
| | QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY |
|---|---|
| Part XIII Quantum cryptography | An important new feature of quantum cryptography is that security of quantum cryptographic protocols is based on the laws of nature – of quantum physics , and not on the unproven assumptions of computational complexity. Quantum cryptography is the first area of information processing and communication in which quantum particle physics laws are directly exploited to bring an essential advantage in information processing. |
| MAIN OUTCOMES – so far | prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 2/74 BASICS of QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING |
| It has been shown that would we have quantum computer, we could design absolutely secure quantum generation of shared and secret random classical keys. It has been proven that even without quantum computers unconditionally secure quantum generation of classical secret and shared keys is possible (in the sense that any eavesdropping is detectable). Unconditionally secure basic quantum cryptographic primitives, such as bit commitment and oblivious transfer, are impossible. Quantum zero-knowledge proofs exist for all NP-complete languages Quantum teleportation and pseudo-telepathy are possible. Quantum cryptography and quantum networks are already in advanced experimental stage. | As an introduction to quantum cryptography the very basic motivations, experiments, principles, concepts and results of quantum information processing and communication will be presented in the next few slides. |
| prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 3/74 | prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 4/74 |

| BASIC MOTIVATION | QUANTUM PHYSICS | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| In quantum information processing we witness an interaction between the two most important areas of science and technology of 20-th century, between quantum physics and informatics. This is very likely to have important consequences for 21th century. | Quantum physics deals with fundamental entities of physics - particles (waves?) like protons, electrons and neutrons (from which matter is built); photons (which carry electromagnetic radiation) various "elementary particles" which mediate other interactions in physics. We call them particles in spite of the fact that some of their properties are totally unlike the properties of what we call particles in our ordinary classical world. For example, a quantum particle " can go through two places at the same time" and can interact with itself. Quantum physics is full of counter-intuitive, weird, mysterious and even paradoxical events. | | |
| prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 5/74 FEYNMAN'S VIEW | prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 6/74 CLASSICAL versus QUANTUM INFORMATION | | |
| I am going to tell you what Nature behaves like However, do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly avoid it, BUT HOW CAN IT BE LIKE THAT? Because you will get "down the drain" into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped NOBODY KNOWS HOW IT CAN BE LIKE THAT Richard Feynman (1965): The character of physical law. | Main properties of classical information: It is easy to store, transmit and process classical information in time and space. It is easy to make (unlimited number of) copies of classical information One can measure classical information without disturbing it. Main properties of quantum information: It is difficult to store, transmit and process quantum information There is no way to copy perfectly unknown quantum information Measurement of quantum information destroys it, in general. | | |

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| The essence of the difference between classical computers and quantum computers is in the way information is stored and processed. In classical computers, information is represented on macroscopic level by bits, which can 0 or 1 In quantum computers, information is represented on microscopic level using qubits, (quantum bits) which can take on any from the following uncountable many values | |
|--|----------------------------|
| $\alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle$ where α, β are arbitrary complex numbers such that $ \alpha ^2 + \beta ^2 = 1.$ This enormous massive parallelism is one reason why quantum can be so powerful. | a single step |
| prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 9/74 prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography CLASSICAL EXPERIMENTS CLASSICAL EXPERIMENT with bullets | 10/74 |
| $ \underbrace{detector}_{gun} \underbrace{f_{1}}_{gun} \underbrace{f_{2}}_{gun} $ | $\left(P_{12}(x) \right)$ |



THREE BASIC PRINCIPLES of QUANTUM WORLD

 $\mathbf{P1}$ To each transfer from a quantum state ϕ to a state ψ a complex number

 $\langle \psi | \phi \rangle$

is associated. This number is called the probability amplitude of the transfer and

 $|\langle \psi | \phi \rangle|^2$

is then the **probability** of the transfer.

 ${\rm P2}$ If a transfer from a quantum state ϕ to a quantum state ψ can be decomposed into two subsequent transfers

 $\psi \leftarrow \phi' \leftarrow \phi$

then the resulting amplitude of the transfer is the product of amplitudes of subtransfers: $\langle \psi | \phi \rangle = \langle \psi | \phi' \rangle \langle \phi' | \phi \rangle$

 ${\bf P3}$ If a transfer from a state ϕ to a state ψ has two independent alternatives



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QUANTUM SYSTEMS = HILBERT SPACE

Hilbert space H_n is an n-dimensional complex vector space with

scalar product

$$\langle \psi | \phi \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_i \psi_i^* \text{ of vectors } | \phi \rangle = \begin{vmatrix} \phi_1 \\ \phi_2 \\ \vdots \\ \phi_n \end{vmatrix}, |\psi\rangle = \begin{vmatrix} \psi_1 \\ \psi_2 \\ \vdots \\ \psi_n \end{vmatrix},$$

This allows to define the norm of vectors as

$$\|\phi\| = \sqrt{|\langle \phi | \phi \rangle|}$$

Two vectors $|\phi\rangle$ and $|\psi\rangle$ are called orthogonal if $\langle\phi|\psi\rangle=0.$

A basis B of H_n is any set of n vectors $|b_1\rangle, |b_2\rangle, \dots, |b_n\rangle$ of the norm 1 which are mutually orthogonal.

Given a basis $B = \{|b_i\rangle\}_{i=1}^n$, any vector $|\psi\rangle$ from H_n can be uniquely expressed in the form:

$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i |\mathbf{b}_i\rangle.$$

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then the resulting amplitude is the sum of amplitudes of two subtransfers.

| BRA-KET NOTATION EXAMPLES | |
|--|--|
| Dirac introduced a very handy notation, so called bra-ket notation, to deal with amplitudes, quantum states and linear functionals $f: H \to C$. If $\psi, \phi \in H$, then $\langle \psi \phi \rangle$ – scalar product of ψ and ϕ (an amplitude of going from ϕ to ψ). $ \phi \rangle$ – ket-vector (a column vector) - an equivalent to ϕ $\langle \psi - \text{bra-vector}$ (a row vector) a linear functional on H such that $\langle \psi (\phi \rangle) = \langle \psi \phi \rangle$ | $ \psi\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_i^* \psi_i;$ |

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| EVOLUTION in QUANTUM SYSTEMCOMPUTATION in HILBERT SPACEBescribed by Schrödinger linear equation $ih \frac{\partial \Phi(t)\rangle}{\partial t} = H(t) \Phi(t)\rangle$ where \hbar is Planck constant, H(t) is a Hamiltonian (total energy) of the system that can be represented by a Hermitian matrix and $\Phi(t)$ is the state of the system in time t. If the Hamiltonian is time independent then the above Shrödinger equation has solution $ \Phi(t)\rangle = U(t) \Phi(0)\rangle$ where $U(t) = e^{\frac{Ht}{\hbar}}$ is the evolution operator that can be represented by a unitary matrix. A step of such an evolution is therefore a multiplication of a "unitary matrix" A with a vector $ \psi\rangle$, i.e. A $ \psi\rangle$ | A matrix A is unitary if $A \cdot A^{\dagger} = A^{\dagger} \cdot A = I$ where the matrix A^{\dagger} is obtained from the matrix A by revolving A around the main diagonal and changing all elements by their complex conjugates. |
|--|---|
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| PAULI MATRICES | QUANTUM (PROJECTION) MEASUREMENTS |
| Very important one-qubit unary operators are the following Pauli operators, expressed in the standard basis as follows; $ \begin{aligned} & \sigma_x = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \ \sigma_y = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \ \sigma_z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned} \\ Observe that Pauli matrices transform a qubit state \phi\rangle = \alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle as follows \begin{aligned} & \sigma_x(\alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle) = \beta 0\rangle + \alpha 1\rangle \\ & \sigma_z(\alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle) = \alpha 0\rangle - \beta 1\rangle \\ & \sigma_y(\alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle) = \beta 0\rangle - \alpha 1\rangle \end{aligned} Operators \sigma_x, \sigma_z and \sigma_y represent therefore a bit error, a sign error and a bit-sign error.$ | A quantum state is always observed (measured) with respect to an observable O – a decomposition of a given Hilbert space into orthogonal subspaces (where each vector can be uniquely represented as a sum of vectors of these subspaces). |

UNITARY MATRICES

QUANTUM EVOLUTION / COMPUTATION

QUANTUM STATES and PROJECTION MEASUREMENT

In case an orthonormal basis $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$ is chosen in a Hilbert space H_n , then any state $|\phi\rangle \in H_n$ can be expressed in the form

$$|\phi\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i |\beta_i\rangle, \qquad \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i|^2 = 1$$

where

$$a_i = \langle \beta_i | \phi \rangle$$
 are called probability amplitudes

and

their squares provide probabilities

that if the state $|\phi\rangle$ is measured with respect to the basis $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$, then the state $|\phi\rangle$ collapses into the state $|\beta_i\rangle$ with probability $|a_i|^2$.

The classical "outcome" of the measurement of the state $|\phi\rangle$ with respect to the basis $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$ is the index i of that state $|\beta_i\rangle$ into which the state $|\phi\rangle$ collapses.

QUBITS

A qubit is a quantum state in H_2

$$|\phi\rangle=\alpha|0\rangle+\beta|1\rangle$$
 where $\alpha,\beta\in {\sf C}$ are such that $|\alpha|^2+|\beta|^2=1$ and

$$\{|0
angle,|1
angle\}$$
 is a (standard) basis of H_2

EXAMPLE: Representation of qubits by

- (a) electron in a Hydrogen atom
- (b) a spin-1/2 particle




Figure 5: Qubit representations by energy levels of an electron in a hydrogen atom and by a spin-1/2 particle. The condition $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$ is a legal one if $|\alpha|^2$ and $|\beta|^2$ are to be the probabilities of being in one of two basis states (of electrons or photons).

MIXED STATES – DENSITY MATRICES

MAXIMALLY MIXED STATES

$$\rho = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i |\phi\rangle \langle \phi_i|.$$

One interpretation of a mixed state $\{(p_i, |\phi_i\rangle)\}_{i=1}^k$ is that a source X produces the state $|\phi_i\rangle$ with probability p_i .

Any matrix representing a density operator is called density matrix.

Density matrices are exactly Hermitian, positive matrices with trace 1.

To two different mixed states can correspond the same density matrix.

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Two mixes states with the same density matrix are physically undistinguishable.

To the maximally mixed state,

 $\Bigl(rac{1}{2},\ket{0}\Bigr),\Bigl(rac{1}{2},\ket{1}\Bigr)$

representing a random bit, corresponds the density matrix

$$\frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} (1,0) + \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} (0,1) = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{2} I_2$$

Surprisingly, many other mixed states have density matrix that is the same as that of the maximally mixed state.

QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

CLASSICAL ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem

plaintext an n-bit string p shared key an n-bit string k cryptotext an n-bit string c encoding $c = p \oplus k$ decoding $p = c \oplus k$

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QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem

plaintext: an n-qubit string $|p\rangle = |p_1\rangle \dots |p_n\rangle$ shared key: two n-bit strings k,k' cryptotext: an n-qubit string $|c\rangle = |c_1\rangle \dots |c_n\rangle$ encoding: $|c_i\rangle = \sigma_x^{k_i} \sigma_z^{k_i'} |p_i\rangle$ decoding: $|p_i\rangle = \sigma_z^{k_i'} \sigma_x^{k_i} |c_i\rangle$ where $|p_i\rangle = \begin{pmatrix}a_i\\b_i\end{pmatrix}$ and $|c_i\rangle = \begin{pmatrix}d_i\\e_i\end{pmatrix}$ are qubits and $\sigma_x = \begin{pmatrix}0 & 1\\1 & 0\end{pmatrix}$ with $\sigma_z = \begin{pmatrix}1 & 0\\0 & -1\end{pmatrix}$ are Pauli matrices. prof. Jozef Gruska

UNCONDITIONAL SECURITY of QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD

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In the case of encryption of a qubit

$$|\phi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$$

by **QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem**, what is being transmitted is the mixed state

$$\left(\frac{1}{4}, |\phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{x} |\phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{z} |\phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{x} \sigma_{z} |\phi\rangle\right)$$

whose density matrix is

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$\frac{1}{2}I_2$

This density matrix is identical to the density matrix corresponding to that of a random bit, that is to the mixed state

 $\Big(rac{1}{2},|0
angle\Big),\Big(rac{1}{2},|1
angle\Big)$

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SHANNON's THEOREMS

COMPOSED QUANTUM SYSTEMS (1)

Tensor product of vectors

| Shannon classical encryption theorem says that n bits are necessary and sufficient to encrypt securely n bits. Quantum version of Shannon encryption theorem says that 2n classical bits are necessary and sufficient to encrypt securely n qubits. | $ (x_{1}, \dots, x_{n}) \otimes (y_{1}, \dots, y_{m}) = (x_{1}y_{1}, \dots, x_{1}y_{m}, x_{2}y_{1}, \dots, x_{2}y_{m}, \dots, x_{2}y_{m}, \dots, x_{n}y_{1}, \dots, x_{n}y_{m}) $ Tensor product of matrices $A \otimes B = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11}B & \dots & a_{1n}B \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ a_{n1}B & \dots & a_{nn}B \end{pmatrix} $ where $A = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & \dots & a_{1n} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ a_{n1} & \dots & a_{nn} \end{pmatrix} $ Example $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} & 0 & 0 \\ a_{21} & a_{22} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & a_{11} & a_{12} \\ 0 & 0 & a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} $ $ \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & 0 & a_{12} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{11} & 0 & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & 0 & a_{22} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{21} & 0 & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} $ prof. Jozef Gruska 1002 IVS4 13. Quantum cryptography 24/74 |
|--|---|
| COMPOSED QUANTUM SYSTEMS II | QUANTUM REGISTERS |
| Tensor product of Hilbert spaces $H_1 \otimes H_2$ is the complex vector space spanned by tensor products of vectors from H_1 and H_2 . That corresponds to the quantum system composed of the quantum systems corresponding to Hilbert spaces H_1 and H_2 . An important difference between classical and quantum systems A state of a compound classical (quantum) system can be (cannot be) always composed from the states of the subsystem. | A general state of a 2-qubit register is: $ \phi\rangle = \alpha_{00} 00\rangle + \alpha_{01} 01\rangle + \alpha_{10} 10\rangle + \alpha_{11} 11\rangle$ where $ \alpha_{00} ^2 + \alpha_{01} ^2 + \alpha_{10} ^2 + \alpha_{11} ^2 = 1$ and $ 00\rangle, 01\rangle, 10\rangle, 11\rangle$ are vectors of the "standard" basis of H_4 , i.e. $ 00\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 1\\0\\0\\0 \end{pmatrix} 01\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 0\\1\\0\\0 \end{pmatrix} 10\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 0\\0\\1\\0 \end{pmatrix} 11\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 0\\0\\0\\1\\0 \end{pmatrix}$ An important unitary matrix of degree 4, to transform states of 2-qubit registers: $CNOT = XOR = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0\\0 & 1 & 0 & 0\\0 & 0 & 0 & 1\\0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$ |

It holds:

 $\mathsf{CNOT}: |x, y\rangle \Rightarrow |x, x \oplus y\rangle$

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NO-CLONING THEOREM

BELL STATES

INFORMAL VERSION: Unknown quantum state cannot be cloned.

FORMAL VERSION: There is no unitary transformation U such that for any gubit state $|\psi\rangle$

 $U(|\psi\rangle|0\rangle) = |\psi\rangle|\psi\rangle$

PROOF: Assume U exists and for two different states $|\alpha\rangle$ and $|\beta\rangle$

$$U(|lpha
angle|0
angle) = |lpha
angle \qquad U(|eta
angle|0
angle) = |eta
angle|eta
angle$$

Let

$$|\gamma
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|lpha
angle + |eta
angle)$$

Then

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$$U(|\gamma\rangle|0\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\alpha\rangle|\alpha\rangle + |\beta\rangle|\beta\rangle) \neq |\gamma\rangle|\gamma\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|\alpha\rangle|\alpha\rangle + |\beta\rangle|\beta\rangle + |\alpha\rangle|\beta\rangle + |\beta\rangle|\alpha\rangle)$$

However, CNOT can make copies of the basis states $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$: Indeed, for $x \in \{0, 1\}$,

$$CNOT(|x\rangle|0\rangle) = |x\rangle|x\rangle$$

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States

$$egin{aligned} |\Phi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle+|11
angle), & |\Phi^-
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle-|11
angle) \ |\Psi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle+|10
angle), & |\Psi^-
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle-|10
angle) \end{aligned}$$

form an orthogonal (so called Bell) basis in H_4 and play an important role in quantum computing.

Theoretically, there is an observable for this basis. However, no one has been able to construct a device for Bell measurement using linear elements only.

QUANTUM PARALLELISM

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$$f:\{0,1,\ldots,2^n-1\}\Rightarrow\{0,1,\ldots,2^n-1\}$$

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then the mapping

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$$f':(x,0)\Rightarrow(x,f(x))$$

is one-to-one and therefore there is a unitary transformation U_f such that.

$$U_f(|x\rangle|0
angle) \Rightarrow |x
angle|f(x)
angle$$

Let us now have the state

$$|\Psi
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}|i
angle|0
angle$$

With a single application of the mapping U_f we then get

$$U_f|\Psi
angle=rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}U_f(|i
angle|0
angle)=rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}|i
angle|f(i)
angle$$

OBSERVE THAT IN A SINGLE COMPUTATIONAL STEP 2ⁿ VALUES OF f ARE COMPUTED!

QUANTUM n-qubit REGISTERS

A general state of an n-qubit register has the form:

$$\phi \rangle = \sum_{i=0}^{2^n - 1} \alpha_i |i\rangle = \sum_{i \in \{0,1\}^n} \alpha_i |i\rangle$$
, where $\sum_{i=0}^{2^n - 1} |\alpha_i|^2 = 1$

and $|\phi\rangle$ is a vector in H_{2^n} .

Operators on n-qubits registers are unitary matrices of degree 2^n .

Is it difficult to create a state of an n-qubit register?

In general yes, in some important special cases not. For example, if n-qubit Hadamard transformation

$$H_n = \bigotimes_{i=1}^n H.$$

is used then

$$H_n|0^{(n)}\rangle = \otimes_{i=1}^n H|0\rangle = \otimes_{i=1}^n |0'\rangle = |0'^{(n)}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |i\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} |x\rangle$$

and, in general, for $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$

$$H_n|x\rangle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{x \cdot y} |y\rangle.$$
¹

¹The dot product is defined as follows: $x \cdot y = \bigotimes_{i=1}^{n} x_i y_i$.

| The dot product | is actified | 45 10110115. | ~) | $- \bigotimes_{i=1}^{j} \chi_i y_i$ |
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| IN WHAT LIES POWER OF QUANTUM COMPUTING? | POWER of ENTANGLEMENT |
|--|-----------------------|
| | |

In quantum superposition or in quantum parallelism?

NOT, in QUANTUM ENTANGLEMENT!

Let
$$|\psi
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle + |11
angle)$$

be a state of two very distant particles, **for example** on two planets Measurement of one of the particles, with respect to the standard basis, makes the above state to collapse to one of the states

 $|00\rangle$ or $|11\rangle.$

This means that subsequent measurement of other particle (on another planet) provides the same result as the measurement of the first particle. This indicate that in quantum world non-local influences, correlations, exist.

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Quantum state $|\Psi\rangle$ of a composed bipartite quantum system $A \otimes B$ is called entangled if it cannot be decomposed into tensor product of the states from A and B.

Quantum entanglement is an important quantum resource that allows

- To create phenomena that are impossible in the classical world (for example teleportation)
- To create quantum algorithms that are asymptotically more efficient than any classical algorithm known for the same problem.
- To create communication protocols that are asymptotically more efficient than classical communication protocols for the same task

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
- To create, for two parties, shared secret binary keys
- To increase capacity of quantum channels

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|--------------------------------|--|-------------|--------------------------------------|---|----------------|
| | | | QUANTUM K | EY GENERATION | |
| computational | assical cryptography is based on unproven I complexity (and it can be jeopardize by p d/or technology). | | secure generation | ocols for using quantum systems to achieve on of secret (classical) keys by two parties I achievements of quantum information pr research. | are one of the |
| | antum cryptography is based on laws of q build systems where undetectable eavesdro | | • | rimental systems for implementing such pr vements of experimental quantum information | |
| improvements secure with re | l cryptography is vulnerable to technologic it has to be designed in such a way that a spect to future technology , during the w recy is required. | a secret is | It is believed ar another term is | nd hoped that it will be quantum key generation (QKG) | |
| | generation, on the other hand, needs to b against technology available at the momen | . . | where one can transi | quantum key distribution (QKD) expect the first fer from the experimental to the applicatio | on stage. |

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QUANTUM KEY GENERATION – EPR METHOD

Let Alice and Bob share n pairs of particles in the entangled EPR-state.



n pairs of particles in EPR state

If both of them measure their particles in the standard basis, then they get, as the classical outcome of their measurements the same random, shared and secret binary key of length n.

POLARIZATION of PHOTONS

Polarized photons are currently mainly used for experimental quantum key generation.

Photon, or light quantum, is a particle composing light and other forms of electromagnetic radiation.

Photons are electromagnetic waves and their electric and magnetic fields are perpendicular to the direction of propagation and also to each other.

An important property of photons is polarization – it refers to the bias of the electric field in the electromagnetic field of the photon.




Figure 6: Electric and magnetic fields of a linearly polarized photon

plane at 45° or 135° as diagonally polarized. Polarizers that produce only vertically or

horizontally polarized photons are depicted in Figure 6 a, b.

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|---|---|--------------|--|---|--|
| POLARIZATIO | N of PHOTONS I | | POLARIZATI | ON of PHOTONS | |
| | Electric and magnetic fields of a linearly polarized p | | However, for any a photons from an i through with prob | o determine exactly polarization of a single photon angle θ there are θ - polarizers – "filters" – that pro- incoming stream of photons and they let θ_1 -polariz bability $\cos^2(\theta - \theta_1)$. (a) (c) (c) (d) Figure 6: Photon polarizers and measuring devices- | oduce θ-polarized ed photons to get |
| If the electric field ve (see Figure). | ector is always parallel to a fixed line we have linear | polarization | | ectronic fields oscillate in a plane at either 0° or 90 ally rectilinearly polarized and those whose electr | |

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POLARIZATION of PHOTONS III

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QUANTUM KEY GENERATION – PROLOGUE






Figure 6: Photon polarizers and measuring devices-80%

For any two orthogonal polarizations there are generators that produce photons of two given orthogonal polarizations. For example, a calcite crystal, properly oriented, can do the job.

Fig. c – a calcite crystal that makes θ -polarized photons to be horizontally (vertically) polarized with probability $cos^2\theta(sin^2\theta)$.

Fig. d – a calcite crystal can be used to separate horizontally and vertically polarized photons.

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BB84 QUANTUM GENERATION of CLASSICAL RANDOM KEY

BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL II

Quantum key generation protocol BB84 (due to Bennett and Brassard), for generation of a key of length n, has several phases:

Preparation phase

Alice is assumed to have four transmitters of photons in one of the following four polarizations 0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees




Figure 8: Polarizations of photons for BB84 and B92 protocols

Expressed in a more general form, Alice uses for encoding states from the set $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle, |0'\rangle, |1'\rangle\}.$

Bob has a detector that can be set up to distinguish between rectilinear polarizations (0 and 90 degrees) or can be quickly reset to distinguish between diagonal polarizations (45 and 135 degrees).

Very basic setting Alice tries to send a quantum system to Bob and an eavesdropper tries to learn, or to change, as much as possible, without being detected.

Eavesdroppers have this time especially hard time, because quantum states cannot be copied and cannot be measured without causing, in general, a disturbance.

Key problem: If Alice prepares a quantum system in a specific way, unknown fully to the eavesdropper Eve, and sends it to Bob

then the question is how much information can Eve extract of that quantum system and how much it costs in terms of the disturbance of the system.

Three special cases

- **I** Eve has no information about the state $|\psi\rangle$ Alice sends.
- **Z** Eve knows that $|\psi\rangle$ is one of the states of an orthonormal basis $\{|\phi_i\rangle\}_{i=1}^n$.
- **3** Eve knows that $|\psi\rangle$ is one of the states $|\phi_1\rangle, \ldots, |\phi_n\rangle$ that **are not** mutually orthonormal and that p_i is the probability that $|\psi\rangle = |\phi_i\rangle$.

Due to the laws of quantum physics, there is no detector that could distinguish between unorthogonal polarizations.

In a more formal setting, Bob can measure the incomming photons either in the standard basis B $= \{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ or in the dual basis $D = \{|0'\rangle, |1'\rangle\}.$

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To send a bit 0 (1) of her first random sequence through a quantum channel Alice chooses, on the basis of her second random sequence, one of the encodings $|0\rangle$ or $|0'\rangle$ ($|1\rangle$ or $|1'\rangle$), i.e., in the standard or dual basis.

Bob chooses, each time on the base of his private random sequence, one of the bases B or D to measure the photon he is to receive and he records the results of his measurements and keeps them secret.

| Alice's | Bob's | Alice's state | The result | Correctness |
|----------------------------|-------------------|---|------------------------------|-------------|
| encodings | observables | relative to Bob | and its probability | concerness |
| cheodings | | 1-1 | | |
| $0 \rightarrow 0\rangle$ | $0 \rightarrow B$ | | 0 (prob. 1) | correct |
| | 1 ightarrow D | $rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\ket{0'}+\ket{1'})$ | $0/1 (prob. \frac{1}{2})$ | random |
| $0 \rightarrow 0'\rangle$ | 0 ightarrow B | $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(0 angle+ 1 angle)$ | $0/1 (prob. \frac{1}{2})$ | random |
| | 1 ightarrow D | 0'> | 0 (prob. 1) | correct |
| 1 ightarrow 1 angle | $0 \rightarrow B$ | $ 1\rangle$ | 1 (prob. 1) | correct |
| 1 / 11/ | 1 ightarrow D | $rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\ket{0'}-\ket{1'})$ | $0/1$ (prob. $\frac{1}{2}$) | random |
| 1 ightarrow 1' angle | 0 ightarrow B | $rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\ket{0}+\ket{1})$ | $0/1 (prob. \frac{1}{2})$ | random |
| / | 1 ightarrow D | $ 1'\rangle$ | 1 (prob. 1) | correct |
| | F i 0 0 | | | |

Figure 9: Quantum cryptography with BB84 protocol

Figure 9 shows the possible results of the measurements and their probabilities.

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| BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL III | BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL III |
|---|--|
| An example of an encoding – decoding process is in the Figure 10. Raw key extraction Bob makes public the sequence of bases he used to measure the photons he received – but not the results of the measurements – and Alice tells Bob, through a classical channel, in which cases he has chosen the same basis for measurement as she did for encoding. The corresponding bits then form the basic raw key. $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | Test for eavesdropping Alice and Bob agree on a sequence of indices of the raw key and make the corresponding bits of their raw keys public. Case 1. Noiseless channel. If the subsequences chosen by Alice and Bob are not completely identical eavesdropping is detected. Otherwise, the remaining bits are taken as creating the final key. Case 2. Noisy channel. If the subsequences chosen by Alice and Bob contains more errors than the admitable error of the channel (that has to be determined from channel characteristics), then eavesdropping is assumed. Otherwise, the remaining bits are taken as the next result of the raw key generation process. Error correction phase In the case of a noisy channel for transmission it may happen that Alice and Bob have different raw keys after the key generation phase. A way out is to use a special error correction techniques and at the end of this stage both Alice and Bob share identical keys. |
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| | |
| BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL IV | EXPERIMENTAL CRYPTOGRAPHY |
| BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL IV Privacy amplification phase One problem remains. Eve can still have quite a bit of information about the key both Alice and Bob share. Privacy amplification is a tool to deal with such a case. Privacy amplification is a method how to select a short and very secret binary string s from a longer but less secret string s'. The main idea is simple. If $ s = n$, then one picks up n random subsets S_1, \ldots, S_n of bits of s' and let s_i , the i-th bit of S, be the parity of S_i . One way to do it is to take a random binary matrix of size $ s \times s' $ and to perform multiplication Ms'^T , where s'^T is the binary column vector corresponding to s'. The point is that even in the case where an eavesdropper knows quite a few bits of s', she will have almost no information about s. More exactly, if Eve knows parity bits of k subsets of s', then if a random subset of bits of s' is chosen, then the probability that Eve has any information about its parity bit is less than $\frac{2^{-(n-k-1)}}{\ln 2}$. | EXPERIMENTAL CRYPTOGRAPHY Successes Transmissions using optical fibers to the distance of 200 km. Open air transmissions to the distance 144 km at day time (from one pick of Canary Islands to another). Next goal: earth to satellite transmissions. All current systems use optical means for quantum state transmissions Problems and tasks No single photon sources are available. Weak laser pulses currently used contains in average 0.1 - 0.2 photons. Loss of signals in the fiber. (Current error rates: 0,5 - 4%) To move from the experimental to the developmental stage. |

QUANTUM TELEPORTATION - BASIC SETING

QUANTUM TELEPORTATION - BASIC SETING I

2 classical bits

Quantum teleportation allows to transmit unknown quantum information to a very Bob Alice gets destroyed distant place in spite of impossibility to measure or to broadcast information to be by measurement unitary transformation measurement transmitted. FPR channel $|\Psi>$ Alice and Bob share two particles in the EPR-state $|\Psi|$ $|EPR_{pair}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$ unidentified quantum state EPR-pair $|\textit{EPR}-\textit{pair}
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle+|11
angle)$ $|\psi
angle = lpha |0
angle + eta |1
angle$ and then Alice receives another particle in an unknown qubit state Total state $|\psi\rangle|$ *EPR* - *pair* $\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|000\rangle + \alpha|011\rangle + \beta|100\rangle + \beta|111\rangle)$ $|\psi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$ Alice then measure her two particles in the Bell basis. Alice measures her two qubits with respect to the "Bell basis": $egin{aligned} |\Phi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle+|11
angle) & |\Phi^angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle-|11
angle) \ |\Psi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle+|10
angle) & |\Psi^angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle-|10
angle) \end{aligned}$ IV054 13. Quantum cryptography prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 57/74 prof. Jozef Gruska 58/74 **QUANTUM TELEPORTATION III.** QUANTUM TELEPORTATION II Since the total state of all three particles is: If the first two particles of the state $|\psi\rangle|EPR - pair\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|000\rangle + \alpha|011\rangle + \beta|100\rangle + \beta|111\rangle)$ $|\psi\rangle|$ EPR - pair $\rangle = |\Phi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) + |\Psi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\beta|0\rangle + \alpha|1\rangle) + |\Phi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|0\rangle - \beta|1\rangle) + |\Phi^-\rangle +$ and can be expressed also as follows: $\beta |1\rangle + |\Psi^{-}\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (-\beta |0\rangle + \alpha |1\rangle)$ $|\psi\rangle|EPR-pair
angle=|\Phi^{+}
anglerac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(lpha|0
angle+eta|1
angle)+|\Psi^{+}
anglerac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(eta|0
angle+lpha|1
angle)+|\Phi^{-}
anglerac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(lpha|0
angle$ are measured with respect to the Bell basis then Bob's particle gets into the mixed state $\beta |1\rangle + |\Psi^{-}\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (-\beta |0\rangle + \alpha |1\rangle)$ $\left(\frac{1}{4},\alpha|0\rangle+\beta|1\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\alpha|0\rangle-\beta|1\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\beta|0\rangle+\alpha|1\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\beta|0\rangle-\alpha|1\rangle\right)$ then the Bell measurement of the first two particles projects the state of Bob's particle

into a "small modification" $|\psi_1
angle$ of the state $|\psi
angle=lpha|0
angle+eta|1
angle$,

$$|\Psi_1
angle=$$
 either $|\Psi
angle$ or $\sigma_x|\Psi
angle$ or $\sigma_z|\Psi
angle$ or $\sigma_x\sigma_z|\psi
angle$

The unknown state $|\psi\rangle$ can therefore be obtained from $|\psi_1\rangle$ by applying one of the four operations

$$\sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_z, I$$

and the result of the Bell measurement provides two bits specifying which of the above four operations should be applied.

These four bits Alice needs to send to Bob using a classical channel (by email, for example).

to which corresponds the density matrix

$$\frac{1}{4}\binom{\alpha^*}{\beta^*}(\alpha,\beta) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\alpha^*}{-\beta^*}(\alpha,-\beta) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\beta^*}{\alpha^*}(\beta,\alpha) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\beta^*}{-\alpha^*}(\beta,-\alpha) = \frac{1}{2}I$$

The resulting density matrix is identical to the density matrix for the mixed state

 $\left(rac{1}{2}, |0
ight
angle \oplus \left(rac{1}{2}, |1
ight
angle
ight)$

Indeed, the density matrix for the last mixed state has the form

$$rac{1}{2}inom{1}{0}(1,0)+rac{1}{2}inom{0}{1}(0,1)=rac{1}{2}inom{1}{2}$$

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QUANTUM TELEPORTATION – COMMENTS

| Alice can be seen as dividing information contained in ψ⟩ into quantum information - transmitted through EPR channel classical information - transmitted through a classical channel In a quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state φ⟩ can be disassembled into, and later reconstructed from, two classical bit-states and an maximally entangled pure quantum state. Using quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state can be teleported from one place to another by a sender who does need to know - for teleportation itself - neither the state to be teleported nor the location of the intended receiver. The teleportation procedure can not be used to transmit information faster than light but it can be argued that quantum information presented in unknown state is transmitted instantaneously (except two random bits to be transmitted at the speed of light at most). EPR channel is irreversibly destroyed during the teleportation process. | QIPC is believed to lead to new Quantum Information Processing Technology that could have broad impacts. Several areas of science and technology are approaching such points in their development where they badly need expertise with storing, transmission and processing of particles. It is increasingly believed that new, quantum information processing based, understanding of (complex) quantum phenomena and systems can be developed. Quantum cryptography seems to offer new level of security and be soon feasible. QIPC has been shown to be more efficient in interesting/important cases. |
|--|---|
| UNIVERSAL SETS of QUANTUM GATES | FUNDAMENTAL RESULTS |
| The main task at quantum computation is to express solution of a given problem P as a unitary matrix U and then to construct a circuit C_U with elementary quantum gates from a universal sets of quantum gates to realize U. A simple universal set of quantum gates consists of gates. $CNOT = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}, \sigma_z^{\frac{1}{4}} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & e^{\frac{\pi}{4}i} \end{pmatrix}$ | The first really satisfactory results, concerning universality of gates, have been due to Barenco et al. (1995) Theorem 0.1 CNOT gate and all one-qubit gates form a universal set of gates. The proof is in principle a simple modification of the RQ-decomposition from linear algebra. Theorem 0.1 can be easily improved: Theorem 0.2 CNOT gate and elementary rotation gates |

IMPORTANT

WHY IS QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING SO

| QUANTUM ALGORITHMS | EXAMPLES of QUANTUM ALGORITHMS |
|---|---|
| Quantum algorithms are methods of using quantum circuits and processors to solve algorithmic problems. On a more technical level, a design of a quantum algorithm can be seen as a process of an efficient decomposition of a complex unitary transformation into products of elementary unitary operations (or gates), performing simple local changes. The four main features of quantum mechanics that are exploited in quantum computation: Superposition; Interference; Entanglement; Measurement. | Deutsch problem: Given is a black-box function f: $\{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, how many queries are needed to find out whether f is constant or balanced: Classically: 2 Quantumly: 1 Deutsch-Jozsa Problem: Given is a black-box function $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ and a promise that f is either constant or balanced, how many queries are needed to find out whether f is constant or balanced. Classically: n Quantumly 1 Factorization of integers: all classical algorithms are exponential. Peter Shor developed polynomial time quantum algorithm Search of an element in an unordered database of n elements: Classically n queries are needed in the worst case Lov Grover showed that quantumly \sqrt{n} queries are enough |
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| FACTORIZATION on QUANTUM COMPUTERS | REDUCTIONS Shor's polynomial time quantum factorization algorithm is based on an understanding that factorization problem can |
| Quantum computers works with superpositions of basic quantum states on which very special (unitary) operations are applied and and very special quantum features (non-locality) are used. Quantum computers work not with bits, that can take on any of two values 0 and 1, but with qubits (quantum bits) that can take on any of infinitely many states $\alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle$, where α and β are complex numbers such that $ \alpha ^2 + \beta ^2 = 1$. | based on an understanding that factorization problem can be reduced first on the problem of solving a simple modular quadratic equation; second on the problem of finding periods of functions f(x) = a^x mod n. |

FIRST REDUCTION

SECOND REDUCTION

The second key concept is that of the **period** of functions

$$f_{n,x}(k) = x^k \mod n$$

Period is the smallest integer r such that

 $f_{n,x}(k+r) = f_{n,x}(k)$

for any k, i.e. the smallest r such that

```
x^r \equiv 1 \pmod{n}.
```

```
AN ALGORITHM TO SOLVE EQUATION x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}.
```

| • Choose randomly $1 < a < n$. |
|---|
| 2 Compute $gcd(a, n)$. If $gcd(a, n) \neq 1$ we have a factor. |
| Find period r of function a ^k mod n. |
| If r is odd or $a^{r/2} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$, then go to step 1; otherwise stop. |
| |

```
If this algorithm stops, then a^{r/2} is a non-trivial solution of the equation
```

$$x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

IV054 13. Quantum cryptography prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 69/74 prof. Jozef Gruska 70/74 **EXAMPLE EFFICIENCY** of **REDUCTION** Let n = 15. Select a < 15 such that gcd(a, 15) = 1. {The set of such a is {2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14}} **Lemma** If 1 < a < n satisfying gcd(n, a) = 1 is selected in the above algorithm randomly and *n* is not a power of prime, then Choose a = 11. Values of $11^{\times} \mod 15$ are then $Pr\{r \text{ is even and } a^{r/2} \not\equiv \pm 1\} \geq \frac{9}{16}.$ 11, 1, 11, 1, 11, 1which gives r = 2. Hence $a^{r/2} = 11 \pmod{15}$. Therefore **1** Choose randomly 1 < a < n. **2** Compute gcd(a, n). If $gcd(a, n) \neq 1$ we have a factor. gcd(15, 12) = 3, gcd(15, 10) = 5**I** Find period r of function $a^k \mod n$. For a = 14 we get again r = 2, but in this case If r is odd or $a^{r/2} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$, then go to step 1; otherwise stop. $14^{2/2} \equiv -1 \pmod{15}$ **Corollary** If there is a polynomial time randomized [quantum] algorithm to compute the period of the function and the following algorithm fails. $f_{n,a}(k) = a^k \mod n$ $\blacksquare Choose randomly 1 < a < n.$ then there is a polynomial time randomized [quantum] algorithm to find non-trivial **2** Compute gcd(a, n). If $gcd(a, n) \neq 1$ we have a factor. solution of the equation $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ (and therefore also to factorize integers). **I** Find period r of function $a^k \mod n$. If r is odd or $a^{r/2} \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$, then go to step 1; otherwise stop. 71/74 prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 72/74

Lemma If there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to find a nontrivial solution of the modular quadratic equations

 $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$,

then there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to factorize integers.

Proof. Let $a \neq \pm 1$ be such that $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Since

 $a^2 - 1 = (a + 1)(a - 1),$


if *n* is not prime, then a prime factor of *n* has to be a prime factor of either a + 1 or a - 1. By using Euclid's algorithm to compute

$$gcd(a+1, n)$$
 and $gcd(a-1, n)$

we can find, in $O(\lg n)$ steps, a prime factor of n.

A GENERAL SCHEME for Shor's ALGORITHM

The following flow diagram shows the general scheme of Shor's quantum factorization algorithm



SHOR'S QUANTUM FACTORIZATION ALGORITHM

I For given $n, q = 2^d, a$ create states

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{x=0}^{q-1}|\textit{n},\textit{a},\textit{q},x,\textbf{0}\rangle \text{ and } \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\sum_{x=0}^{q-1}|\textit{n},\textit{a},\textit{q},x,\textit{a}^x \bmod \textit{n}\rangle$$

2 By measuring the last register the state collapses into the state

$$rac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}}\sum_{j=0}^A |n,a,q,jr+l,y
angle$$
 or, shortly $rac{1}{\sqrt{A+1}}\sum_{j=0}^A |jr+l
angle,$

where A is the largest integer such that $l + Ar \leq q$, r is the period of $a^{x} \mod n$ and l is the offset.

In case $A = \frac{q}{r} - 1$, the resulting state has the form.

$$\sqrt{\frac{r}{q}}\sum_{j=0}^{\frac{q}{r}-1}|jr+l
angle$$

By applying quantum Fourier transformation we get then the state

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{r}}\sum_{j=0}^{r-1}e^{2\pi i l j/r}|j\frac{q}{r}\rangle.$$

5 By measuring the resulting state we get $c = \frac{jq}{r}$ and if gcd(j, r) = 1, what happens prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 74/74