## *IV054 Coding, Cryptography and Cryptographic Protocols* **2011 - Exercises VII.**

- 1. Find all integers a such that a is order of some element of the group  $(\mathbb{Z}_{151}^*, \cdot)$ .
- 2. Consider the ElGamal signature scheme. Let (p, q, y) be a public key and let x be a secret key. Let i, j be integers and gcd(j, p-1) = 1. Let (a, b), where  $a = q^i y^j \mod p$  and  $b = -aj^{-1} \mod (p-1)$ , be a valid signature for a message w.
  - (a) Find w.
  - (b) What can bad Eve do using this knowledge?
- 3. Alice and Bob use the Ong-Schnorr-Shamir subliminal channel with the public key n = 2011, h = 1974 and the trapdoor information k = 171. Demonstrate usage of the subliminal change on the secret message w = 18 and the harmless message w' = 23.
- 4. Alice use the DSA signature scheme to sign her messages. Her public key is p = 877, q = 73 and r = 588. Alice sent message  $m_A = 55$  to Bob signed with the signature (72,0). Eve intercepted the message and wants to change it to  $m_E = 50$  and forge Alice's signature. Perform all steps of her calculation and all steps of Bob's verification of a forged signature. Do not use brute force.
- 5. Consider the DSA signature algorithm with a hash function H. If H is not collision resistant, show that we can forge a given signature with a chosen-message attack. Apply this attack to SHA-1 by using brute force. What is its complexity?
- 6. Consider the following one-time signature scheme used for signing of N-bit messages. Let H be a cryptographically secure hash function.
  - (Initial phase) Alice chooses two random numbers  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  and computes  $y_1 = H^M(x_1)$  and  $y_2 = H^M(x_2)$  where  $M = 2^N$ . Alice publishes  $y_1$  and  $y_2$ .
  - (Signing) Alice computes  $s_1 = H^n(x_1)$  and  $s_2 = H^{M-n-1}(x_2)$ , where  $0 \le n \le 2^N 1$  is the value of an N-bit message to be signed.
  - (Verification) To verify a signature, Bob checks validity of the following equations:

$$y_1 = H^{M-n}(s_1)$$
 and  $y_2 = H^{n+1}(s_2)$ .

- (a) Demonstrate usage of the proposed scheme on signing of 2-bit message '11'.
- (b) Explain why it is insufficient to compute only a value of  $s_1$ .
- (c) Compare the proposed scheme with Lamport one-time signatures.