	Quantum cryptography
Part XIII Quantum cryptography	Quantum cryptography has a potential to be cryptography of 21 <sup>st</sup> century.         An important new feature of quantum cryptography is that security of quantum cryptographic protocols is based on the laws of nature – of quantum physics, and not on the unproven assumptions of computational complexity.         Quantum cryptography is the first area of information processing and communication in which quantum particle physics laws are directly exploited to bring an essential advantage in information processing.
MAIN OUTCOMES – so far	BASICS of QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING
<ul> <li>It has been shown that would we have quantum computer, we could design absolutely secure quantum generation of shared and secret random classical keys.</li> <li>It has been proven that even without quantum computers unconditionally secure quantum generation of classical secret and shared keys is possible (in the sense that any eavesdropping is detectable).</li> <li>Unconditionally secure basic quantum cryptographic primitives, such as bit commitment and oblivious transfer, are impossible.</li> <li>Quantum zero-knowledge proofs exist for all NP-complete languages</li> <li>Quantum teleportation and pseudo-telepathy are possible.</li> <li>Quantum cryptography and quantum networks are already in advanced experimental stage.</li> </ul>	As an introduction to quantum cryptography the very basic motivations, experiments, principles, concepts and results of quantum information processing and communication will be presented in the next few slides.
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# BASIC MOTIVATION

# QUANTUM PHYSICS

two most important areas of between quantur	essing we witness an interactio science and technology of 20-t <b>n physics and informatics</b> . portant consequences for 21th	th century,	<ul> <li>Quantum physics deals with fundamental entities of physics – particles (way</li> <li>protons, electrons and neutrons (from which matter is built);</li> <li>photons (which carry electromagnetic radiation)</li> <li>various "elementary particles" which mediate other interactions in physics</li> <li>We call them particles in spite of the fact that some of their properties a unlike the properties of what we call particles in our ordinary classical work.</li> <li>For example, a quantum particle can go through two places at the same can interact with itself.</li> <li>Because of that quantum physics is full of counterintuitive, weird, mand even paradoxical events.</li> </ul>	cs. are totally orld. time and
prof. Jozef Gruska FEYNMAN's VIEW	IV054 13. Quantum cryptography	5/62	prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography CLASSICAL versus QUANTUM INFORMATION	6/62
I am going to tell you what I	Vature behaves like		Main properties of classical information:	
However, do not keep saying	to yourself, if you can possibly	' avoid it,	It is easy to store, transmit and process classical information and space.	in time
BUT HOW	V CAN IT BE LIKE THAT?		It is easy to make (unlimited number of) copies of classical in	nformation
Because you will get " down t nobody has yet escaped	the drain" into a blind alley fro	m which	One can measure classical information without disturbing it.	
NOBODY KNOV	WS HOW IT CAN BE LIKE TH		<ul> <li>Main properties of quantum information:</li> <li>It is difficult to store, transmit and process quantum information</li> <li>There is no way to copy unknown quantum information</li> <li>Measurement of quantum information destroys it, in general.</li> </ul>	
Ric	hard Feynman (1965): The character of	f physical law		

<section-header><equation-block><text><text><text><text><equation-block><text></text></equation-block></text></text></text></text></equation-block></section-header>	An n bit classical register can store at any moment exactly one n-bit string. An n-qubit quantum register can store at any moment a superposition of all 2 <sup>n</sup> n-bit strings. Consequently, on a quantum computer one can compute in a single step with 2 <sup>n</sup> values. This enormous massive parallelism is one reason why quantum computing can be so powerful.
prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 9/62 CLASSICAL EXPERIMENTS	prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 10/62 QUANTUM EXPERIMENTS
$(C, t) \in C, t $	for the contract of the con

### THREE BASIC PRINCIPLES

**P1** To each transfer from a quantum state  $\phi$  to a state  $\psi$  a complex number

 $\langle \psi | \phi \rangle$ 

is associated. This number is called the probability amplitude of the transfer and

 $|\langle \psi | \phi \rangle|^2$ 

is then the **probability** of the transfer.

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**P2** If a transfer from a quantum state  $\phi$  to a quantum state  $\psi$  can be decomposed into two subsequent transfers

 $\psi \leftarrow \phi' \leftarrow \phi$ 

then the resulting amplitude of the transfer is the product of amplitudes of subtransfers:  $\langle \psi | \phi \rangle = \langle \psi | \phi' \rangle \langle \phi' | \phi \rangle$ 

**P3** If a transfer from a state  $\phi$  to a state  $\psi$  has two independent alternatives



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# QUANTUM SYSTEMS = HILBERT SPACE

Hilbert space  $H_n$  is n-dimensional complex vector space with

scalar product  

$$\langle \psi | \phi \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_i \psi_i^* \text{ of vectors} | \phi \rangle = \begin{vmatrix} \phi_1 \\ \phi_2 \\ \vdots \\ \phi_n \end{vmatrix}, | \psi \rangle = \begin{vmatrix} \psi_1 \\ \psi_2 \\ \vdots \\ \psi_n \end{vmatrix},$$

This allows to define the norm of vectors as

$$\|\phi\| = \sqrt{|\langle \phi | \phi \rangle|}$$

Two vectors  $|\phi\rangle$  and  $|\psi\rangle$  are called **orthogonal** if  $\langle\phi|\psi\rangle = 0$ .

A basis B of  $H_n$  is any set of n vectors  $|b_1\rangle, |b_2\rangle, \ldots, |b_n\rangle$  of the norm 1 which are mutually orthogonal.

Given a basis B, any vector  $|\psi\rangle$  from  $H_n$  can be uniquely expressed in the form

$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i |b_i\rangle.$$

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then the resulting amplitude is the sum of amplitudes of two subtransfers.

**BRA-KET NOTATION QUANTUM EVOLUTION / COMPUTATION** EVOLUTION COMPUTATION in QUANTUM SYSTEM HILBERT SPACE Dirac introduced a very handy notation, so called bra-ket notation, to deal with amplitudes, quantum states and linear functionals  $f: H \rightarrow C$ .  $ih \frac{1}{\partial t} = H(t) |\Phi(t)\rangle$ If  $\psi, \phi \in H$ , then

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$$\langle \psi | \phi \rangle$$
 – scalar product of  $\psi$  and  $\phi$  (an amplitude of going from  $\phi$  to  $\psi$ ).

 $|\phi
angle$  – ket-vector (a column vector) - an equivalent to  $\phi$ 

$$\langle \psi |$$
 – bra-vector (a row vector) a linear functional on H

such that 
$$\langle \psi | (|\phi \rangle) = \langle \psi | \phi \rangle$$

is described by  
Schrödinger linear equation  

$$|_{t}\partial|\Phi(t)\rangle$$

where h is Planck constant, H(t) is a Hamiltonian (total energy) of the system that can be represented by a Hermitian matrix and  $\Phi(t)$  is the state of the system in time t. If the Hamiltonian is time independent then the above Shrödinger equation has solution

$$|\Phi(t)
angle = U(t)|\Phi(0)$$

where

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$$U(t) = e^{\frac{iHt}{h}}$$

is the evolution operator that can be represented by a unitary matrix. A step of such an evolution is therefore a multiplication of a **unitary matrix** A with a vector  $|\psi\rangle$ , i.e. A  $|\psi\rangle$ 

A matrix A is **unitary** if

				$A \cdot A^* = A^* \cdot A = I$	
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### PAULI MATRICES

follows

bit-sign error.

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expressed in the standard basis as follows;

# QUANTUM (PROJECTION) MEASUREMENTS

A quantum state is always observed (measured) with respect to an observable O - a decomposition of a given Hilbert space into orthogonal subspaces (where each vector can be uniquely represented as a sum of vectors of these subspaces).



There are two outcomes of a projection measurement of a state  $|\phi\rangle$  with respect to O:

 $\blacksquare$  Classical information into which subspace projection of  $|\phi\rangle$  was made.

 $\blacksquare$  Resulting quantum projection (as a new state)  $|\phi'\rangle$  in one of the above subspaces.

The subspace into which projection is made is chosen **randomly** and the corresponding probability is uniquely determined by the amplitudes at the representation of  $|\phi\rangle$  as a sum of states of the subspaces.

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# QUANTUM STATES and PROJECTION MEASUREMENT

In case an orthonormal basis  $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$  is chosen in  $H_n$ , any state  $|\phi\rangle \in H_n$  can be expressed in the form

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Very important one-qubit unary operators are the following Pauli operators,

 $\sigma_{x} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \sigma_{y} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \sigma_{z} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$ 

Observe that Pauli matrices transform a qubit state  $|\phi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$  as

 $\sigma_{x}(\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) = \beta|0\rangle + \alpha|1\rangle$   $\sigma_{z}(\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) = \alpha|0\rangle - \beta|1\rangle$  $\sigma_{y}(\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) = \beta|0\rangle - \alpha|1\rangle$ 

Operators  $\sigma_x, \sigma_z$  and  $\sigma_y$  represent therefore a bit error, a sign error and a

$$|\phi
angle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i |eta_i
angle, \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i|^2 = 1$$

where

$$a_i = \langle eta_i | \phi 
angle$$
 are called probability amplitudes

and

#### their squares provide probabilities

that if the state  $|\phi\rangle$  is measured with respect to the basis  $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$ , then the state  $|\phi\rangle$  collapses into the state  $|\beta_i\rangle$  with probability  $|a_i|^2$ .

The classical "outcome" of a measurement of the state  $|\phi\rangle$  with respect to the basis  $\{\beta_i\}_{i=1}^n$  is the index i of that state  $|\beta_i\rangle$  into which the state collapses.

# QUBITS

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A qubit is a quantum state in  $H_2$ 

$$|\phi
angle = lpha |\mathbf{0}
angle + eta |\mathbf{1}
angle$$

where 
$$lpha,eta\in {\mathcal C}$$
 are such that  $|lpha|^2+|eta|^2=1$  and

 $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$  is a (standard) basis of  $H_2$ 

Basis states

### **EXAMPLE:** Representation of qubits by

- (a) electron in a Hydrogen atom
- (b) a spin-1/2 particle

#### Basis states




Figure 5: Qubit representations by energy levels of an electron in a hydrogen atom and by a spin-1/2 particle. The condition  $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$  is a legal one if  $|\alpha|^2$  and  $|\beta|^2$  are to be the probabilities of being in one of two basis states (of electrons or photons).

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# HILBERT SPACE H<sub>2</sub>

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
### QUANTUM MEASUREMENT

#### of a qubit state

Ouantum world

 $\begin{array}{l} -\alpha \mid 0 > +\beta \mid 1 > \\ = \alpha'' \mid 0'' > +\beta'' \mid 1'' > \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{measurement wrt.} \{ \mid 0'' >, \mid 1'' > \} \end{array}$ 

measure



transforms one of the basis into another one.

Hadamard matrix  $H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$ 

 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$ 

### General form of a unitary matrix of degree 2

$$U = e^{i\gamma} \begin{pmatrix} e^{i\alpha} & 0\\ 0 & e^{-i\alpha} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \cos\theta & i\sin\theta\\ i\sin\theta & \cos\theta \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} e^{i\beta} & 0\\ 0 & e^{-i\beta} \end{pmatrix}$$

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measurement wrt.  $\underline{-}$   $\{|0^{\prime\prime\prime}>,|1^{\prime\prime\prime}>\}$ 

 $|\phi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$ 

 $= \alpha''' |0''' > + \beta''' |1''' >$ 

# MIXED STATES – DENSITY MATRICES

STANDARD BASIS

 $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$ 

 $|H|0\rangle = |0'\rangle$ 

 $|H|1\rangle = |1'\rangle$ 

A probability distribution  $\{(p_i, |\phi_i\rangle)\}_{i=1}^k$  on pure states is called a mixed state to which it is assigned a density operator

$$\rho = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i |\phi\rangle \langle \phi_i|.$$

One interpretation of a mixed state  $\{(p_i, |\phi_i\rangle)\}_{i=1}^k$  is that a source X produces the state  $|\phi_i\rangle$  with probability  $p_i$ .

Any matrix representing a density operator is called density matrix.

Density matrices are exactly Hermitian, positive matrices with trace 1.

To two different mixed states can correspond the same density matrix.

Two mixes states with the same density matrix are physically undistinguishable.

# MAXIMALLY MIXED STATES

To the maximally mixed state

 $\left(\frac{1}{2}, |0
ight), \left(\frac{1}{2}, |1
ight)$ 

which represents a random bit corresponds the density matrix

$$\frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} (1,0) + \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} (0,1) = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{2} I_2$$

Surprisingly, many other mixed states have density matrix that is the same as that of the maximally mixed state.

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### QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

CLASSICAL ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem

QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem

plaintext: an n-qubit string  $|p\rangle = |p_1\rangle \dots |p_n\rangle$ 

cryptotext: an n-qubit string  $|c\rangle = |c_1\rangle \dots |c_n\rangle$ 

shared key: two n-bit strings k,k'

encoding:  $|c_i\rangle = \sigma_x^{k_i} \sigma_z^{k'_i} |p_i\rangle$ 

decoding:  $|\mathbf{p}_i\rangle = \sigma_x^{k_i} \sigma_z^{k'_i} |\mathbf{c}_i\rangle$ 

SHANNON's THEOREMS

are Pauli matrices.

plaintext an n-bit string c shared key an n-bit string c cryptotext an n-bit string c

encoding  $c = p \oplus k$ 

decoding  $p = c \oplus k$ 

### UNCONDITIONAL SECURITY of QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD

In the case of encryption of a qubit

$$|\phi\rangle = \alpha |\mathbf{0}\rangle + \beta |\mathbf{1}\rangle$$

by **QUANTUM ONE-TIME PAD cryptosystem**, what is being transmitted is the mixed state

$$\left(\frac{1}{4}, |\phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{x} |\phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{z} |\phi\rangle\right), \left(\frac{1}{4}, \sigma_{x} \sigma_{z} |\phi\rangle\right)$$

whose density matrix is

 $\frac{1}{2}I_2$ 

This density matrix is identical to the density matrix corresponding to that of a random bit, that is to the mixed state

 $\Bigl(rac{1}{2},|0
angle\Bigr),\Bigl(rac{1}{2},|1
angle\Bigr)$ 

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# COMPOSED QUANTUM SYSTEMS (1)

#### Tensor product of vectors

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 $(x_1,\ldots,x_n)\otimes(y_1,\ldots,y_m)=(x_1y_1,\ldots,x_1y_m,x_2y_1,\ldots,x_2y_m,\ldots,x_2y_m,\ldots,x_ny_1,\ldots,x_ny_m)$ 

Tensor product of matrices  $A \otimes B = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11}B & \dots & a_{1n}B \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ a_{n1}B & \dots & a_{nn}B \end{pmatrix}$ where  $A = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & \dots & a_{1n} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \end{pmatrix}$ 

$$\begin{pmatrix} a_{n1} & \dots & a_{nn} \end{pmatrix}$$
Example  $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} & 0 & 0 \\ a_{21} & a_{22} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & a_{11} & a_{12} \\ 0 & 0 & a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix}$ 

$$\begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & 0 & a_{12} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{11} & 0 & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & 0 & a_{22} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{21} & 0 & a_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$

Shannon classical encryption theorem says that n bits are necessary and sufficient to encrypt securely n bits.

where  $|p_i\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} a_i \\ b_i \end{pmatrix}$  and  $|c_i\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} d_i \\ e_i \end{pmatrix}$  are qubits and  $\sigma_x = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$  with  $\sigma_z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$ 

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Quantum version of Shannon encryption theorem says that 2n classical bits are necessary and sufficient to encrypt securely n qubits.

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# COMPOSED QUANTUM SYSTEMS (2)

to Hilbert spaces  $H_1$  and  $H_2$ .

Tensor product of Hilbert spaces  $H_1 \otimes H_2$  is the complex vector space spanned by tensor products of vectors from  $H_1$  and  $H_2$ . That corresponds

An important difference between classical and quantum systems

to the quantum system composed of the quantum systems corresponding

A state of a compound classical (quantum) system can be (cannot be) always composed from the states of the subsystem.

# QUANTUM REGISTERS

A general state of a 2-qubit register is:

$$|\phi\rangle = \alpha_{00}|00\rangle + \alpha_{01}|01\rangle + \alpha_{10}|10\rangle + \alpha_{11}|11\rangle$$

where

$$|\alpha_{00}|^2 + |\alpha_{01}|^2 + |\alpha_{10}|^2 + |\alpha_{11}|^2 = 1$$

and  $|00\rangle$ ,  $|01\rangle$ ,  $|10\rangle$ ,  $|11\rangle$  are vectors of the "standard" basis of  $H_4$ , i.e.

$$|00
angle = egin{pmatrix} 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \end{pmatrix} |01
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \end{pmatrix} |10
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \end{pmatrix} |11
angle = egin{pmatrix} 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

An important unitary matrix of degree 4, to transform states of 2-qubit registers:

$$CNOT = XOR = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

It holds:

 $\mathsf{CNOT}: |x, y\rangle \Rightarrow |x, x \oplus y\rangle$ 

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QUANTUM MEASUREMENT	NO-CLONING THEOREM
of the states of 2-qubit registers $ \phi\rangle = \alpha_{00} 00\rangle + \alpha_{01} 01\rangle + \alpha_{10} 10\rangle + \alpha_{11} 11\rangle$ $Measurement with respect to the basis { 00\rangle,  01\rangle,  10\rangle,  11\rangle}$ RESULTS: $ 00\rangle \text{ and } 00 \text{ with probability }  \alpha_{00} ^{2}$ $ 01\rangle \text{ and } 01 \text{ with probability }  \alpha_{01} ^{2}$ $ 10\rangle \text{ and } 10 \text{ with probability }  \alpha_{11} ^{2}$ $Measurement of particular qubits:$ By measuring the first qubit we get $0 \text{ with probability }  \alpha_{00} ^{2} +  \alpha_{01} ^{2}$ and $ \phi\rangle$ is reduced to the vector $\frac{\alpha_{00} 00\rangle + \alpha_{01} 01\rangle}{\sqrt{ \alpha_{10} ^{2} +  \alpha_{11} ^{2}}}$ $1 \text{ with probability }  \alpha_{10} ^{2} +  \alpha_{11} ^{2}$ and $ \phi\rangle$ is reduced to the vector $\frac{\alpha_{10} 10\rangle + \alpha_{11} 11\rangle}{\sqrt{ \alpha_{10} ^{2} +  \alpha_{11} ^{2}}}$	INFORMAL VERSION: Unknown quantum state cannot be cloned. FORMAL VERSION: There is no unitary transformation U such that for any qubit state $ \psi\rangle$ $U( \psi\rangle 0\rangle) =  \psi\rangle \psi\rangle$ PROOF: Assume U exists and for two different states $ \alpha\rangle$ and $ \beta\rangle$ $U( \alpha\rangle 0\rangle) =  \alpha\rangle \alpha\rangle \qquad U( \beta\rangle 0\rangle) =  \beta\rangle \beta\rangle$ Let $ \gamma\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}( \alpha\rangle +  \beta\rangle)$ Then $U( \gamma\rangle 0\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}( \alpha\rangle \alpha\rangle +  \beta\rangle \beta\rangle) \neq  \gamma\rangle \gamma\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}( \alpha\rangle \alpha\rangle +  \beta\rangle \beta\rangle +  \alpha\rangle \beta\rangle +  \beta\rangle \alpha\rangle)$ However, CNOT can make copies of basis states $ 0\rangle,  1\rangle$ : $CNOT( x\rangle 0\rangle) =  x\rangle x\rangle$

States

$$egin{aligned} |\Phi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle+|11
angle), & |\Phi^-
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle-|11
angle) \ |\Psi^+
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle+|10
angle), & |\Psi^-
angle &=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01
angle-|10
angle) \end{aligned}$$

form an orthogonal (Bell) basis in  $H_4$  and play an important role in quantum computing.

Theoretically, there is an observable for this basis. However, no one has been able to construct a measuring device for Bell measurement using linear elements only.

### QUANTUM n-qubit REGISTER

A general state of an n-qubit register has the form:

$$|\phi\rangle = \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} \alpha_i |i\rangle = \sum_{i \in \{0,1\}^n} \alpha_i |i\rangle, \text{ where } \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |\alpha_i|^2 = \mathbb{I}$$

and  $|\phi\rangle$  is a vector in  $H_{2^n}$ .

Operators on n-qubits registers are unitary matrices of degree  $2^n$ .

Is it difficult to create a state of an n-qubit register?

In general yes, in some important special cases not. For example, if n-qubit Hadamard transformation

$$H_n = \bigotimes_{i=1}^n H.$$

is used then

$$H_n|0^{(n)}\rangle = \otimes_{i=1}^n H|0\rangle = \otimes_{i=1}^n |0'\rangle = |0'^{(n)}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |i\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} |x\rangle$$

and, in general, for 
$$x \in \{0,1\}^n$$

$$|H_n|x
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{x\in\{0,1\}^n}{(-1)^{x\cdot y}|y
angle}. \ ^1$$

<sup>1</sup>The dot product is defined as follows:  $x \cdot y = \bigotimes_{i=1}^{n} x_i y_i$ . prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography

IN WHAT LIES POWER OF QUANTUM COMPUTING?

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# QUANTUM PARALLELISM

lf

$$f: \{0,1,\ldots,2^n-1\} \Rightarrow \{0,1,\ldots,2^n-1\}$$

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then the mapping

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 $f':(x,0) \Rightarrow (x,f(x))$ 

is one-to-one and therefore there is a unitary transformation  $U_f$  such that.

$$U_f(|x\rangle|0\rangle) \Rightarrow |x\rangle|f(x)\rangle$$

Let us have the state

$$|\Psi
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}|i
angle|0
angle$$

With a single application of the mapping  $U_f$  we then get

$$|U_f|\Psi
angle=rac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1}|i
angle|f(i)
angle$$

# OBSERVE THAT IN A SINGLE COMPUTATIONAL STEP 2" VALUES OF f ARE COMPUTED!

In quantum superposition or in quantum parallelism?

NOT, in QUANTUM ENTANGLEMENT!

Let
$$|\psi
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00
angle + |11
angle)$$

be a state of two very distant particles, **for example** on two planets Measurement of one of the particles, with respect to the standard basis, makes the above state to collapse to one of the states

|00
angle or |11
angle.

This means that subsequent measurement of other particle (on another planet) provides the same result as the measurement of the first particle. This indicate that in quantum world non-local influences, correlations, exist.

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POWER of ENTANGLEMENT	CLASSICAL versus QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY	
<ul> <li>Quantum state  Ψ⟩ of a composed bipartite quantum system A ⊗ B is called entangled if it cannot be decomposed into tensor product of the states from A and B.</li> <li>Quantum entanglement is an important quantum resource that allows</li> <li>To create phenomena that are impossible in the classical world (for example teleportation)</li> <li>To create quantum algorithms that are asymptotically more efficient than any classical algorithm known for the same problem.</li> <li>To create communication protocols that are asymptotically more efficient than classical communication protocols for the same task</li> <li>To create, for two parties, shared secret binary keys</li> <li>To increase capacity of quantum channels</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Security of classical cryptography is based on unproven assumption computational complexity (and it can be jeopardize by progress in algorithms and/or technology).</li> <li>Security of quantum cryptography is based on laws of quantum plathat allow to build systems where undetectable eavesdropping is impossible.</li> <li>Since classical cryptography is vulnerable to technological improvements it has to be designed in such a way that a secret is secure with respect to future technology, during the whole perio which the secrecy is required.</li> <li>Quantum key generation, on the other hand, needs to be designed to be secure against technology available at the moment of key generation.</li> </ul>	
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QUANTUM KEY GENERATION	QUANTUM KEY GENERATION – EPR METHOD	
Quantum protocols for using quantum systems to achieve unconditionally secure generation of secret (classical) keys by two parties are one of the main theoretical achievements of quantum information processing and communication research.	Let Alice and Bob share n pairs of particles in the entangled EPR-state. $rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}( 00 angle+ 11 angle).$	
Moreover, experimental systems for implementing such protocols are one of the main achievements of experimental quantum information processing research. It is believed and hoped that it will be		
quantum key generation (QKG)		
another term is	n pairs of particles in EPR state	
quantum key distribution (QKD)		

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# **POLARIZATION of PHOTONS**

### POLARIZATION of PHOTONS

Polarized photons are currently mainly used for experimental quantum key generation.

Photon, or light quantum, is a particle composing light and other forms of electromagnetic radiation.

Photons are electromagnetic waves and their electric and magnetic fields are perpendicular to the direction of propagation and also to each other.

An important property of photons is polarization – it refers to the bias of the electric field in the electromagnetic field of the photon.




Figure 6: Electric and magnetic fields of a linearly polarized photon

# **POLARIZATION of PHOTONS**

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There is no way to determine exactly polarization of a single photon.

However, for any angle  $\theta$  there are  $\theta$ -polarizers – "filters" – that produce  $\theta$ -polarized photons from an incoming stream of photons and they let  $\theta_1$ -polarized photons to get through with probability  $\cos^2(\theta - \theta_1)$ .





Figure 6: Photon polarizers and measuring devices-80%

Photons whose electronic fields oscillate in a plane at either  $0^{\circ}$  or  $90^{\circ}$  to some reference line are called usually rectilinearly polarized and those whose electric field oscillates in a plane at  $45^{\circ}$  or  $135^{\circ}$  as diagonally polarized. Polarizers that produce only vertically or horizontally polarized photons are depicted in Figure 6 a, b.

osing light and other forms of	t y
electric and magnetic fields are and also to each other.	X
tion — it refers to the bias of the ne photon.	Z
	Figure 6: Electric and magnetic fields of a linearly polarized photon
	If the electric field vector is always parallel to a fixed line we have <b>linear polarization</b> (see Figure).

# POLARIZATION of PHOTONS

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Generation of orthogonally polarized photons.

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Figure 6: Photon polarizers and measuring devices-80%

For any two orthogonal polarizations there are generators that produce photons of two given orthogonal polarizations. For example, a calcite crystal, properly oriented, can do the job.

Fig. c – a calcite crystal that makes  $\theta$ -polarized photons to be horizontally (vertically) polarized with probability  $\cos^2\theta(\sin^2\theta)$ .

Fig. d – a calcite crystal can be used to separate horizontally and vertically polarized photons.

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## QUANTUM KEY GENERATION - PROLOGUE

much it costs in terms of the disturbance of the system.

**I** Eve has no information about the state  $|\psi\rangle$  Alice sends.

orthonormal and that  $p_i$  is the probability that  $|\psi\rangle = |\phi_i\rangle$ .

eavesdropper, Eve, and sends it to Bob.

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to learn, or to change, as much as possible, without being detected.

copied and cannot be measured without causing, in general, a disturbance.

Very basic setting Alice tries to send a quantum system to Bob and an eavesdropper tries

Eavesdroppers have this time especially hard time, because quantum states cannot be

The question is how much information can Eve extract of that quantum system and how

Three special cases

Key problem: Alice prepares a quantum system in a specific way, unknown to the

**Z** Eve knows that  $|\psi\rangle$  is one of the states of an orthonormal basis  $\{|\phi_i\rangle\}_{i=1}^n$ .

**B** Eve knows that  $|\psi\rangle$  is one of the states  $|\phi_1\rangle, \ldots, |\phi_n\rangle$  that **are not** mutually

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# **TRANSMISSION ERRORS**

If Alice sends randomly chosen bit

0 encoded randomly as  $|0\rangle$  or  $|0'\rangle$ 

or

1 encoded as randomly as  $|1\rangle$  or  $|1'\rangle$ 

and Bob measures the encoded bit by choosing randomly the standard or the dual basis, then the probability of error is  $\frac{1}{4} = \frac{2}{8}$ 

If Eve measures the encoded bit, sent by Alice, according to the randomly chosen basis, standard or dual, then she can learn the bit sent with the probability 75% .

If she then sends the state obtained after the measurement to Bob and he measures it with respect to the standard or dual basis, randomly chosen, then the probability of error for his measurement is  $\frac{3}{8}$  – a 50% increase with respect to the case there was no eavesdropping.

Indeed the error is

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1  1	$+\frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2})$	1	1	3)	_ 3
$\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{4}$	$\overline{2}\sqrt{2}$	4	2	· 4)	<u> </u>

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random

random

correct

correct

random

random

correct

0/1 (prob.  $\frac{1}{2}$ )

0/1 (prob.  $\frac{1}{2}$ )

0 (prob. 1)

1 (prob. 1)

0/1 (prob.  $\frac{1}{2}$ )

0/1 (prob.  $\frac{1}{2}$ )

1 (prob. 1)

BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL	BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL
Quantum key generation protocol BB84 (due to Bennett and Brassard), for generation of a key of length n, has several phases: Preparation phase Alice is assumed to have four transmitters of photons in one of the following four polarizations 0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees	(In accordance with the laws of quantum physics, there is no detector that could distinguish between unorthogonal polarizations.) (In a more formal setting, Bob can measure the incomming photons either in the standard basis $B = \{ 0\rangle,  1\rangle\}$ or in the dual basis $D = \{ 0'\rangle,  1'\rangle\}$ . To send a bit 0 (1) of her first random sequence through a quantum channel Alice chooses, on the basis of her second random sequence, one of the encodings $ 0\rangle$ or $ 0'\rangle$ ( $ 1\rangle$ or $ 1'\rangle$ ), i.e., in the standard or dual basis, Bob chooses, each time on the base of his private random sequence, one of the bases B or D to measure the photon he is to receive and he records the results of his measurements and keeps them secret.
$ 1'>=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}( 0>- 1>) \qquad  0> \qquad  0'>=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}( 0>+ 1>) \qquad  1'>$	Alice's         Bob's         Alice's state         The result         Correctness           encodings         observables         relative to Bob         and its probability         Its probability
	$  0 \rightarrow   0 \rangle = 0 \rightarrow B $ $  0 \rangle = 0 (prob. 1) $ correct

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(a)	1 >	(b)	
. г. о			

Figure 8: Polarizations of photons for BB84 and B92 protocols

Expressed in a more general form, Alice uses for encoding states from the set  $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle, |0'\rangle, |1'\rangle\}.$ 

Bob has a detector that can be set up to distinguish between rectilinear polarizations (0 and 90 degrees) or can be quickly reset to distinguish between diagonal polarizations (45 and 135 degrees).

Figure 9: Quantum cryptography with BB84 protocol

 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0'\rangle+|1'\rangle)$ 

 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)$ 

0'

 $|1\rangle$ 

 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0'\rangle - |1'\rangle)$ 

 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle+|1\rangle)$ 

 $|1'\rangle$ 

Figure 9 shows the possible results of the measurements and their probabilities.

 $1 \rightarrow D$ 

 $0 \rightarrow B$ 

 $1 \rightarrow D$ 

 $0 \rightarrow B$ 

 $1 \rightarrow D$ 

 $0 \rightarrow B$ 

 $1 \rightarrow D$ 

 $0 \rightarrow |0\rangle$ 

 $0 \rightarrow |0'\rangle$ 

1 
ightarrow |1
angle


1 
ightarrow |1'
angle

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BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL	BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL
An example of an encoding – decoding process is in the Figure 10. Raw key extraction Bob makes public the sequence of bases he used to measure the photons he received – but not the results of the measurements – and Alice tells Bob, through a classical channel, in which cases he has chosen the same basis for measurement as she did for encoding. The corresponding bits then form the basic raw key. $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1$	Test for eavesdropping         Alice and Bob agree on a sequence of indices of the raw key and make the corresponding bits of their raw keys public.         Case 1. Noiseless channel. If the subsequences chosen by Alice and Bob are not completely identical eavesdropping is detected. Otherwise, the remaining bits are taken as creating the final key.         Case 2. Noisy channel. If the subsequences chosen by Alice and Bob contains more errors than the admitable error of the channel (that has to be determined from channel characteristics), then eavesdropping is assumed. Otherwise, the remaining bits are taken as the next result of the raw key generation process.         Error correction phase         In the case of a noisy channel for transmission it may happen that Alice and Bob have different raw keys after the key generation phase.         A way out is to use qa special error correction techniques and at the end of this stage both Alice and Bob share identical keys.
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BB84 QUANTUM KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL	EXPERIMENTAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
Privacy amplification phase One problem remains. Eve can still have quite a bit of information about the key both Alice and Bob share. Privacy amplification is a tool to deal with such a case.	<ul> <li>Successes</li> <li>Transmissions using optical fibers to the distance of 120 km.</li> <li>Open air transmissions to the distance 144 km at day time (from one pick of Canary Islands to another).</li> </ul>

### QUANTUM TELEPORTATION

Quantum teleportation allows to transmit unknown quantum information to a very distant place in spite of impossibility to measure or to broadcast information to be transmitted.



$$\begin{split} |\Phi^+\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle) & |\Phi^-\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle - |11\rangle) \\ |\Psi^+\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle + |10\rangle) & |\Psi^-\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle) \\ \end{split}$$

### QUANTUM TELEPORTATION II

If the first two particles of the state

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$$\begin{split} |\psi\rangle|\textit{EPR}-\textit{pair}\rangle &= |\Phi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) + |\Psi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\beta|0\rangle + \alpha|1\rangle) + |\Phi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\alpha|0\rangle - \beta|1\rangle) + |\Psi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (-\beta|0\rangle + \alpha|1\rangle) \end{split}$$

are measured with respect to the Bell basis then Bob's particle gets into the mixed state

$$\left(\frac{1}{4},\alpha|\mathbf{0}\rangle+\beta|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\alpha|\mathbf{0}\rangle-\beta|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\beta|\mathbf{0}\rangle+\alpha|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)\oplus\left(\frac{1}{4},\beta|\mathbf{0}\rangle-\alpha|\mathbf{1}\rangle\right)$$

to which corresponds the density matrix

$$\frac{1}{4}\binom{\alpha^*}{\beta^*}(\alpha,\beta) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\alpha^*}{-\beta^*}(\alpha,-\beta) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\beta^*}{\alpha^*}(\beta,\alpha) + \frac{1}{4}\binom{\beta^*}{-\alpha^*}(\beta,-\alpha) = \frac{1}{2}$$

The resulting density matrix is identical to the density matrix for the mixed state

$$\left(rac{1}{2}, |0
angle
ight) \oplus \left(rac{1}{2}, |1
angle
ight)$$

Indeed, the density matrix for the last mixed state has the form

$$rac{1}{2}inom{1}{0}(1,0)+rac{1}{2}inom{0}{1}(0,1)=rac{1}{2}inom{1}{2}$$

# QUANTUM TELEPORTATION I

Total state of three particles:

$$|\psi
angle| \textit{EPR} - \textit{pair}
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (lpha|000
angle + lpha|011
angle + eta|100
angle + eta|111
angle)$$

can be expressed as follows:

$$\begin{split} |\psi\rangle|EPR-pair\rangle &= |\Phi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle) + |\Psi^+\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\beta|0\rangle + \alpha|1\rangle) + |\Phi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha|0\rangle - \beta|1\rangle) + |\Psi^-\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(-\beta|0\rangle + \alpha|1\rangle) \end{split}$$

and therefore Bell measurement of the first two particles projects the state of Bob's particle into a "small modification"  $|\psi_1\rangle$  of the state  $|\psi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$ ,

$$|\Psi_1
angle =$$
 either  $|\Psi
angle$  or  $\sigma_x|\Psi
angle$  or  $\sigma_z|\Psi
angle$  or  $\sigma_x\sigma_z|\psi
angle$ 

The unknown state  $|\psi\rangle$  can therefore be obtained from  $|\psi_1\rangle$  by applying one of the four operations

$$\sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_z, I$$

and the result of the Bell measurement provides two bits specifying which of the above four operations should be applied.

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These four bits Alice needs to send to Bob using a classical channel (by email, for example).

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# **QUANTUM TELEPORTATION – COMMENTS**

- Alice can be seen as dividing information contained in  $|\psi\rangle$  into quantum information – transmitted through EPR channel classical information – transmitted through a classical cahnnel
- In a quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state  $|\phi\rangle$  can be disassembled into, and later reconstructed from, two classical bit-states and an maximally entangled pure quantum state.
- Using quantum teleportation an unknown quantum state can be teleported from one place to another by a sender who does need to know - for teleportation itself neither the state to be teleported nor the location of the intended receiver.
- The teleportation procedure can not be used to transmit information faster than light

but

it can be argued that quantum information presented in unknown state is transmitted instanteneously (except two random bits to be transmitted at the speed of light at most).

EPR channel is irreversibly destroyed during the teleportation process.

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DARPA Network	WHY IS QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING SO IMPORTANT
<ul> <li>In Cambridge connecting Harward, Boston Uni, and BBN Technology (10,19 and 29 km).</li> <li>Currently 6 nodes, in near future 10 nodes.</li> <li>Continuously operating since March 2004</li> <li>Three technologies: lasers through optic fibers, entanglement through fiber and free-space QKD (in future two versions of it).</li> <li>Implementation of BB84 with authentication, sifting error correction and privacy amplification.</li> <li>One 2x2 switch to make sender-receiver connections</li> <li>Capability to overcome several limitations of stand-alone QKD systems.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>QIPC is believed to lead to new Quantum Information Processing Technology that could have broad impacts.</li> <li>Several areas of science and technology are approaching such points in their development where they badly need expertise with storing, transmision and processing of particles.</li> <li>It is increasingly believed that new, quantum information processing based, understanding of (complex) quantum phenomena and systems can be developed.</li> <li>Quantum cryptography seems to offer new level of security and be soon feasible.</li> <li>QIPC has been shown to be more efficient in interesting/important cases.</li> </ul>
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prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 57/62 UNIVERSAL SETS of QUANTUM GATES	prof. Jozef Gruska IV054 13. Quantum cryptography 58/62 FUNDAMENTAL RESULTS

QUANTUM ALGORITHMS	EXAMPLES of QUANTUM ALGORITHMS
<ul> <li>Quantum algorithms are methods of using quantum circuits and processors to solve algorithmic problems.</li> <li>On a more technical level, a design of a quantum algorithm can be seen as a process of an efficient decomposition of a complex unitary transformation into products of elementary unitary operations (or gates), performing simple local changes.</li> <li>The four main features of quantum mechanics that are exploited in quantum computation: <ul> <li>Superposition;</li> <li>Interference;</li> <li>Entanglement;</li> <li>Measurement.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Deutsch problem: Given is a black-box function f: $\{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ , how many queries are needed to find out whether f is constant or balanced: Classically: 2 Quantumly: 1 Deutsch-Jozsa Problem: Given is a black-box function $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ and a promise that f is either constant or balanced, how many querries are needed to find out whether f is constant or balanced. Classically: n Quantumly 1 Factorization of integers: all classical algorithms are exponential. Peter Shor developed polynomial time quantum algorithm Search of an element in an unordered database of n elements: Clasically n queries are needed in the worst case Lov Grover showen that quantumly $\sqrt{n}$ queries are enough
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