \text{ is even and } a^{r/2} \not\equiv \pm 1\} \ge \frac{9}{16}.$
Hence $a^{r/2} = 11 \pmod{15}$. Therefore gcd(15, 12) = 3, $gcd(15, 10) = 5For a = 14 we get again r = 2, but in this case$	 Choose randomly 1 < a < n. Compute gcd(a, n). If gcd(a, n) ≠ 1 we have a factor. Find period r of function a^k mod n. If r is odd or a^{r/2} ≡ ±1 (mod n),then go to step 1; otherwise stop.
$14^{2/2} \equiv -1 \pmod{15}$ and the following algorithm fails. Choose randomly $1 < a < n$. Compute $gcd(a, n)$. If $gcd(a, n) \neq 1$ we have a factor. Find period r of function $a^k \mod n$. If r is odd or $a^{r/2} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$, then go to step 1; otherwise stop.	Corollary If there is a polynomial time randomized [quantum] algorithm to compute the period of the function $f_{n,a}(k) = a^k \mod n,$ then there is a polynomial time randomized [quantum] algorithm to find non-trivial solution of the equation $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ (and therefore also to factorize integers).
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A GENERAL SCHEME for Shor's ALGORITHM

The following flow diagram shows the general scheme of Shor's quantum factorization algorithm



SHOR'S QUANTUM FACTORIZATION ALGORITHM I.

I For given $n, q = 2^d, a$ create states

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{\mathbf{x}=\mathbf{0}}^{q-1}|\mathbf{\textit{n}},\mathbf{\textit{a}},\mathbf{q},\mathbf{x},\mathbf{0}\rangle \text{ and } \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{\mathbf{x}=\mathbf{0}}^{q-1}|\mathbf{\textit{n}},\mathbf{\textit{a}},\mathbf{q},\mathbf{x},\mathbf{\textit{a}}^{\mathbf{x}} \bmod \mathbf{\textit{n}}\rangle$$

2 By measuring the last register the state collapses into the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}}\sum_{j=0}^{A}|n,a,q,jr+l,y\rangle \text{ or, shortly } \frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}}\sum_{j=0}^{A}|jr+l\rangle,$$

where A is the largest integer such that $l + Ar \le q$, r is the period of $a^x \mod n$ and l is the offset.

$$\sqrt{rac{r}{q}}\sum_{j=0}^{rac{r}{r}-1}|jr+l
angle$$

B By applying quantum Fourier transformation we get then the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{r}}\sum_{j=0}^{r-1}e^{2\pi i l j/r}|j\frac{q}{r}\rangle.$$

By measuring the resulting state we get $c = \frac{jq}{r}$ and if gcd(j, r) = 1, what is very likely, then from c and q we can determine the period r.

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SHOR'S QUANTUM FACTORIZATION ALGORITHM II.

Indeed, since

$$c = \frac{jq}{r}$$

for randomly chosen j and still unknown period r and very likely gcd(j, r) = 1 we have

$$\frac{c}{j} = \frac{q}{r}$$

and therefore

$$r = \frac{q}{\gcd(c,q)}$$

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