CODING, CRYPTOGRAPHY and CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS prof. RNDr. Jozef Gruska, DrSc. Faculty of Informatics Masaryk University December 7, 2016	Part I Quantum cryptography
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY	MAIN OUTCOMES – so far
A new and important feature of quantum cryptography is that security of quantum cryptographic protocols is based on the laws of nature – of quantum physics, and not on the unproven assumptions of computational complexity. Quantum cryptography is the first area of information processing and communication in which quantum physics laws are directly exploited to bring an essential advantage in information processing.	 It has been shown that would we have quantum computer, we could design absolutely secure quantum generation of shared and secret random classical keys. It has been proven that even without quantum computers unconditionally secure quantum generation of classical secret and shared keys is possible (in the sense that any eavesdropping is detectable). Unconditionally secure basic quantum cryptographic primitives, such as bit commitment and oblivious transfer, are impossible. Quantum zero-knowledge proofs exist for all NP-complete languages Quantum teleportation and pseudo-telepathy are possible. Quantum cryptography and quantum networks are already in the developmental stages.

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
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
BASICS of QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING	BASIC MOTIVATION
As an introduction to quantum cryptography the very basic motivations, experiments, principles, concepts and results of quantum information processing and communication will be presented in the next few slides.	In quantum information processing we witness an interaction between the two most important areas of science and technology of 20-th century, between quantum physics and informatics. This is very likely to have important consequences for 21th century.
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QUANTUM PHYSICS	FEYNMAN's VIEW
Quantum physics deals with fundamental entities of physics – particles (waves?) like	I am going to tell you what Nature behaves like
 protons, electrons and neutrons (from which matter is built); photons (which carry electromagnetic radiation) various "elementary particles" which mediate other interactions in physics. We call them particles in spite of the fact that some of their properties are totally unlike the properties of what we call particles in our ordinary classical world. For example, a quantum particle " can go through two places at the same time" and can interact with itself. Quantum physics is full of counter-intuitive, weird, mysterious and even paradoxical events. 	However, do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly avoid it, BUT HOW CAN IT BE LIKE THAT? Because you will get "down the drain" into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped NOBODY KNOWS HOW IT CAN BE LIKE THAT Richard Feynman (1965): The character of physical law.

 Main properties of classical information: It is easy to store, transmit and process classical information in time and space. It is easy to make (unlimited number of) copies of classical information One can measure classical information without disturbing it. Main properties of quantum information: It is difficult to store, transmit and process quantum information There is no way to copy perfectly unknown quantum information Measurement of quantum information destroys it, in general. 	$\begin{array}{l} \label{eq:transformation} \mbox{The essence of the difference between} \\ \mbox{classical computers and quantum computers} \\ \mbox{is in the way information is stored and processed.} \end{array}$
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An n bit classical register can store at any moment exactly one n-bit string. An n-qubit quantum register can store at any moment a superposition of all 2" n-bit strings. Consequently, on a quantum computer one can "compute' in a single step all 2" values of a function defined on n-bit inputs. This enormous massive parallelism is one reason why quantum computing to be so powerful.	pr. Jozef Trusa 100 1 Junuary 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

CLASSICAL versus QUANTUM INFORMATION

CLASSICAL versus QUANTUM COMPUTING





then the resulting amplitude is the sum of amplitudes of two subtransfers.

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BRA-KET NOTATION

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EXAMPLES

Dirac introduced a very handy notation, so called bra-ket notation, to deal
with amplitudes, quantum states and linear functionals $f:H ightarrow C$.

If $\psi, \phi \in H$, then

 $\langle \psi | \phi \rangle$ – scalar product of ψ and ϕ (an amplitude of going from ϕ to ψ).

 $|\phi
angle$ – ket-vector (a column vector) - an equivalent to ϕ

 $\langle \psi |$ – bra-vector (a row vector) a linear functional on H

such that $\langle \psi | (|\phi \rangle) = \langle \psi | \phi
angle$

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Example For states $\phi = (\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n)$ and $\psi = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n)$ we have

$$\phi \rangle = \begin{pmatrix} \phi_1 \\ \cdots \\ \phi_n \end{pmatrix}, \langle \phi | = (\phi_1^*, \dots, \phi_n^*); \langle \phi | \psi \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n \phi_i^* \psi_i;$$
$$|\phi\rangle \langle \psi | = \begin{pmatrix} \phi_1 \psi_1^* & \cdots & \phi_1 \psi_n^* \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \phi_n \psi_1^* & \cdots & \phi_n \psi_n^* \end{pmatrix}$$

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QUANTUM EVOLU	JTION / COMPUTATION			ICES	
QUAN where \hbar is Planck constant be represented by a Herm If the Hamiltonian is time where	VOLUTION inCOMPUTATION inininNTUM SYSTEMHILBERT SPACEis described bySchrödinger linear equation $ih \frac{\partial \Phi(t)\rangle}{\partial t} = H(t) \Phi(t)\rangle$ nt, H(t) is a Hamiltonian (total energy) of itian matrix, and $\Phi(t)$ is the state of the second pendent then the above Shrödinger equivalent independent then the above Shrödinger equivalent $ \Phi(t)\rangle = U(t) \Phi(0)\rangle$ $U(t) = e^{\frac{iHt}{\hbar}}$ that can be represented by a unitary matrix a multiplication of a "unitary matrix" of	ystem in time t. quation has solution ix. A step of such	by revolving	s unitary if $A \cdot A^{\dagger} = A^{\dagger} \cdot A = I$ atrix A^{\dagger} is obtained from t A around the main diagon elements by their complex	al and

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QUANTUM (PROJECTION) MEASUREMENTS

A quantum state is always observed (measured) with respect to an observable O - a decomposition of a given Hilbert space into orthogonal subspaces (where each vector can be uniquely represented as a sum of vectors of these subspaces).



QUANTUM STATES and PROJECTION MEASUREMENT

In case an orthonormal basis $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$ is chosen in a Hilbert space H_n , then any state $|\phi\rangle \in H_n$ can be expressed in the form

$$|\phi
angle = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i |eta_i
angle, \qquad \sum_{i=1}^n |a_i|^2 = 1$$

where

$$m{a}_i = \langle eta_i | \phi
angle$$
 are called probability amplitudes

and

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HILBERT SPACE H₂

their squares provide probabilities

that if the state $|\phi\rangle$ is measured with respect to the basis $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$, then the state $|\phi\rangle$ collapses into the state $|\beta_i\rangle$ with probability $|a_i|^2$.

The classical "outcome" of the measurement of the state $|\phi\rangle$ with respect to the basis $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$ is the index i of that state $|\beta_i\rangle$ into which the state $|\phi\rangle$ collapses.

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There are two outcomes of a projection measurement of a state $|\phi\rangle$ with respect to O: I Into classical world comes information into which subspace projection of $|\phi\rangle$ was made.

2 In the classical world projection of the measured state (as a new state) $|\phi'\rangle$ stays in one of the above subspaces.

The subspace into which projection is made is chosen randomly and the corresponding probability is uniquely determined by the amplitudes at the representation of $|\phi\rangle$ as a sum of states of the subspaces.

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A qubit is a quantum state in H_2

 $|\phi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$ where $\alpha, \beta \in C$ are such that $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$ and

 $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ is a (standard) basis of H_2

EXAMPLE: Representation of qubits by

- (a) electron in a Hydrogen atom
- (b) a spin-1/2 particle

Basis states





Figure 5: Qubit representations by energy levels of an electron in a hydrogen atom and by a spin-1/2 particle. The condition $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$ is a probabilities of being in one of two basis states (of el

legal one if $ \alpha ^2$ and $ \beta ^2$ a	re to be the		
electrons or photons).			
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STANDARD BASIS $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$





Hadamard matrix $H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$

 $egin{array}{l} H|0'
angle = |0
angle \ H|1'
angle = |1
angle \end{array}$ $|H|0\rangle = |0'\rangle$ H|1
angle = |1'
angle

transforms one of the basis into another one.

General form of a unitary matrix of degree 2

$$U = e^{i\gamma} \begin{pmatrix} e^{i\alpha} & 0 \\ 0 & e^{-i\alpha} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \cos\theta & i\sin\theta \\ i\sin\theta & \cos\theta \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} e^{i\beta} & 0 \\ 0 & e^{-i\beta} \end{pmatrix}$$

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Basis states

PAULI MATRICES

QUANTUM MEASUREMENT of QUBITS

of a qubit state

Very important one-qubit unary operators are the following Pauli operators, expressed in the standard basis as follows:

$$\sigma_x = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \sigma_y = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \sigma_z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Observe that Pauli matrices transform a qubit state $|\phi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$ as follows

Operators σ_x, σ_z and σ_y represent therefore a bit error, a sign error and a bit-sign error.


A qubit state can "contain" unboundly large amount of classical information. However, an unknown quantum state cannot be identified. By a measurement of the qubit state

 $\alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$

with respect to the basis

 $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$

we can obtain only classical information and only in the following random way:



Two mixes states with the same density matrix are physically undistinguishable.

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QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

CLASSICAL ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem

QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem

plaintext: an n-qubit string $|p\rangle = |p_1\rangle \dots |p_n\rangle$

cryptotext: an n-qubit string $|c\rangle = |c_1\rangle \dots |c_n\rangle$

shared key: two n-bit strings k,k'

SHANNON's THEOREMS

encoding: $|c_i\rangle = \sigma_x^{k_i} \sigma_z^{k'_i} |p_i\rangle$

decoding: $|p_i\rangle = \sigma_z^{k'_i} \sigma_x^{k_i} |c_i\rangle$

are Pauli matrices.

plaintext an n-bit string p shared key an n-bit string k cryptotext an n-bit string c

encoding $c = p \oplus k$ decoding $p = c \oplus k$

UNCONDITIONAL SECURITY of QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD

In the case of encryption of a qubit

$$|\phi\rangle = \alpha |\mathbf{0}\rangle + \beta |\mathbf{1}\rangle$$

by **QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem**, what is being transmitted is the mixed state

$$\left(\frac{1}{4}, |\phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{x} |\phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{z} |\phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{x} \sigma_{z} |\phi\rangle\right)$$

whose density matrix is

$$\frac{1}{2}I_2$$

This density matrix is identical to the density matrix corresponding to that of a random bit, that is to the mixed state

 $\left(rac{1}{2},\left|0
ight
angle,\left(rac{1}{2},\left|1
ight
angle
ight)$

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COMPOSED QUANTUM SYSTEMS (1)

Tensor product of vectors

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$$(x_1,\ldots,x_n)\otimes(y_1,\ldots,y_m)=(x_1y_1,\ldots,x_1y_m,x_2y_1,\ldots,x_2y_m,\ldots,x_2y_m,\ldots,x_ny_1,\ldots,x_ny_m)$$

Tensor product of matrices $A \otimes B = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11}B & \dots & a_{1n}B \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ a_{n1}B & \dots & a_{nn}B \end{pmatrix}$ where $A = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & \dots & a_{1n} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ a_{n1} & \dots & a_{nn} \end{pmatrix}$ Example $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} & 0 & 0 \\ a_{21} & a_{22} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & a_{11} & a_{12} \\ 0 & 0 & a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & 0 & a_{12} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{11} & 0 & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & 0 & a_{22} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{21} & 0 & a_{22} \end{pmatrix}$

Shannon classical encryption theorem says that n bits are necessary and sufficient to encrypt securely n bits.

where $|p_i\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} a_i \\ b_i \end{pmatrix}$ and $|c_i\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} d_i \\ e_i \end{pmatrix}$ are qubits and $\sigma_x = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$ with $\sigma_z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$

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Quantum version of Shannon encryption theorem says that 2n classical bits are necessary and sufficient to encrypt securely n qubits.

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COMPOSED QUANTUM SYSTEMS II

to Hilbert spaces H_1 and H_2 .

Tensor product of Hilbert spaces $H_1 \otimes H_2$ is the complex vector space spanned by tensor products of vectors from H_1 and H_2 . That corresponds

An important difference between classical and quantum systems

always composed from the states of the subsystem.

to the quantum system composed of the quantum systems corresponding

A state of a compound classical (quantum) system can be (cannot be)

QUANTUM REGISTERS

A general state of a 2-qubit register is:

$$|\phi\rangle = \alpha_{00}|00\rangle + \alpha_{01}|01\rangle + \alpha_{10}|10\rangle + \alpha_{11}|11\rangle$$

where

$$|\alpha_{00}|^2 + |\alpha_{01}|^2 + |\alpha_{10}|^2 + |\alpha_{11}|^2 = 1$$

and |00
angle, |01
angle, |10
angle, |11
angle are vectors of the "standard" basis of H_4 , i.e.

$$|00
angle = egin{pmatrix} 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ \end{pmatrix} |01
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ \end{pmatrix} |10
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ \end{pmatrix} |11
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ \end{pmatrix} |11
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ \end{pmatrix}$$

An important unitary matrix of degree 4, to transform states of 2-qubit registers:

$$CNOT = XOR = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

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It holds:

	$CNOT: x,y\rangle \Rightarrow x,x\oplus y\rangle$
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NO-CLONING THEOREM	BELL STATES
INFORMAL VERSION: Unknown quantum state cannot be cloned.	
FORMAL VERSION: There is no unitary transformation U such that for any qubit sta $ \psi angle$	States
$U(\psi angle 0 angle)= \psi angle \psi angle$	$egin{aligned} \Phi^+ angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(00 angle+ 11 angle), & \Phi^- angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(00 angle- 11 angle) \ \Psi^+ angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(01 angle+ 10 angle), & \Psi^- angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(01 angle- 10 angle) \end{aligned}$
PROOF: Assume U exists and for two different states $ lpha angle$ and $ eta angle$	$\sqrt{2}$ $\sqrt{2}$ $\sqrt{2}$ 1 $\sqrt{2}$ 1
$U(lpha angle 0 angle) = lpha angle \qquad U(eta angle 0 angle) = eta angle eta angle$	$ \Psi^+ angle=rac{-}{\sqrt{2}}(01 angle+ 10 angle), \hspace{0.5cm} \Psi^- angle=rac{-}{\sqrt{2}}(01 angle- 10 angle)$
Let	form an orthogonal (so called Bell) basis in H_4 and play an important role
$ \gamma angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(lpha angle + eta angle)$	in quantum computing.
Then	Theoretically, there is an observable for this basis. However, no one has
$U(\gamma\rangle 0\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha\rangle \alpha\rangle + \beta\rangle \beta\rangle) \neq \gamma\rangle \gamma\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha\rangle \alpha\rangle + \beta\rangle \beta\rangle + \alpha\rangle \beta\rangle + \beta\rangle \alpha\rangle)$	been able to construct a device for Bell measurement using linear elements only.
However, CNOT can make copies of the basis states $ 0 angle, 1 angle$: Indeed, for $x\in\{0,1\}$,	
$CNOT(x\rangle 0 angle) = x angle x angle$	

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QUANTUM n-qubit REGISTERS

A general state of an n-qubit register has the form:

$$|\phi\rangle = \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} \alpha_i |i\rangle = \sum_{i \in \{0,1\}^n} \alpha_i |i\rangle, \text{ where } \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |\alpha_i|^2 = 1$$

and $|\phi\rangle$ is a vector in H_{2^n} .

Operators on n-qubits registers are unitary matrices of degree 2^n .

Is it difficult to create a state of an n-qubit register?

In general yes, in some important special cases not. For example, if n-qubit Hadamard transformation

 $H_n = \bigotimes_{i=1}^n H.$

is used then

$$H_n|0^{(n)}\rangle = \bigotimes_{i=1}^n H|0\rangle = \bigotimes_{i=1}^n |0'\rangle = |0'^{(n)}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |i\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} |x\rangle$$

and, in general, for $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$

$$|H_n|x
angle=rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{x\in\{0,1\}^n}{(-1)^{x\cdot y}|y
angle}$$

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IN WHAT LIES POWER OF QUANTUM COMPUTING?

lf

$$: \{0, 1, \dots, 2^n - 1\} \Rightarrow \{0, 1, \dots, 2^n - 1\}$$

then the mapping

$$f':(x,0) \Rightarrow (x,f(x))$$

is one-to-one and therefore there is a unitary transformation U_f such that.

$$U_f(|x\rangle|0\rangle) \Rightarrow |x\rangle|f(x)\rangle$$

Let us now have the state

$$|\Psi
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}|i
angle|0
angle$$

With a single application of the mapping U_f we then get

$$|U_f|\Psi
angle=rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}U_f(|i
angle|0
angle)=rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}|i
angle|f(i)
angle$$

OBSERVE THAT IN A SINGLE COMPUTATIONAL STEP 2" VALUES OF f ARE COMPUTED!

¹The dot product is defined as follows: $x \cdot y = \bigotimes_{i=1}^{n} x_i y_i$. prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 1. Quantum cryptography IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 41/77 prof. Jozef Gruska 42/77 **POWER of ENTANGLEMENT** Quantum state $|\Psi\rangle$ of a composed bipartite quantum system $A \otimes B$ is In quantum superposition or in quantum parallelism? called entangled if it cannot be decomposed into tensor product of the NOT. states from A and B. in QUANTUM ENTANGLEMENT! Let Quantum entanglement is an important quantum resource that allows $|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$ To create phenomena that are impossible in the classical world (for example teleportation) be a state of two very distant particles, for example on two planets To create quantum algorithms that are asymptotically more efficient Measurement of one of the particles, with respect to the standard basis, makes the above than any classical algorithm known for the same problem. state to collapse to one of the states ■ To create communication protocols that are asymptotically more $|00\rangle$ or $|11\rangle$. efficient than classical communication protocols for the same task This means that subsequent measurement of other particle (on another planet) provides To create, for two parties, shared secret binary keys the same result as the measurement of the first particle. This indicate that in quantum world non-local influences, correlations, exist. To increase capacity of quantum channels

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CLASSICAL versus QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY	QUANTUM KEY GENERATION
Security of classical cryptography is based on unproven assumptions of computational complexity (and it can be jeopardize by progress in algorithms and/or technology).	Quantum protocols for using quantum systems to achieve unconditionally secure generation of secret (classical) keys by two parties are one of the main theoretical achievements of quantum information processing and communication research.
Security of quantum cryptography is based on laws of quantum physics that allow to build systems where undetectable eavesdropping is impossible.	Moreover, experimental systems for implementing such protocols are one of the main achievements of experimental quantum information processing research.
Since classical cryptography is vulnerable to technological improvements it has to be designed in such a way that a secret is	It is believed and hoped that it will be
secure with respect to future technology, during the whole period in	quantum key generation (QKG)
which the secrecy is required.	another term is
Quantum key generation, on the other hand, needs to be designed only to be secure against technology available at the moment of key	quantum key distribution (QKD)
generation.	where one can expect the first
	transfer from the experimental to the application stage.
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prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 45/77 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION – EPR METHOD	prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 46/77 POLARIZATION of PHOTONS
QUANTUM KEY GENERATION – EPR METHOD Let Alice and Bob share n pairs of particles in the entangled EPR-state.	POLARIZATION of PHOTONS Polarized photons are currently mainly used for experimental quantum key generation. Photon, or light quantum, is a particle composing light and other forms of electromagnetic radiation. Photons are electromagnetic waves and their electric and magnetic fields are

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LINEAR POLARIZATION - visualisation	CIRCULAR POLARIZATION
You can think of light as traveling in waves. One way to visualise these waves is to imagine taking a long rope and tying one end in a fixed place and to move the free end in some way. Moving the free end of the rope up and down sets up a "wave" along the rope which also moves up and down. If you think of he rope as as representing a beam of light, the light would be a "vertically polarized". If the free end of the rope is moved from side to side a wave that moves from from side to side is set up. If this way moves a light beam, it is called "horizontally polarized". $\int_{V} \int_{V} $	If the free end of the rope is moved around in a circle, then we would get a wave that looks like a corkscrew. This would visualise circular polarization"
Both vertical and horizontal polarizations are examples of " linear polarizations" Prof. Jozef Gruska 49/77 49/77	prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 1. Quantum cryptography 50/77
RECTANGULARLY and DIAGONALLY POLARIZED PHOTONS	POLARIZATION of PHOTONS III
If one photon is polarized horizontally and second vertically we speak about rectangularly polarized photons. If one photon is polarized diagonally and second in a perpendicular way, we speak about diagonally polarized photons.	Generation of orthogonally polarized photons. $\begin{array}{c} & & \\ \hline \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\$
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QUANTUM KEY GENERATION – PROLOGUE

BB84 QUANTUM GENERATION of CLASSICAL RANDOM KEY

Very basic setting Alice tries to send a quantum system to Bob and an eavesdropper tries to learn, or to change, as much as possible, without being detected.

Eavesdroppers have this time especially hard time, because quantum states cannot be copied and cannot be measured without causing, in general, a disturbance.

Key problem: If Alice prepares a quantum system in a specific way, unknown fully to the eavesdropper Eve, and sends it to Bob

then the question is how much information can Eve extract of that quantum system and how much it costs in terms of the disturbance of the system.


Three special cases

- \blacksquare Eve has no information about the state $|\psi\rangle$ Alice sends.
- **E** Eve knows that $|\psi\rangle$ is one of the states of an orthonormal basis $\{|\phi_i\rangle\}_{i=1}^n$.
- **B** Eve knows that $|\psi\rangle$ is one of the states $|\phi_1\rangle, \ldots, |\phi_n\rangle$ that **are not** mutually orthonormal and that p_i is the probability that $|\psi\rangle = |\phi_i\rangle$.

Quantum key generation protocol BB84 (due to Bennett and Brassard), for generation of a key of length n, has several phases:

Preparation phase

Alice is assumed to have four transmitters of photons in one of the following four polarizations 0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees



Expressed in a more general form, Alice uses for encoding states from the set $\{|0\rangle,|1\rangle,|0'\rangle,|1'\rangle\}.$

Bob has a detector that can be set up to distinguish between rectilinear polarizations (0 and 90 degrees) or can be quickly reset to distinguish between diagonal polarizations (45 and 135 degrees).

B84 QUANTI	JM KEY	GENERATION	N PROTOCOL	II		BB8	4 QL	JAN ⁻	гим	KE	Y GE	NER	ΑΤΙΟ	ON F	RO	госо	DL III
orthogonal polarization a more formal setting $\{ 0\rangle, 1\rangle\}$ or in the o send a bit 0 (1) of the basis of her second and ard or dual basis ob chooses, each time assure the photon hem secret.	tions. ng, Bob can r dual basis <i>D</i> = ther first rand d random sequ ne on the base e is to receive Bob's observables	neasure the incomine $\{ 0'\rangle, 1'\rangle\}$. om sequence througence, one of the ended of his private rance of his private rance and he records the Alice's state relative to Bob	tor that could disting ng photons either in ng a quantum chann ncodings $ 0\rangle$ or $ 0'\rangle$ (dom sequence, one of e results of his measu The result and its probability	the standard ba el Alice choose: $ 1\rangle$ or $ 1'\rangle$), i.e. the bases B or rements and ke Correctness	s, on in the D to	Bob n but no chann	nakes ot the el, in y	public result which	the sof the cases	equenc ne mea he has	F ce of b asurem s chose	ents –	e usec and <i>i</i> same	r <mark>actior</mark> I to m Alice t basis	n ieasuro :ells B for m	e the p ob, thi easure). photons he received – rough a classical ment as she did for
0 ightarrow 0 angle —	$egin{array}{c} 0 ightarrow B \ 1 ightarrow D \end{array}$	$\ket{0} \ rac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\ket{0'} + \ket{1'})$	$\frac{0 \text{ (prob. 1)}}{0/1 \text{ (prob. } \frac{1}{2})}$	correct random		$egin{array}{c} 1 \ 1 angle \end{array}$	0 0'>	0 0>	0 0'>	$egin{array}{c} 1 \ 1 angle \end{array}$	$egin{array}{c} 1 \ 1' angle \end{array}$	0 0'>	0 0>	0 0>	$egin{array}{c} 1 \ 1 angle \end{array}$	$egin{array}{c} 1 \ 1' angle \end{array}$	Alice's random sequence Alice's polarizations
0 ightarrow 0' angle	0 ightarrow B 1 ightarrow D	$\frac{\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(0\rangle + 1\rangle)}{ 0'\rangle}$	$0/1 (prob. \frac{1}{2})$ 0 (prob. 1)	random correct		0 B	1 D	1 D	1 D	0 B	0 B	1 D	0 B	0 B	1 D	0 B	Bob's random sequence Bob's observable
1 ightarrow 1 angle —	$egin{array}{c} 0 ightarrow B \ 1 ightarrow D \end{array}$	$ert rac{ert 1}{\sqrt{2}} (ert 0' angle - ert 1' angle)$	$\frac{1 \text{ (prob. 1)}}{0/1 \text{ (prob. } \frac{1}{2})}$	correct random		1 Figur	0 e 10: (R Quantı	0 Im trar	1 Ismissi		0 the BB measu				R ands fo	outcomes r the case that the result
1 ightarrow 1' angle	0 ightarrow B 1 ightarrow D	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(0 angle+ 1 angle)$	$0/1 (\text{prob. } \frac{1}{2})$ 1 (prob. 1)	random correct							or the	measu	remen				

Figure 9 shows the possible results of the measurements and their probabilities.

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BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL IV

Test for eavesdropping

Alice and Bob agree on a sequence of indices of the raw key and make the corresponding bits of their raw keys public.

Case 1. Noiseless channel. If the subsequences chosen by Alice and Bob are not completely identical eavesdropping is detected. Otherwise, the remaining bits are taken as creating the final key.

Case 2. Noisy channel. If the subsequences chosen by Alice and Bob contains more errors than the admitable error of the channel (that has to be determined from channel characteristics), then eavesdropping is assumed. Otherwise, the remaining bits are taken as the next result of the raw key generation process.

Error correction phase

In the case of a noisy channel for transmission it may happen that Alice and Bob have different raw keys after the key generation phase.

A way out is to use a special error correction techniques and at the end of this stage both Alice and Bob share identical keys.

Privacy amplification phase

One problem remains. Eve can still have quite a bit of information about the key both Alice and Bob share. Privacy amplification is a tool to deal with such a case.

Privacy amplification is a method how to select a short and very secret binary string s from a longer but less secret string s'. The main idea is simple. If |s| = n, then one picks up n random subsets S_1, \ldots, S_n of bits of s' and let s_i , the i-th bit of S, be the parity of S_i . One way to do it is to take a random binary matrix of size $|s| \times |s'|$ and to perform multiplication Ms'^T , where s'^T is the binary column vector corresponding to s'.

The point is that even in the case where an eavesdropper knows quite a few bits of s', she will have almost no information about s.

More exactly, if Eve knows parity bits of k subsets of s', then if a random subset of bits of s' is chosen, then the probability that Eve has any information about its parity bit is less than $\frac{2^{-(n-k-1)}}{\ln 2}$.

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EXPERIMENTA	L CRYPTOGRAPHY		QUANTUM TE	LEPORTATION - BASIC SETTING	i -
 Open air transmi Islands to anothe Next goal: earth 	to satellite transmissions.		distant place in spite transmitted.	on allows to transmit unknown quantum inform of impossibility to measure or to broadcast in two particles in the EPR-state $ EPR_{pair}\rangle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(00 angle + 11 angle)$	-
All current systems us	se optical means for quantum state transmissions	i		$\sqrt{2}$	
No single photon	Problems and tasks n sources are available. Weak laser pulses current	ly used contains in	and then Alice receiv	res another particle in an unknown qubit state $ \psi\rangle=\alpha 0\rangle+\beta 1\rangle$	
average 0.1 - 0.2	-		Alice then measure h	er two particles in the Bell basis.	
To move from the second sec	ne experimental to the developmental stage.				


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QUANTUM TELEPORTATION - BASIC SETTING I



Alice measures her two qubits with respect to the "Bell basis":

$$\begin{split} |\Phi^{+}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|00\rangle + |11\rangle) & |\Phi^{-}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|00\rangle - |11\rangle) \\ |\Psi^{+}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|01\rangle + |10\rangle) & |\Psi^{-}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|01\rangle - |10\rangle) \end{split}$$

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QUANTUM TELEPORTATION III.

If the first two particles of the state

$$\begin{split} |\psi\rangle|\textit{EPR}-\textit{pair}\rangle &= |\Phi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) + |\Psi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\beta|0\rangle + \alpha|1\rangle) + |\Phi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\alpha|0\rangle - \beta|1\rangle) + |\Psi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (-\beta|0\rangle + \alpha|1\rangle) \end{split}$$

are measured with respect to the Bell basis then Bob's particle gets into the mixed state

$$\left(\frac{1}{4},\alpha|\mathbf{0}\rangle+\beta|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\alpha|\mathbf{0}\rangle-\beta|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\beta|\mathbf{0}\rangle+\alpha|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\beta|\mathbf{0}\rangle-\alpha|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)$$

to which corresponds the density matrix

$$\frac{1}{4}\binom{\alpha^*}{\beta^*}(\alpha,\beta) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\alpha^*}{-\beta^*}(\alpha,-\beta) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\beta^*}{\alpha^*}(\beta,\alpha) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\beta^*}{-\alpha^*}(\beta,-\alpha) = \frac{1}{2}$$

The resulting density matrix is identical to the density matrix for the mixed state

$$\left(rac{1}{2},\ket{0}
ight)\oplus\left(rac{1}{2},\ket{1}
ight)$$

Indeed, the density matrix for the last mixed state has the form

$$rac{1}{2}inom{1}{0}(1,0)+rac{1}{2}inom{0}{1}(0,1)=rac{1}{2}inom{1}{2}$$

QUANTUM TELEPORTATION II

Since the total state of all three particles is:

$$|\psi\rangle|EPR - pair
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(lpha|000
angle + lpha|011
angle + eta|100
angle + eta|111
angle)$$

and can be expressed also as follows:

$$\begin{split} \psi \rangle | \textit{EPR} - \textit{pair} \rangle &= |\Phi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\alpha | 0 \rangle + \beta | 1 \rangle) + |\Psi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\beta | 0 \rangle + \alpha | 1 \rangle) + |\Phi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\alpha | 0 \rangle - \beta | 1 \rangle) + |\Psi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (-\beta | 0 \rangle + \alpha | 1 \rangle) \end{split}$$

then the Bell measurement of the first two particles projects the state of Bob's particle into a "small modification" $|\psi_1\rangle$ of the state $|\psi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$,

$$|\Psi_1
angle =$$
 either $|\Psi
angle$ or $\sigma_x|\Psi
angle$ or $\sigma_z|\Psi
angle$ or $\sigma_x\sigma_z|\psi
angle$

The unknown state $|\psi\rangle$ can therefore be obtained from $|\psi_1\rangle$ by applying one of the four operations

$$\sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_z, I$$

and the result of the Bell measurement provides two bits specifying which of the above four operations should be applied.

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These four bits Alice needs to send to Bob using a classical channel (by email, for example).

QUANTUM TELEPORTATION – COMMENTS

- Alice can be seen as dividing information contained in $|\psi\rangle$ into quantum information – transmitted through EPR channel classical information – transmitted through a classical channel
- In a quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state $|\phi\rangle$ can be disassembled into, and later reconstructed from, two classical bit-states and an maximally entangled pure quantum state.
- Using quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state can be teleported from one place to another by a sender who does need to know - for teleportation itself neither the state to be teleported nor the location of the intended receiver.
- The teleportation procedure can not be used to transmit information faster than light

but

it can be argued that quantum information presented in unknown state is transmitted instantaneously (except two random bits to be transmitted at the speed of light at most).

EPR channel is irreversibly destroyed during the teleportation process.

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WHY IS QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING SO IMPORTANT

- QIPC is believed to lead to new Quantum Information Processing Technology that could have broad impacts.
- Several areas of science and technology are approaching such points in their development where they badly need expertise with storing, transmission and processing of particles.
- It is increasingly believed that new, quantum information processing based, understanding of (complex) quantum phenomena and systems can be developed.
- Quantum cryptography seems to offer new level of security and be soon feasible.
- QIPC has been shown to be more efficient in interesting/important cases.

UNIVERSAL SETS of QUANTUM GATES

The main task at quantum computation is to express solution of a given problem P as a unitary matrix U and then to construct a circuit C_U with elementary quantum gates from a universal sets of quantum gates to realize U.

A simple universal set of quantum gates consists of gates.

$$CNOT = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}, \sigma_z^{\frac{1}{4}} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & e^{\frac{\pi}{4}i} \end{pmatrix}$$

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FUNDAMENTAL RESULTS			QUANTUM ALGORITHMS		
been due to Barenco of Theorem 0.1 CNOT g gates. The proof is in princip from linear algebra. T Theorem 0.2 CNOT g	sate and all one-qubit gates form a number of the RQ- ple a simple modification of t	v of gates, have universal set of decomposition	to solve algorithmic On a more technica a process of an effic into products of ele simple local change	i l level, a design of a quantum algorithm cient decomposition of a complex unitat mentary unitary operations (or gates), is. ures of quantum mechanics that are exp	n can be seen as ry transformation performing

EXAMPLES of QUANTUM ALGORITHMS	FACTORIZATION on QUANTUM COMPUTERS	
Deutsch problem: Given is a black-box function f: $\{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, how many queries are needed to find out whether f is constant or balanced: Classically: 2 Quantumly: 1	In the following we present the basic idea behind a polynomial time algorithm for quantum computers to factorize integers.	
Deutsch-Jozsa Problem: Given is a black-box function $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ and a promise that f is either constant or balanced, how many queries are needed to find out whether f is constant or balanced. Classically: n Quantumly 1 Factorization of integers: all classical algorithms are exponential.	Quantum computers works with superpositions of basic quantum states on which very special (unitary) operations are applied and and very special quantum features (non-locality) are used.	
Peter Shor developed polynomial time quantum algorithms Search of an element in an unordered database of n elements: Classically n queries are needed in the worst case Lov Grover showed that quantumly \sqrt{n} queries are enough	Quantum computers work not with bits, that can take on any of two values 0 and 1, but with qubits (quantum bits) that can take on any of infinitely many states $\alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle$, where α and β are complex numbers such that $ \alpha ^2 + \beta ^2 = 1$.	
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REDUCTIONS	FIRST REDUCTION	
Shor's polynomial time quantum factorization algorithm is based on an understanding that factorization problem can	Lemma If there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to find a nontrivial solution of the modular quadratic equations $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, then there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to	

then there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to factorize integers.

Proof. Let $a \neq \pm 1$ be such that $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Since

 $a^2 - 1 = (a + 1)(a - 1),$

if *n* is not prime, then a prime factor of *n* has to be a prime factor of either a + 1 or a - 1. By using Euclid's algorithm to compute

gcd(a+1,n) and gcd(a-1,n)

we can find, in $O(\lg n)$ steps, a prime factor of n.

e i	
be reduced	
first on the problem of solving a simple modular quadratic equation;	
quadratic equation;	

second on the problem of finding periods of functions $f(x) = a^x \mod n$.

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SECOND REDUCTION	EXAMPLE
The second key concept is that of the period of functions $f_{n,x}(k) = x^k \mod n.$	Let $n = 15$. Select $a < 15$ such that $gcd(a, 15) = 1$. {The set of such a is {2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14}}
Period is the smallest integer r such that	Choose $a = 11$. Values of 11^{\times} mod 15 are then
$f_{n,x}(k+r) = f_{n,x}(k)$	11, 1, 11, 1, 11, 1
for any k , i.e. the smallest r such that	which gives $r = 2$.
$x' \equiv 1 \pmod{n}.$	Hence $a^{r/2} = 11 \pmod{15}$. Therefore
AN ALGORITHM TO SOLVE EQUATION $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.	$gcd(15, 12) = 3, \qquad gcd(15, 10) = 5$
$\square Choose randomly 1 < a < n.$	For $a = 14$ we get again $r = 2$, but in this case
Compute $gcd(a, n)$. If $gcd(a, n) \neq 1$ we have a factor. Find period r of function $a^k \mod n$.	$14^{2/2}\equiv -1 \pmod{15}$
If r is odd or $a^{r/2} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$, then go to step 1; otherwise stop.	and the following algorithm fails.
If this algorithm stops, then $a^{r/2}$ is a non-trivial solution of the equation $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}.$	 Choose randomly 1 < a < n. Compute gcd(a, n). If gcd(a, n) ≠ 1 we have a factor. Find period r of function a^k mod n. If r is odd or a^{r/2} ≡ ±1 (mod n),then go to step 1; otherwise stop.
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EFFICIENCY of REDUCTION	A CENERAL SCHEME for Charle ALCORITUNA
	A GENERAL SCHEME for Shor's ALGORITHM
Lemma If $1 < a < n$ satisfying $gcd(n, a) = 1$ is selected in the above algorithm randomly and n is not a power of prime, then $Pr\{r \text{ is even and } a^{r/2} \neq \pm 1\} \geq \frac{9}{16}.$	The following flow diagram shows the general scheme of Shor's quantum factorization algorithm $\begin{array}{c} choose randomly\\ a \in \{2, \dots, n-1\} \\ \hline \\ compute\\ z = gcd(a, n)\\ no \\ z = 1? \end{array}$
Lemma If $1 < a < n$ satisfying $gcd(n, a) = 1$ is selected in the above algorithm randomly and <i>n</i> is not a power of prime, then	The following flow diagram shows the general scheme of Shor's quantum factorization algorithm $ \begin{array}{c} choose randomly\\ a \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}\\ \hline \\ compute\\ z = gcd(a, n)\\ no \end{array} $

SHOR's QUANTUM FACTORIZATION ALGORITHM

I For given $n, q = 2^d, a$ create states

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{x=0}^{q-1}|\textit{n},\textit{a},q,x,\textbf{0}\rangle \text{ and } \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{x=0}^{q-1}|\textit{n},\textit{a},q,x,\textit{a}^x \bmod \textit{n}\rangle$$

2 By measuring the last register the state collapses into the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}}\sum_{j=0}^{A}|n,a,q,jr+l,y\rangle \text{ or, shortly } \frac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}}\sum_{j=0}^{A}|jr+l\rangle,$$

where A is the largest integer such that $l + Ar \leq q$, r is the period of $a^{x} \mod n$ and l is the offset.

In case $A = \frac{q}{r} - 1$, the resulting state has the form.

$$\sqrt{\frac{r}{q}}\sum_{j=0}^{\frac{q}{r}-1}|jr|+$$

 $|I\rangle$

By applying quantum Fourier transformation we get then the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{r}}\sum_{i=0}^{r-1}e^{2\pi i l j/r}|j\frac{q}{r}\rangle.$$

B By measuring the resulting state we get $c = \frac{jq}{r}$ and if gcd(j, r) = 1, what is very prof. Jozef Gruska 10054 1. Quantum cryptography 77/77