

Semantic Pre-processing of Anaphoric References

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Abstract. In the paper we describe the method of encoding communication of agents in a multi-agent system (MAS). The autonomous agents communicate with each other by exchanging messages formulated in a near-to-natural language. Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) is an expressive system primarily designed for the logical analysis of natural language; thus we make use of TIL as a tool for encoding the semantic content of messages. The hyper-intensional features of TIL analysis are described in particular with respect to agents' attitudes and anaphoric references. By an example we illustrate the way TIL can function as a dynamic logic of discourse where anaphoric pronouns refer to entities of any type, even constructions, i.e. the structured meanings of other expressions.

1 Introduction

Multi-agent system (MAS) is a system composed of autonomous, intelligent but resource-bounded agents. The agents are active in their perceiving environment and acting in order to achieve their individual as well as collective goals. As a whole, the system of collaborative agents is able to deal with the situations that are hardly manageable by an individual agent or a monolithic centralised system. The agents communicate and collaborate with each other by exchanging messages formulated in a standardised natural language. According to the FIPA standards¹ for MAS, a *message* is the basic unit of communication. It can be of an arbitrary form but it is supposed to have a structure containing several attributes. Message semantic *content* is one of these attributes, the other being for instance 'Performatives', like 'Query', 'Inform', 'Request' or 'Reply'. The content can be encoded in any suitable language. The FIPA standard languages (for instance the SL language or KIF) are mostly based on the First-Order Logic (FOL) paradigm, enriched with higher-order constructs wherever needed. The enrichments extending FOL are well defined syntactically, while their semantics is often rather sketchy, which may lead to communication inconsistencies. Moreover, the bottom-up development from FOL to more complicated cases yields the versions that do not fully meet the needs of the MAS communication. In particular, agents' attitudes and anaphora processing create a problem. In the paper we focus on agents' communication, and we are going to demonstrate the need for an expressive logical tool of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) for encoding the semantic content of messages.

¹ The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, <http://www.fipa.org>

The paper is organised as follows. After briefly introducing TIL philosophy and motivations in the next Section 2, in Section 3 we describe the method of analysing sentences with anaphoric references occurring in any context; extensional, intensional, or even hyperintensional context of attitudes. By way of an example we demonstrate in Section 4 how TIL functions as the logic of dynamic discourse. Finally, a few notes on TIL implementation by the TIL-Script language are contained in concluding Section 5.

2 Basic notions of Transparent Intensional Logic

TIL *constructions* are uniquely assigned to expressions as their structured meanings. Intuitively, construction is a procedure (an instruction or a generalised algorithm), that consists of particular sub-instructions on how to proceed in order to obtain the output entity given some input entities. Thus the sense of a sentence is a hyper-proposition, i.e., the *construction* of a proposition denoted by the sentence. The denoted proposition is a flat mapping with the domain of possible worlds. Our motive for working ‘top-down’ has to do with anti-contextualism: any given term or expression (even one involving indexicals or anaphoric pronouns) expresses the same construction as its sense (meaning) in whatever sort of context the term or expression is embedded within. And the meaning of an expression determines the respective denoted entity (if any), but not vice versa. However, some terms, like those with indexicals or anaphoric pronouns, express only incomplete meanings (open constructions) and, therefore, only *v*(aluation)-denote, being insofar sensitive to which context they are embedded in.

There are two kinds of constructions, atomic and compound. Atomic constructions (*Variables* and *Trivializations*) do not contain any other constituent but itself; they supply objects (of any type) on which compound constructions operate. *Variables* x, y, p, q, \dots , construct objects dependently on a valuation; they *v*-construct. *Trivialisation* of an object X (of any type, even a construction), in symbols 0X , constructs simply X without the mediation of any other construction. *Compound* constructions, which consist of other constituents, are *Composition* and *Closure*. *Composition* $[F A_1 \dots A_n]$ is the instruction to apply a function f (*v*-constructed by F) to an argument A (*v*-constructed by $A_1 \dots A_n$).² Thus it *v*-constructs the value of f at A , if the function f is defined at A , otherwise the Composition is *v*-improper, i.e., it does not *v*-construct anything. *Closure* $[\lambda x_1 \dots x_n X]$ is the instruction to *v*-construct a function by abstracting over variables x_1, \dots, x_n in the ordinary manner of λ -calculi. Finally, higher-order constructions can be used twice over as constituents of composed constructions. This is achieved by a fifth construction called *Double Execution*, 2X , that behaves as follows: If X *v*-constructs a construction X' , and X' *v*-constructs an entity Y , then 2X *v*-constructs Y ; otherwise 2X is *v*-improper.

TIL constructions, as well as the entities they construct, all receive a type. The formal ontology of TIL is bi-dimensional; one dimension is made up of

² We treat functions as mappings, i.e., set-theoretical objects, unlike the *constructions* of functions.

constructions, the other dimension encompasses non-constructions. On the ground level of the type-hierarchy, there are entities unstructured from the algorithmic point of view belonging to a *type of order 1*. Given a so-called *epistemic (or 'objectual') base* of *atomic types* (o -truth values, ι -individuals, τ -time moments / real numbers, ω -possible worlds), the induction rule for forming functions is applied: where $\alpha, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_n$ are types of order 1, the set of partial mappings from $\beta_1 \times \dots \times \beta_n$ to α , denoted $(\alpha \beta_1 \dots \beta_n)$, is a type of order 1 as well.³ Constructions that construct entities of order 1 are *constructions of order 1*. They belong to a *type of order 2*, denoted by $*_1$. This type $*_1$ together with atomic types of order 1 serves as a base for the induction rule: any collection of partial mappings, type $(\alpha \beta_1 \dots \beta_n)$, involving $*_1$ in their domain or range is a *type of order 2*. Constructions belonging to a type $*_2$ that identify entities of order 1 or 2, and partial mappings involving such constructions, belong to a *type of order 3*. And so on *ad infinitum*.

An object A of a type α is called an α -object, denoted A/α . That a construction C v -constructs an α -object is denoted $C \rightarrow_v \alpha$. Quantifiers, \forall^α (the general one) and \exists^α (the existential one), are of types $(o(o\alpha))$, i.e., sets of sets of α -objects.⁴ $[^0\forall^\alpha \lambda x A]$ v -constructs True iff $[\lambda x A]$ v -constructs the whole type α , otherwise False; $[^0\exists^\alpha \lambda x A]$ v -constructs True iff $[\lambda x A]$ v -constructs a non-empty subset of the type α , otherwise False. We write ' $\forall x A$ ', ' $\exists x A$ ' instead of ' $[^0\forall^\alpha \lambda x A]$ ', ' $[^0\exists^\alpha \lambda x A]$ ', respectively, when no confusion can arise. Singularisers ι^α are of types $(\alpha(o\alpha))$; $[^0\iota^\alpha \lambda x A]$ v -constructs the only α -member of the singleton v -constructed by $\lambda x A$, otherwise (i.e., if $\lambda x A$ v -constructs an empty class or a multi-element class) v -improper.

We use an infix notation without trivialisation when using constructions of truth-value functions \wedge (conjunction), \vee (disjunction), \supset (implication), \equiv (equivalence) and negation (\neg), and when using a construction of an identity.

(α) -intensions are members of a type $(\alpha\omega)$, i.e., functions from possible worlds to an arbitrary type α . (α) -extensions are members of the type α , where α is not equal to $(\beta\omega)$ for any β , i.e., extensions are not functions from possible worlds. Intensions are frequently functions of a type $((\alpha\tau)\omega)$, i.e., functions from possible worlds to *chronologies* of the type α (in symbols: $\alpha_{\tau\omega}$), where a chronology is a function of type $(\alpha\tau)$. We will use variables w, w_1, \dots as v -constructing elements of type ω (possible worlds), and t, t_1, \dots as v -constructing elements of type τ (times). If $C \rightarrow \alpha_{\tau\omega}$ v -constructs an α -intension, the frequently used Composition of the form $[[Cw]t]$, the intensional descent of the α -intension, is abbreviated as C_{wt} .

Some important kinds of intensions are:

Propositions, type $o_{\tau\omega}$. They are denoted by empirical (declarative) sentences.

³ TIL is an open-ended system. The above epistemic base $\{o, \iota, \tau, \omega\}$ was chosen, because it is apt for natural-language analysis, but the choice of base depends on the area to be analysed. ⁴ Collections, sets, classes of ' α -objects' are members of type $(o\alpha)$; TIL handles classes (subsets of a type) as characteristic functions. Similarly relations ($-in$ -extension) are of type(s) $(o\beta_1 \dots \beta_n)$.

Properties of members of a type α , or simply *α -properties*, type $(o\alpha)_{\tau\omega}$. General terms (some substantives, intransitive verbs) denote properties, mostly of individuals.

Relations-in-intension, type $(o\beta_1\dots\beta_m)_{\tau\omega}$. For example transitive empirical verbs, also attitudinal verbs denote these relations.

α -roles, offices, type $\alpha_{\tau\omega}$, where $\alpha \neq (o\beta)$. Frequently $\iota_{\tau\omega}$. Often denoted by concatenation of a superlative and a noun (“*the highest mountain*”).

Example: We are going to analyse the sentence “Adam is looking for a parking place”. Our method of analysis consists of three steps:

1. *Type-theoretical analysis*, i.e., assigning types to the objects talked about by the analysed sentence. In our case we have:
 - (a) *Adam*/ ι ;
 - (b) *Look_for*/ $(o\iota(o\iota)_{\tau\omega})_{\tau\omega}$ —the relation-in-intension of an individual to a property of individuals: the seeker wants to find an instance of the property;
 - (c) *Parking(Place)*/ $(o\iota)_{\tau\omega}$ —the property of individuals.
2. *Synthesis*, i.e., composing the constructions of the objects *ad* (1) in order to construct the proposition of type $o_{\tau\omega}$ denoted by the whole sentence. The sentence claims that the individual Adam has the ‘seeking-property’ of looking for a parking place. Thus we have to construct the individual Adam, the ‘seeking-property’, and then apply the latter to the former. Here is how:
 - (a) The atomic construction of the individual called Adam is simply ${}^0\textit{Adam}$;
 - (b) The ‘seeking-property’ has to be constructed by Composing the relation-in-intension *Look_for* with a seeker $x \rightarrow \iota$ and the property *Parking*/ $(o\iota)_{\tau\omega}$ an instance of which is being sought: $[{}^0\textit{Look_for}_{wt}x \ {}^0\textit{Parking}] \ v$ —constructing a truth value. Abstracting first from x by $\lambda x[{}^0\textit{Look_for}_{wt}x \ {}^0\textit{Parking}]$ we obtain the class of individuals; abstracting further from w and t we obtain the ‘seeking-property’: $\lambda w\lambda t [\lambda x[{}^0\textit{Look_for}_{wt}x \ {}^0\textit{Parking}]]$.
 - (c) Now we have to Compose the property constructed *ad* (b) with the individual constructed *ad* (a). The property has to be subjected to the intensional descent first, i.e., $[\lambda w\lambda t [\lambda x[{}^0\textit{Look_for}_{wt}x \ {}^0\textit{Parking}]]]_{wt}$ and then Composed with the former.⁵ Since we are going to construct a proposition, i.e., an intension, we finally have to abstract from w, t :


$$\lambda w\lambda t [[\lambda w\lambda t [\lambda x[{}^0\textit{Look_for}_{wt}x \ {}^0\textit{Parking}]]]_{wt}^0 \textit{Adam}].$$

This construction is the literal analysis of our sentence. It can be still β -reduced to the equivalent form:

$$\lambda w\lambda t [{}^0\textit{Look_for}_{wt} \ {}^0\textit{Adam} \ {}^0\textit{Parking}].$$

⁵ For details on predication of properties and relations-in-intension of individuals, see Jespersen (forthcoming).

3. *Type-Theoretical checking:*



The role of Trivialisation and empirical parameters $w \rightarrow \omega, t \rightarrow \tau$ in the communication between agents can be elucidated as follows. Each agent has to be equipped with a basic ontology, namely the set of primitive concepts (Trivialised objects) she is informed about. Thus the upper index '0' serves as a marker of the primitive concept that the agents should have in their ontology. If they do not, they have to learn them by asking the others. The lower index ' wt ' can be understood as an instruction to execute an *empirical inquiry (search)* in order to obtain the actual current value of an intension, for instance by searching agent's database or by asking the other agents, or even by means of agent's sense perception.

3 Anaphora and Meaning

The problem of an anaphoric reference to a previously used expression is a well-known hard nut of *linguistic analysis*, because the antecedent of the anaphoric reference is often not unambiguously determined. Thus it is often said that anaphora constitutes a pragmatic problem rather than a problem of logical semantics. We agree that *logical analysis* cannot disambiguate any sentence, because it presupposes understanding and full linguistic competence. Yet our method of logical analysis can contribute to solving the problem of disambiguation in at least two respects; (a) a type-theoretical analysis often unambiguously determines which of the possible meanings of a homonymous expression is used in a sentence, and (b) if there are two or more possible readings of a sentence, the logical analysis should make all of them explicit. This often concerns the distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* readings.

In this section we propose a method of *logically* analysing sentences with anaphoric references. The method consists in substituting an appropriate construction of the object to which the anaphora refers for the anaphoric variable. In other words, we perform a *semantic* pre-processing of the embedded anaphoric clause based on the *meaning* of the respective antecedent. In this sense anaphora *is a semantic* problem.

3.1 Semantic pre-processing of Anaphoric References

Our hyperintensional (procedural) semantics makes it possible to apply anti-contextualist and compositional analysis to anaphoric sentences. The meaning of a sentence containing a clause with an anaphoric reference is the procedure which is a two-phase instruction that comes down to this:

- (i) execute the substitution based on the meaning of the antecedent for the anaphoric variable;
- (ii) execute the result (a propositional construction) again to obtain a proposition.

To specify phase (i) we make use of the fact that constructions are objects *sui generis* that the other constructions can operate on. The substitution is realised by a function $Sub/(^*_n^* _n^* _n^* _n^*)$ that operates on constructions C_1 , C_2 and C_3 yielding as output the construction C_4 that is the result of substituting C_1 for C_2 in C_3 . The phase (ii) consists in executing the adjusted meaning, namely the construction pre-processed by phase (i). To this end we use the fifth construction defined above, the *Double Execution*. The method is uniquely applicable to all kinds of sentences, including those that express (*de dicto* / *de re*) attitudes to a hyperintension, attitudes to an intension, and relations (-in-intension) to extensional entities. Now we adduce examples that illustrate the method. (A) “5 + 7 = 12, and Charles knows it.”

The embedded clause “Charles knows it” does not express Charles’ relation(-in-intension) to a truth-value, but to a *construction*, here the *procedure* of calculating the result of $5 + 7 = 12$. Hence $Know(ing)/(oi^*_1)_{\tau\omega}$ is a relation-in-intension of an individual to a construction. However, the meaning of the clause is incomplete; it is an *open* construction with the free variable *it*: $\lambda w \lambda t [^0 Know_{wt} ^0 Charles\ it]$. The variable $it/^*_2 \rightarrow *_1$ is the meaning of the pronoun ‘it’ that in (A) anaphorically refers to the meaning of “5 + 7 = 12”, i.e., the construction $[^0 +^0 5^0 7]$. The meaning of the whole sentence (A) is, however, complete. It is the *closed* construction

$$(A') \quad \lambda w \lambda t [[^0 = ^0 +^0 5^0 7] ^0 12] \wedge z [^0 Sub ^0 0 [^0 = ^0 +^0 5^0 7] ^0 12] ^0 it [\lambda w \lambda t [^0 Know_{wt} ^0 Charles\ it]]]]_{wt}$$

Types: *Charles* / *i*; *Know* / $(oi^*_1)_{\tau\omega}$; *Sub* / $(^*_2^* _2^* _2^* _2^*)$; $it/^*_2 \rightarrow *_1$; the other types are obvious.

Since (A') seems to be rather complicated, we now show that (A') is an adequate analysis meeting our three requirements of compositionality, anti-contextualism and a purely semantic solution. The argument of the second conjunct of (A'), namely

$$(S) \quad [^0 Sub ^0 0 [^0 = ^0 +^0 5^0 7] ^0 12] ^0 it [\lambda w \lambda t [^0 Know_{wt} ^0 Charles\ it]]]_{wt} \rightarrow *_1$$

constructs a *construction* of order 1, namely the one obtained by the substitution of the construction $[^0 = ^0 +^0 5^0 7] ^0 12]$ for the variable *it* into the construction $[\lambda w \lambda t [^0 Know_{wt} ^0 Charles\ it]]$. The result is the construction

$$(S') \quad [\lambda w \lambda t [^0 Know_{wt} ^0 Charles [^0 = ^0 +^0 5^0 7] ^0 12]] ,$$

which constructs a proposition P. But an argument of the truth-value function conjunction (\wedge) can be neither a propositional construction, nor a proposition, but must be a truth-value. Since (S) constructs the construction (S'), and (S') constructs the proposition P, the execution steps have to be: (a) execute (S) to obtain the propositional construction (S'), (b) execute the result (S') to obtain the proposition P; hence we need the Double Execution of (S) to construct the

proposition P, and then (c) P has to undergo intensional descent with respect to the external w, t in order to v -construct a truth-value.

Note that the open construction $\lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 \text{Know}_{wt}^0 \text{Charles } it]$ is assigned to “Charles knows *it*” invariably of a context. The variable *it* is free here either for a pragmatic valuation or for a substitution by means of the meaning of the antecedent that is referred to in the linguistic context. The object—*what* is known by Charles—can be completed by a situation of utterance or by a linguistic context. If the sentence occurs within another linguistic context, then *Sub* substitutes a different construction for the variable *it*, namely the construction to which ‘*it*’ anaphorically refers.

The other example concerns Charles’ attitude of seeking the occupant of an individual office:

(B) “Charles sought the Mayor of Dunedin but (*he*) did not find *him*.”

Suppose now the *de dicto* reading of (B), i.e., that Charles’ search concerned the office of Mayor of Dunedin and not the location of its holder. The function *Sub* creates a new construction from constructions and, so, can easily be iterated. The analysis of (B) is:

$$(B^d) \quad \lambda w \lambda t [[{}^0 \text{Seek}_{wt} \text{ } {}^0 \text{Ch } \lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 \text{Mayor_of}_{wt}^0 D]] \wedge [{}^0 \text{Sub } {}^0 \text{Ch } {}^0 \text{he} \\ [{}^0 \text{Sub } [{}^0 \lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 \text{Mayor_of}_{wt}^0 D]]] {}^0 \text{him } [{}^0 \lambda w \lambda t \neg [{}^0 \text{Find}_{wt} \text{ he } \text{him}]]]]]_{wt}.$$

Types: *Seek*/($ou_{\tau\omega}$) $_{\tau\omega}$; *Find*/($ou_{\tau\omega}$) $_{\tau\omega}$; *Ch(arles)*/ ι ; *Mayor_of* (something)/(u) $_{\tau\omega}$; *D(unedin)*/ ι ; *he*/ $*_1 \rightarrow \iota$; *him*/ $*_1 \rightarrow \iota_{\tau\omega}$.

Again, the meaning of (B) is the closed construction (B^d), and the meaning of the embedded clause “*he* did not find *him*” is the open construction⁶ $\lambda w \lambda t \neg [{}^0 \text{Find}_{wt} \text{ he } \text{him}]$ with the two free variables *he* and *him*.

Of course, another refinement is thinkable. The variables *he* and *him*, ranging over individuals and individual offices, respectively, reduce the ambiguity of ‘find’ by determining that here we are dealing with finding the occupant of an individual office. But the expressions like ‘he’, ‘him’, or ‘she’, ‘her’ also indicate that the finder as well as the occupant of the sought office are male and female, respectively. Thus, e.g., a refined meaning of “He found her” might be

$$\lambda w \lambda t [[{}^0 \text{Find}_{wt} \text{ he } \text{her}] \wedge [{}^0 \text{Male}_{wt} \text{ he}] \wedge [{}^0 \text{Female}_{wt} \text{ her}_{wt}]].$$

Additional types: *Male, Female*/(oi) $_{\tau\omega}$; *her*/ $*_1 \rightarrow \iota_{\tau\omega}$.

Now perhaps a more natural *de re* reading (B^r) of the sentence (B) is understood as uttered in a situation where Charles knows who the Mayor is, and is striving to locate this individual. Unlike the *de dicto* case, the sentence understood *de re* has an *existential presupposition*: in order that (B^r) have *any* truth value, the Mayor has to exist. Thus we must not substitute the construction of an office, but of the individual (if any) that occupies the office. To this end we use $[{}^0 \text{Tr } [{}^0 \text{Mayor_of}_{wt}^0 D]]$ that fails to construct anything if $[{}^0 \text{Mayor_of}_{wt}^0 D]$ is v -improper (the Mayor does not exist), otherwise it v -constructs the Trivialisation of the occupant of the office. Using the technique of substitutions we can discover the adequate analysis of (B^r). Here is how:

⁶ Tenses are disregarded.

$$\lambda w \lambda t [[^0 \text{Seek}^L_{wt} \text{Charles} \text{ } ^2 [^0 \text{Sub} [^0 \text{Tr} [^0 \text{Mayor_of}_{wt} \text{D}]] \text{ } ^0 \text{who} \text{ } ^0 [\lambda w \lambda t [^0 \text{Loc}_{wt} \text{who}]]]]] \wedge \text{ } ^2 [^0 \text{Sub} \text{ } ^0 \text{Charles} \text{ } ^0 \text{he} \text{ } [^0 \text{Sub} [^0 \text{Sub} [^0 \text{Tr} [^0 \text{Mayor_of}_{wt} \text{D}]] \text{ } ^0 \text{who} \text{ } ^0 [\lambda w \lambda t [^0 \text{Loc}_{wt} \text{who}]]]] \text{ } ^0 \text{it} \text{ } ^0 [\lambda w \lambda t \neg [^0 \text{Find}^L_{wt} \text{he it}]]]]]_{wt}$$

Types: $\text{Seek}^L, \text{Find}^L / (o\mu_{\tau\omega})_{\tau\omega}; \text{Tr} / (*_1\iota); \text{Charles} / \iota; \text{Mayor_of} (\text{something}) / (\mu)_{\tau\omega}; \text{D}(\text{unedin}) / \iota; \text{he, who} / *_1 \rightarrow \iota; \text{it} / *_1 \rightarrow \mu_{\tau\omega}; \text{Loc} / (\mu)_{\tau\omega}$.⁷

The second conjunct, which is rather more complicated, needs a gloss. Here we have to pre-process by substitution the meaning of the second embedded clause “he did not find it”, i.e. the open construction $[\lambda w \lambda t \neg [^0 \text{Find}^L_{wt} \text{he it}]]$, by substituting the construction that has been sought, i.e., the location of the individual who plays the role of Mayor of Dunedin: $[^0 \text{Sub} [^0 \text{Tr} [^0 \text{Mayor_of}_{wt} \text{D}]] \text{ } ^0 \text{who} \text{ } ^0 [\lambda w \lambda t [^0 \text{Loc}_{wt} \text{who}]]]$.

3.2 Donkey Sentences

The following example is a variant of the well-known problem of Peter Geach’s *donkey sentences*:

(D) “If somebody has got a new car then *he* often washes *it*.”

The analysis of the embedded clause “*he* often washes *it*” containing the anaphoric pronouns ‘he’ and ‘it’ is again an open construction with two free variables *he*—*who* (washes), *it*—*what* (is washed), *he, it* $\rightarrow \iota$; $\text{Wash} / (ou)_{\tau\omega}$:

$$\lambda w \lambda t [^0 \text{Wash}_{wt} \text{ he it}].$$

If we also want to analyze the frequency of washing, i.e., the meaning of ‘often’, then we use the function $\text{Freq}(\text{uently}) / ((o(o\tau))\tau)$. The function Freq associates each time T with a set of those time intervals (of type $(o(o\tau))$) that are frequent in T (for instance, once a week). The analysis of “*he* often washes *it*” is then

$$\lambda w \lambda t [^0 \text{Freq}_t \lambda t' [^0 \text{Wash}_{wt'} \text{ he it}]].$$

However, since rendering the frequency of washing does not influence the way of solving the problem of anaphora in donkey sentences, we will use, for the sake of simplicity, the simpler construction $\lambda w \lambda t [^0 \text{Wash}_{wt} \text{ he it}]$.

The problem of donkey sentences consists in discovering their logical form, because it is not clear how to understand them. Geach (1962, p. 126) proposes a structure that can be rendered in 1st-order predicate logic as follows (NC new car):

$$\forall x \forall y ((\text{NC}(y) \wedge \text{Has}(x, y)) \rightarrow \text{Wash}(x, y)).$$

However, Russell objected to this analysis that the expression ‘a new car’ is an *indefinite description*, which is not rendered by Geach’s analysis. Hence Russell proposed an analysis that corresponds to this formula of 1st-order predicate logic:

$$\forall x (\exists y (\text{NC}(y) \wedge \text{Has}(x, y)) \rightarrow \text{Wash}(x, y)).$$

⁷ The type μ is the type of a location/position.

But the last occurrence of the variable y (marked in bold) is free in this formula—out of the scope of the existential quantifier supposed to bind it.

Neale in his (1990) proposes a solution that combines both of the above proposals. On the one hand, the existential character of an indefinite description is saved (Russell’s demand), and on the other hand, the anaphoric variable is bound by a general quantifier (Geach’s solution). Neale introduces so-called *restricted quantifiers*:⁸

[every x : man x and [a y : new-car y](x owns y)]([whe z : car z and x owns z]
(x often washes z)).

The sentence (D) does not entail that if the man owns more than one new car then some of this cars are not washed by him. Hence we can reformulate the sentence into

(D₁) “Anybody who owns some new cars often washes *all of them* [each of the new cars he owns].”

However, the following sentence (D’’) means something else:

(D₂) “Anybody who owns some new cars often washes *some of them* [some of the new cars he owns].”

The analysis of (D₁), which in principle corresponds to Geach’s proposal, is

(D₁’) $\lambda w \lambda t \forall x \forall y [[[[{}^0 NC_{wt} y] \wedge [{}^0 Own_{wt} x y]] \supset$
 ${}^2 [{}^0 Sub {}^0 x {}^0 he [{}^0 Sub {}^0 y {}^0 it [\lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 Wash_{wt} he it]]]]]]]]_{wt}$.

Types: $Own / (ou)_{\tau\omega}$; $Wash / (ou)_{\tau\omega}$; NC (being a new car) / $(oi)_{\tau\omega}$; $x, y, he, it \rightarrow \iota$.

But then an objection due to Neale can be levelled against these analyses, namely that in the original sentence (D) the anaphoric pronoun ‘it’ stands *outside* of the scope of the quantifier occurring in the antecedent. To overcome this objection, we use a different type of quantifiers. Apart the common quantifiers $\forall, \exists / (o(oi))$ that operate on a set of individuals, we use quantifiers of another type, namely *Some* and *All* / $((o(oi))(oi))$. *Some* is a function that associates the argument—a set S —with the set of all those sets which have a non-empty intersection with S . *All* is a function that associates the argument—a set S —with the set of all those sets which contain S as a subset. Thus for instance the sentence “Some students are happy” is analyzed by

$\lambda w \lambda t [[{}^0 Some {}^0 Student_{wt}] {}^0 Happy_{wt}]$.

The analyses of the embedded clauses of (D₁), (D₂), namely “*he* washes all of *them*”, “*he* washes some of *them*” are (the anaphoric pronoun ‘*them*’ refers here to the *set of individuals*; we use the variable $them \rightarrow (oi)$ as the meaning of ‘*them*’)

$\lambda w \lambda t [[{}^0 All\ them] \lambda it [{}^0 Wash_{wt} he it]], \lambda w \lambda t [[{}^0 Some\ them] \lambda it [{}^0 Wash_{wt} he it]]$

respectively. Now we need to substitute a construction of the set of new cars owned by the man for the variable $them$. Further, we have to substitute the

⁸ Neale (1990, p. 236). Neale takes into account that the sentence is true even if a man owns *more than one* new car. To avoid singularity he thus claims that the description used in his analysis does not have to be singular (definite) but plural: his abbreviation ‘whe F ’ stands for ‘the F or the F s’.

variable x ('anybody') for the variable he ('who washes'), and then the pre-processed construction has to be Double Executed. To prevent collision of variables, we rename the internal variables w, t .

$$(D_1'') \lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 \forall \lambda x [[[{}^0 Man_{wt} x] \wedge [{}^0 \exists \lambda y [[{}^0 NC_{wt} y] \wedge [{}^0 Own_{wt} x y]]]]]] \supset \\ {}^2 [{}^0 Sub \ {}^0 [\lambda y [[{}^0 NC_{wt} y] \wedge [{}^0 Own_{wt} x y]]] \ {}^0 them \ [{}^0 Sub \ {}^0 x \ {}^0 he \\ {}^0 [\lambda w' \lambda t' [[{}^0 All \ them] \ \lambda it [{}^0 Wash_{w't'} \ he \ it]]]]]]_{wt}].$$

Gloss: "For every man, if the man owns some new cars then all of them [i.e., the new cars owned] are washed by him [the man x]."

This construction can be viewed as the most adequate analysis of (D_1) , because it meets Russell's requirement of an indefinite description in the antecedent, while the scope of \exists does not exceed the antecedent.

The second possible reading of (D) is now analyzed using *Some* instead of *All*:

$$(D_2'') \lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 \forall \lambda x [[[{}^0 Man_{wt} x] \wedge [{}^0 \exists \lambda y [[{}^0 NC_{wt} y] \wedge [{}^0 Own_{wt} x y]]]]]] \supset \\ {}^2 [{}^0 Sub \ {}^0 [\lambda y [[{}^0 NC_{wt} y] \wedge [{}^0 Own_{wt} x y]]] \ {}^0 them \ [{}^0 Sub \ {}^0 x \ {}^0 he \\ {}^0 [\lambda w' \lambda t' [[{}^0 Some \ them] \ \lambda it [{}^0 Wash_{w't'} \ he \ it]]]]]]_{wt}].$$

Gloss: "For every man, if the man owns some new cars then some of them [i.e., the new cars owned] are washed by him [the man x]."

As we pointed out above, it is not clear how to exactly understand the sentence (D) , simply because the sentence is ambiguous. We thus offered analyses that disambiguate it. Whether these readings are the only possible ones is not for us to decide. In our opinion the reading (D_1) is more plausible, and Neale takes into account only this one. However, our method makes it possible to easily analyse particular variants of donkey sentences like "... most of them..." and suchlike. It might be objected, however, that in the interest of disambiguation, we actually analysed two variants of the original sentence.

Sandu formulates in (1997) two principles that every 'compositional procedure for analysing natural language sentences' should obey:

- (a) there is a one-to-one mapping of the surface structure of a sentence of (a fragment of) English into its logical form which preserves the left-to-right ordering of the logical constants
- (b) the mapping preserves the nature of the lexical properties of the logical constants, in the sense that an indefinite is translated by an existential quantifier, etc.

One can see that our analyses (D_1'') and (D_2'') obey these principles with respect to the glossed variants, but not with respect to the original sentence (D) . Regardless of the disambiguation concerning some/all new cars being washed, principle (b) is violated because 'a man' is analysed as 'every man'. To put our arguments on a still more solid ground, we now propose the literal analysis of the sentence (D) . The analysis of the clause "A man has a new car" is as follows:

$$(NC) \lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 \exists \lambda x y [[{}^0 Man_{wt} x] \wedge [{}^0 NC_{wt} y] \wedge [{}^0 Own_{wt} x y]]].$$

Additional type: $\exists/(o(u))$.

The consequent of (D) expresses that *all* the couples $\langle he, it \rangle$ are such that *he Washes it*. Using a variable $couples/*_1 \rightarrow (ou)$, we have:

$$\lambda w \lambda t [[^0 Allcouples] \lambda he it [^0 Wash_{wt} he it]].$$

Now composing (NC) with the latter, we substitute the construction of the set of couples constructed by the Closure of (NC) for the variable *couples*:

$$(D') \quad \lambda w \lambda t [[^0 \exists \lambda xy [[^0 Man_{wt} x] \wedge [^0 NC_{wt} y] \wedge [^0 Own_{wt} x y]]] \supset \\ ^2 [^0 Sub \ ^0 [\lambda xy [[^0 Man_{wt} x] \wedge [^0 NC_{wt} y] \wedge [^0 Own_{wt} x y]]] \ ^0 couples \\ ^0 [\lambda w \lambda t [[^0 Allcouples] \lambda he it [^0 Wash_{wt} he it]]]_{wt}].$$

As is seen, (D') is fully compositional. Our constituents operate on constructions of sets of couples of individuals, as well as particular individuals, which is impossible within a first-order theory. In this respect Hintikka is right when claiming that the compositional treatment does not work;⁹ it does not work within a first-order framework. But as soon as we have a powerful higher-order system like TIL at our disposal, there is no need to give up the desirable principle of compositionality.

One pressing question is whether the anaphoric pronouns should be, in general, bound, and if so, another pressing question is whether this is to be in a standard or non-standard way. The Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL) applies a mechanism of passing on binding.¹⁰ Note that (D') at the same time provides the semantics of this mechanism. Indeed, the variables *he* and *it* are bound in (D'), but the binding is of another kind. They are not directly bound by the existential quantifier. Technically, they are bound by Trivialization; semantically, they are bound by the condition that the pairs of individuals they *v*-construct have to belong to the set mentioned by the antecedent clause.

4 Outline of an Implementation Method

Now we outline the method of computing the complete meaning of anaphoric sentences, i.e., the method of substituting an appropriate antecedent for an anaphoric reference. The method is similar to the one applied in general by Hans Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). 'DRT' is an umbrella term for a collection of logical and computational linguistic methods developed for dynamic interpretation of natural language, where each sentence is interpreted within a certain discourse, which is a sequence of sentences uttered by the same speaker. Interpretation conditions are given *via* instructions for updating the discourse representation. DPL is a logic belonging to this group of theories. Discourse representation theory as presented in Kamp & Reyle (1993) addresses in particular the problem of anaphoric links crossing the sentence boundary. It is a first-order theory, and it can be proved that the expressive power of the DRT language with negation is the same as that of first-order predicate logic. Thus actually only expressions denoting individuals (indefinite or definite noun phrases) introduce the so-called discourse referents, i.e., free variables that are updated when interpreting the discourse. Anaphoric pronouns

⁹ See Sandu & Hintikka (2001) ¹⁰ See Sandu (1997).

are represented by free variables linked to appropriate antecedent discourse variables. As we have seen above, our semantics is hyperintensional, i.e., procedural, and higher order. Thus not only individuals, but entities of any type, like properties of individuals, propositions, relations-in-intension of an individual to another individual, and even constructions (i.e. meanings of the antecedent expressions), can be linked to anaphoric variables.

The specification of the implementation algorithm proposed here is imperative; similarly as in DRT, we update the list of potential antecedents, or rather constructions expressed by them, in order to substitute the type-appropriate entities for anaphoric variables, whenever needed.¹¹ For each type $(l, (oi)_{\tau\omega}, o_{\tau\omega}, (oi(oi)_{\tau\omega})_{\tau\omega}, (oi)_{\tau\omega}, *_n, \text{etc.})$ the list of discourse variables is created. The method substitutes the content of type-appropriate discourse variables for anaphoric variables to complete the meaning of anaphoric clauses. Each closed constituent of a resulting construction becomes an updated value of the respective (type-appropriate) free discourse-referent variable. In this way the discourse variables are gradually updated.

Here we only illustrate the method by an example of a simple dialog between three agents, *Adam*, *Berta* and *Cecil*. The list of discourse variables for the dialog together with the types of entities constructed by their respective content is: $ind:=\iota$, $loc:=\mu$, $pred:=(oi)_{\tau\omega}$, $prof:=(oi)_{\tau\omega}$ —‘propositional function’, $rel_1:=(oi(oi)_{\tau\omega})_{\tau\omega}$, $rel_2:=(oi)_{\tau\omega}$, $rel_3:=(oi o_{\tau\omega})_{\tau\omega}$, $prop:=o_{\tau\omega}$, $constr:=*_n$.

Adam to Cecil: “Berta is coming. *She* is looking for a parking”.

‘Inform’ message content:

$\lambda w \lambda t [[{}^0 Coming_{wt}^0 Berta]$;

(Relevant) discourse variables updates:

$ind:={}^0 Berta$; $pred:={}^0 Coming$;

$prop:=\lambda w \lambda t [[{}^0 Coming_{wt}^0 Berta]$;

$\lambda w \lambda t \quad {}^2 [{}^0 Sub \quad ind \quad {}^0 she \quad {}^0 [{}^0 Looking_for_{wt} \quad she \quad {}^0 Parking]] \Rightarrow$ (is transformed into)

$\lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 Looking_for_{wt}^0 Berta \quad {}^0 Parking]$.

(Relevant) discourse variables updates:

$rel_1:={}^0 Looking_for$; $pred:={}^0 Parking$;

$prop:=\lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 Looking_for_{wt}^0 Berta \quad {}^0 Parking]$;

$prof:=\lambda w \lambda t \lambda x [{}^0 Looking_for_{wt} x \quad {}^0 Parking]$; (‘propositional function’)

Cecil to Adam: “So am I.”

‘Inform’ message content:

$\lambda w \lambda t {}^2 [{}^0 Sub \quad prof \quad {}^0 so \quad {}^0 [so_{wt}^0 Cecil]] \Rightarrow \lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 Looking_for_{wt}^0 Cecil \quad {}^0 Parking]$

Discourse variables updates:

$ind:={}^0 Cecil$; $rel_1:={}^0 Looking_for$; $pred:={}^0 Parking$;

Adam to both: “There is a free parking at p_1 ”.

‘Inform’ message content: $\lambda w \lambda t [[{}^0 Free \quad {}^0 Parking]_{wt} \quad {}^0 p_1]$

Discourse variables updates: $loc:={}^0 p_1$; $pred:=[{}^0 Free \quad {}^0 Parking]$;

$prop:=\lambda w \lambda t [[{}^0 Free \quad {}^0 Parking]_{wt} \quad {}^0 p_1]$

Berta to Adam: “What do you mean by free parking?”

‘Query’ message content: $\lambda w \lambda t [{}^0 Refine_{wt} \quad {}^0 [{}^0 Free \quad {}^0 Parking]]$

¹¹ The algorithm was first proposed in Křetínský (2007).

Discourse variables updates: $constr:=^0[{}^0Free\ {}^0Parking]$

Adam to Berta: “Free parking is a parking and some parts of it are not occupied”.

‘Reply’ message content: $^0[{}^0Free\ {}^0Parking] =$

$^0[\lambda\omega\lambda t\lambda x[{}^0Parking_{wt}x] \wedge \exists y[{}^0Part_of_{wt}yx] \wedge \neg[{}^0Occupied_{wt}y]]]$

Discourse variables updates: $constr:=^0[{}^0Free\ {}^0Parking] = \dots$

Berta to Adam: “I don’t believe *it*. I have just been *there*”.

‘Inform’ message content:

$\lambda\omega\lambda t [{}^2[{}^0Sub\ prop\ {}^0it\ {}^0[-[{}^0Believe_{wt}\ {}^0Berta\ it]]] \Rightarrow$

$\lambda\omega\lambda t \neg[{}^0Believe_{wt}\ {}^0Berta\ {}^0[\lambda\omega\lambda t[{}^0Free\ {}^0Parking]_{wt}\ p_1]]],$

Discourse variables updates:

$ind:=^0Berta; loc:=^0p_1;$

$\lambda\omega\lambda t \exists t'[[t' \leq t] \wedge {}^2[{}^0Sub\ loc\ {}^0there\ {}^0[{}^0Is_at_{wt}^0, Berta\ there]]] \Rightarrow$

$\lambda\omega\lambda t \exists t'[[t' \leq t] \wedge [{}^0Is_at_{wt}^0, Berta\ {}^0p_1]].$

Discourse variables updates:

$prop:= \lambda\omega\lambda t \exists t'[[t' \leq t] \wedge [{}^0Is_at_{wt}^0, Berta\ {}^0p_1]], \dots$

And so on.

Of course, improvements of this method are straightforward. For instance, in the example we were substituting the last type-appropriate entity that received mention; if we wanted to take into account ambiguities of anaphoric references, we might store in the discourse-representation file more than one variable for each type, together with the other characteristics or prerequisites of the entity (e.g., gender, or implicative properties), so as to be able to generate more meanings of an ambiguous sentence.

5 Concluding Remarks

The above described method is currently being implemented in the TIL-Script programming language, the computational variant of TIL. TIL-Script is a FIPA compliant higher-order modification of the standards like FIPA SL (Semantic Language) and FIPA KIF (Knowledge Interchange Format). It is a declarative functional language. Its only imperative feature is the *Let* command for the dynamic assignment of a construction *C* to a discourse variable. A brief introduction to TIL-Script is the subject of another paper in this proceedings, namely ‘TIL-Script: Functional Programming Based on Transparent Intensional Logic’ by Nikola Ciprich, Marie Duží, and Michal Košinár.

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