

Part I

Steganography and Watermarking

Our best theories are not only truer than common sense,

Our best theories are not only truer than common sense,

they make far more sense

Our best theories are not only truer than common sense,

they make far more sense

than common sense has.

STEGANOGRAPHY and WATERMARKING

Steganography and **Watermarking** are arts, sciences and technologies of **hiding** information.

Steganography and **Watermarking** are arts, sciences and technologies of **hiding** information.

Cryptography goals is to make some transmitted messages **unreadable** by the third party.


Steganography and **Watermarking** are arts, sciences and technologies of **hiding** information.


Cryptography goals is to make some transmitted messages **unreadable** by the third party.

Steganography/watermarking goals is to make some transmitted messages **invisible** by the third party.

EXAMPLE - FIND NUMBERS

Find two well-known numbers in the following picture






Obrázok 0.4: Kresba rieky San Antonio

rývajú tajnú správu. Každá cenzorská stanica mala svoju banku známk. Cenzori známky, ktoré mohli niesť nejakú tajnú infor-

EXAMPLE - ANALYSIS of a SCENE - II.

Počítačová steganografia

Ukážky a riešenia steganogramov



Com	pl	ime	nts	o	f	C	P	S	A	M	A	
to	our	chie	f	Col	Har	o	l	d				
R.	Shaw	on	his	vis	it	to						
San	Antonio	May	lith	19	45							

Obrázok A.1: Riešenie kresby rieky San Antonio

PROLOGUE

In this chapter we deal mainly with a variety of methods **how to hide information**.

PROLOGUE

In this chapter we deal mainly with a variety of methods **how to hide information**. Hiding of information is much needed in many important cases.

PROLOGUE

In this chapter we deal mainly with a variety of methods **how to hide information**. Hiding of information is much needed in many important cases.

Our main attention will be devoted to methods developed in **Steganography and Watermarking**.

PROLOGUE

In this chapter we deal mainly with a variety of methods **how to hide information**. Hiding of information is much needed in many important cases.

Our main attention will be devoted to methods developed in **Steganography and Watermarking**.

We will also discuss several **anonymity problems** and methods to solve them.

PROLOGUE

In this chapter we deal mainly with a variety of methods **how to hide information**. Hiding of information is much needed in many important cases.

Our main attention will be devoted to methods developed in **Steganography and Watermarking**.

We will also discuss several **anonymity problems** and methods to solve them.

Preservation of the anonymity of communicating parties is in many cases also of large importance.

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

A very important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

A very important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

This might much destroy music, film, book and software industries.

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

A very important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

This might much destroy music, film, book and software industries. It therefore brings a variety of important problems, concerning protection of the intellectual and production rights, that badly need to be solved.

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

A very important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

This might much destroy music, film, book and software industries. It therefore brings a variety of important problems, concerning protection of the intellectual and production rights, that badly need to be solved.

The fact that an unlimited number of perfect copies of text, audio and video data can be illegally produced and distributed has serious consequences.

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

A very important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

This might much destroy music, film, book and software industries. It therefore brings a variety of important problems, concerning protection of the intellectual and production rights, that badly need to be solved.

The fact that an unlimited number of perfect copies of text, audio and video data can be illegally produced and distributed has serious consequences. For example, it is much needed to develop ways of embedding copyright and source information into audio and video data.

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

A very important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

This might much destroy music, film, book and software industries. It therefore brings a variety of important problems, concerning protection of the intellectual and production rights, that badly need to be solved.

The fact that an unlimited number of perfect copies of text, audio and video data can be illegally produced and distributed has serious consequences. For example, it is much needed to develop ways of embedding copyright and source information into audio and video data.

Digital steganography and **digital watermarking** bring techniques to hide important information, in an undetectable and/or irremovable way, in audio and video digital data.

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

A very important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

This might much destroy music, film, book and software industries. It therefore brings a variety of important problems, concerning protection of the intellectual and production rights, that badly need to be solved.

The fact that an unlimited number of perfect copies of text, audio and video data can be illegally produced and distributed has serious consequences. For example, it is much needed to develop ways of embedding copyright and source information into audio and video data.

Digital steganography and **digital watermarking** bring techniques to hide important information, in an undetectable and/or irremovable way, in audio and video digital data.

Digital steganography is the art and science of embedding information/signals in such a hidden way, especially in texts, images, video and audio carriers, that only intended recipients can recover them.

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

A very important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

This might much destroy music, film, book and software industries. It therefore brings a variety of important problems, concerning protection of the intellectual and production rights, that badly need to be solved.

The fact that an unlimited number of perfect copies of text, audio and video data can be illegally produced and distributed has serious consequences. For example, it is much needed to develop ways of embedding copyright and source information into audio and video data.

Digital steganography and **digital watermarking** bring techniques to hide important information, in an undetectable and/or irremovable way, in audio and video digital data.

Digital steganography is the art and science of embedding information/signals in such a hidden way, especially in texts, images, video and audio carriers, that only intended recipients can recover them.

Digital watermarking is a process of embedding (hiding) information (through "watermarks") into digital data (signals) - picture, audio or video - to identify its owner or to authenticize its origin in an unremovable way.

PROLOGUE I - PROBLEMS WITH COPYING of INFORMATION

A very important property of (digital) information is that it is, in principle, very easy to produce and distribute unlimited number of its copies.

This might much destroy music, film, book and software industries. It therefore brings a variety of important problems, concerning protection of the intellectual and production rights, that badly need to be solved.

The fact that an unlimited number of perfect copies of text, audio and video data can be illegally produced and distributed has serious consequences. For example, it is much needed to develop ways of embedding copyright and source information into audio and video data.

Digital steganography and **digital watermarking** bring techniques to hide important information, in an undetectable and/or irremovable way, in audio and video digital data.

Digital steganography is the art and science of embedding information/signals in such a hidden way, especially in texts, images, video and audio carriers, that only intended recipients can recover them.

Digital watermarking is a process of embedding (hiding) information (through "watermarks") into digital data (signals) - picture, audio or video - to identify its owner or to authenticize its origin in an unremovable way.

Steganography and (digital) watermarking are main parts of the fast developing area of **information hiding**.

Covert channels occur especially in operating systems and networks. They are communication paths of networks that were neither designed nor intended to transfer information, but can be used that way.

Covert channels occur especially in operating systems and networks. They are communication paths of networks that were neither designed nor intended to transfer information, but can be used that way.

These channels are typically used by untrustworthy/spying programs to leak (confidential) information to their owner while performing service for another user/program.

Covert channels occur especially in operating systems and networks. They are communication paths of networks that were neither designed nor intended to transfer information, but can be used that way.

These channels are typically used by untrustworthy/spying programs to leak (confidential) information to their owner while performing service for another user/program.

Anonymity is finding ways to hide meta content of the message (for example who is the sender and/or the recipients of a message).

Covert channels occur especially in operating systems and networks. They are communication paths of networks that were neither designed nor intended to transfer information, but can be used that way.

These channels are typically used by untrustworthy/spying programs to leak (confidential) information to their owner while performing service for another user/program.

Anonymity is finding ways to hide meta content of the message (for example who is the sender and/or the recipients of a message). Anonymity is needed, for example, when making on-line voting, or to hide access to some web pages, or to hide sender.

INFORMATION HIDING SUB-DISCIPLINES

Covert channels occur especially in operating systems and networks. They are communication paths of networks that were neither designed nor intended to transfer information, but can be used that way.

These channels are typically used by untrustworthy/spying programs to leak (confidential) information to their owner while performing service for another user/program.

Anonymity is finding ways to hide meta content of the message (for example who is the sender and/or the recipients of a message). Anonymity is needed, for example, when making on-line voting, or to hide access to some web pages, or to hide sender.

Steganography – covered writing – from Greek *στεγαν-ξ γραφ-ειν* is the **art and science of hiding secret messages** in **innocently looking ones**.

INFORMATION HIDING SUB-DISCIPLINES

Covert channels occur especially in operating systems and networks. They are communication paths of networks that were neither designed nor intended to transfer information, but can be used that way.

These channels are typically used by untrustworthy/spying programs to leak (confidential) information to their owner while performing service for another user/program.

Anonymity is finding ways to hide meta content of the message (for example who is the sender and/or the recipients of a message). Anonymity is needed, for example, when making on-line voting, or to hide access to some web pages, or to hide sender.

Steganography – covered writing – from Greek *στεγαν-ξ γραφ-ειν* is the **art and science of hiding secret messages** in **innocently looking ones**.

Watermarking – is the **art and science of embedding watermarks** in **carriers in undetectable or unremovable way**.

WHY is PROTECTION of INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS so IMPORTANT?

WHY is PROTECTION of INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS so IMPORTANT?

- It is estimated that business and individuals lost a total 63 billions of euro due to forgery alone in the first five years of 21st century.

WHY is PROTECTION of INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS so IMPORTANT?

- It is estimated that business and individuals lost a total 63 billions of euro due to forgery alone in the first five years of 21st century.
- Frauds on this scale are also the major source of funding of various criminal activities.

WHY is PROTECTION of INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS so IMPORTANT?

- It is estimated that business and individuals lost a total 63 billions of euro due to forgery alone in the first five years of 21st century.
- Frauds on this scale are also the major source of funding of various criminal activities.
- It is estimated that 40% of drugs in Africa and China are fake.
- It is estimated that most of the fake drugs have little or no medical value.

WHY is PROTECTION of INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS so IMPORTANT?

- It is estimated that business and individuals lost a total 63 billions of euro due to forgery alone in the first five years of 21st century.
- Frauds on this scale are also the major source of funding of various criminal activities.
- It is estimated that 40% of drugs in Africa and China are fake.
- It is estimated that most of the fake drugs have little or no medical value.

There are various techniques to deal with this problem.

WHY is PROTECTION of INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS so IMPORTANT?

- It is estimated that business and individuals lost a total 63 billions of euro due to forgery alone in the first five years of 21st century.
- Frauds on this scale are also the major source of funding of various criminal activities.
- It is estimated that 40% of drugs in Africa and China are fake.
- It is estimated that most of the fake drugs have little or no medical value.


There are various techniques to deal with this problem.

Perhaps the most modern one, that is being explored currently, is to write down watermarks into materials using tools of nanotechnology.


ANONYMITY

THE DINING CRYPTOGRAPHERS PROBLEM - I.


- Three cryptographers have dinner at a round table of a 5-star restaurant.



THE DINING CRYPTOGRAPHERS PROBLEM - II.




THE DINING CRYPTOGRAPHERS PROBLEM - II.




- Their waiter in the restaurant tells the cryptographers that an arrangement has been made that bill will be paid anonymously - either by one of them, or by NSA.

THE DINING CRYPTOGRAPHERS PROBLEM - II.




- Their waiter in the restaurant tells the cryptographers that an arrangement has been made that bill will be paid anonymously - either by one of them, or by NSA.
- Cryptographers were willing to respect right of each other to make an anonymous payment, but they would like to know whether NSA paid the dinner.

THE DINING CRYPTOGRAPHERS PROBLEM - II.




- Their waiter in the restaurant tells the cryptographers that an arrangement has been made that bill will be paid anonymously - either by one of them, or by NSA.
- Cryptographers were willing to respect right of each other to make an anonymous payment, but they would like to know whether NSA paid the dinner.
- How should cryptographers proceed that all could learn whether one of them payed the bill without learning (for other two) which one did that?

THE DINING CRYPTOGRAPHERS PROBLEM - II.




- Their waiter in the restaurant tells the cryptographers that an arrangement has been made that bill will be paid anonymously - either by one of them, or by NSA.
- Cryptographers were willing to respect right of each other to make an anonymous payment, but they would like to know whether NSA payed the dinner.
- How should cryptographers proceed that all could learn whether one of them payed the bill without learning (for other two) which one did that? - In case NASA did not pay dinner?

DINNING CRYPTOGRAPHERS - SOLUTION



- **Protocol**
 - Each cryptographer flips a perfect coin between him and the cryptographer on his right, so that only two of them can see the outcome.


DINNING CRYPTOGRAPHERS - SOLUTION



■ Protocol

- Each cryptographer flips a perfect coin between him and the cryptographer on his right, so that only two of them can see the outcome.
- Each cryptographer who did not pay dinner says aloud whether the two coins he see - the one he flipped and the one his right-hand neighbour flipped - fell on the same side or on different sides.


DINNING CRYPTOGRAPHERS - SOLUTION



■ Protocol

- Each cryptographer flips a perfect coin between him and the cryptographer on his right, so that only two of them can see the outcome.
- Each cryptographer who did not pay dinner says aloud whether the two coins he see - the one he flipped and the one his right-hand neighbour flipped - fell on the same side or on different sides.
- The cryptographer who paid the dinner says aloud the opposite what he sees.


↑↑↑↑↑



■ Correctness

- An odd number of differences uttered at the table will imply that a cryptographer paid the dinner.


↑↑↑↑↑



■ Correctness

- An odd number of differences uttered at the table will imply that a cryptographer paid the dinner.
- An even number of differences uttered at the table will imply that NSA paid the dinner.


↑↑↑↑↑



■ Correctness

- An odd number of differences uttered at the table will imply that a cryptographer paid the dinner.
- An even number of differences uttered at the table will imply that NSA paid the dinner.
- **Observation:** In a case a cryptographer paid the dinner the other two cryptographers would have no idea he did that.


TECHNICALITIES of SOLUTION



Let three coin tossing made by cryptographers be represented by bits b_1, b_2, b_3 .

TECHNICALITIES of SOLUTION

.....



Let three coin tossing made by cryptographers be represented by bits b_1, b_2, b_3 . In case none of cryptographers payed dinner, they announce the values


$$b_1 \oplus b_2, b_2 \oplus b_3, b_3 \oplus b_1,$$

the parity of which is

$$(b_1 \oplus b_2) \oplus (b_2 \oplus b_3) \oplus (b_3 \oplus b_1) = 0$$

TECHNICALITIES of SOLUTION

.....



Let three coin tossing made by cryptographers be represented by bits b_1, b_2, b_3 . In case none of cryptographers payed dinner, they announce the values

$$b_1 \oplus b_2, b_2 \oplus b_3, b_3 \oplus b_1,$$

the parity of which is

$$(b_1 \oplus b_2) \oplus (b_2 \oplus b_3) \oplus (b_3 \oplus b_1) = 0$$

In case one of them payed dinner, say Cryptographer 2, they announce:

$$b_1 \oplus b_2, \overline{b_2 \oplus b_3}, b_3 \oplus b_1$$

and the parity of outcomes is

$$(b_1 \oplus b_2) \oplus (\overline{b_2 \oplus b_3}) \oplus (b_3 \oplus b_1) = 1$$

- **Anonymous one-to-many or broadcast communication:**

- **Anonymous one-to-many or broadcast communication:** there is one anonymous sender and all parties receive the message that has been sent.

- **Anonymous one-to-many or broadcast communication:** there is one anonymous sender and all parties receive the message that has been sent.
- **Anonymous many-to-one communication:**

- **Anonymous one-to-many or broadcast communication:** there is one anonymous sender and all parties receive the message that has been sent.
- **Anonymous many-to-one communication:** all parties send messages and there is only one receiver.

CHAUM's PROTOCOL for ANONYMOUS BROADCASTING

Let communicating scheme be modeled by an unoriented graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ representing nodes (parties) and E edges (communication links). Let n be a large integer.

CHAUM's PROTOCOL for ANONYMOUS BROADCASTING

Let communicating scheme be modeled by an unoriented graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ representing nodes (parties) and E edges (communication links). Let n be a large integer.

Protocol: Each party P_i performs the following actions (all parties in parallel).

CHAUM's PROTOCOL for ANONYMOUS BROADCASTING

Let communicating scheme be modeled by an unoriented graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ representing nodes (parties) and E edges (communication links). Let n be a large integer.

Protocol: Each party P_i performs the following actions (all parties in parallel).

- For each $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ it sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow 0$;

CHAUM's PROTOCOL for ANONYMOUS BROADCASTING

Let communicating scheme be modeled by an unoriented graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ representing nodes (parties) and E edges (communication links). Let n be a large integer.

Protocol: Each party P_i performs the following actions (all parties in parallel).

- For each $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ it sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow 0$;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $i < j$, P_i randomly chooses a key k_{ij} and sends it securely to P_j ;

CHAUM's PROTOCOL for ANONYMOUS BROADCASTING

Let communicating scheme be modeled by an unoriented graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ representing nodes (parties) and E edges (communication links). Let n be a large integer.

Protocol: Each party P_i performs the following actions (all parties in parallel).

- For each $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ it sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow 0$;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $i < j$, P_i randomly chooses a key k_{ij} and sends it securely to P_j ;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $j < i$, after receiving k_{ji} P_i sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow -k_{ji} \bmod n$;

CHAUM's PROTOCOL for ANONYMOUS BROADCASTING

Let communicating scheme be modeled by an unoriented graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ representing nodes (parties) and E edges (communication links). Let n be a large integer.

Protocol: Each party P_i performs the following actions (all parties in parallel).

- For each $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ it sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow 0$;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $i < j$, P_i randomly chooses a key k_{ij} and sends it securely to P_j ;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $j < i$, after receiving k_{ji} P_i sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow -k_{ji} \bmod n$;
- P_i broadcasts $O_i = m_i + \sum_{j=1}^n k_{ij} \bmod n$, where $m_i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$ is the message being sent by P_i ;

CHAUM's PROTOCOL for ANONYMOUS BROADCASTING

Let communicating scheme be modeled by an unoriented graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ representing nodes (parties) and E edges (communication links). Let n be a large integer.

Protocol: Each party P_i performs the following actions (all parties in parallel).

- For each $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ it sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow 0$;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $i < j$, P_i randomly chooses a key k_{ij} and sends it securely to P_j ;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $j < i$, after receiving k_{ji} P_i sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow -k_{ji} \bmod n$;
- P_i broadcasts $O_i = m_i + \sum_{j=1}^n k_{ij} \bmod n$, where $m_i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$ is the message being sent by P_i ;
- P_i computes the global sum $\Sigma = \sum_{j=1}^n O_j \bmod n$.

CHAUM's PROTOCOL for ANONYMOUS BROADCASTING

Let communicating scheme be modeled by an unoriented graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ representing nodes (parties) and E edges (communication links). Let n be a large integer.

Protocol: Each party P_i performs the following actions (all parties in parallel).

- For each $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ it sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow 0$;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $i < j$, P_i randomly chooses a key k_{ij} and sends it securely to P_j ;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $j < i$, after receiving k_{ji} P_i sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow -k_{ji} \bmod n$;
- P_i broadcasts $O_i = m_i + \sum_{j=1}^n k_{ij} \bmod n$, where $m_i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$ is the message being sent by P_i ;
- P_i computes the global sum $\Sigma = \sum_{j=1}^n O_j \bmod n$.

Clearly, $\Sigma = \sum_{j=1}^n m_j \bmod n$, and therefore if only one $m_j \neq 0$, all participants get that message.

CHAUM's PROTOCOL for ANONYMOUS BROADCASTING

Let communicating scheme be modeled by an unoriented graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ representing nodes (parties) and E edges (communication links). Let n be a large integer.

Protocol: Each party P_i performs the following actions (all parties in parallel).

- For each $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ it sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow 0$;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $i < j$, P_i randomly chooses a key k_{ij} and sends it securely to P_j ;
- If $(i, j) \in E$, $j < i$, after receiving k_{ji} P_i sets $k_{ij} \leftarrow -k_{ji} \bmod n$;
- P_i broadcasts $O_i = m_i + \sum_{j=1}^n k_{ij} \bmod n$, where $m_i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$ is the message being sent by P_i ;
- P_i computes the global sum $\Sigma = \sum_{j=1}^n O_j \bmod n$.

Clearly, $\Sigma = \sum_{j=1}^n m_j \bmod n$, and therefore if only one $m_j \neq 0$, all participants get that message.

Observation One can show that to preserve anonymity of a correctly behaving sender P_i it is sufficient that one another participants P_j such that $(i, j) \in E$ behaves correctly.

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING
and
versus CRYPTOGRAPHY

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING

Both techniques belong to the category of information hiding, but the objectives and embeddings of these techniques are just opposite.

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING

Both techniques belong to the category of information hiding, but the objectives and embeddings of these techniques are just opposite.

In watermarking, the important information is in the cover data. The embedded data - watermarks - are usually only/mainly for protection or detection of the cover data origins.

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING

Both techniques belong to the category of information hiding, but the objectives and embeddings of these techniques are just opposite.

In watermarking, the important information is in the cover data. The embedded data - watermarks - are usually only/mainly for protection or detection of the cover data origins.

In steganography, the cover data is not important. It mostly serves as a diversion from **the most important information that is in the embedded data.**

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING

Both techniques belong to the category of information hiding, but the objectives and embeddings of these techniques are just opposite.

In watermarking, the important information is in the cover data. The embedded data - watermarks - are usually only/mainly for protection or detection of the cover data origins.

In steganography, the cover data is not important. It mostly serves as a diversion from **the most important information that is in the embedded data.**

Comment: Steganography tools typically embed/hide relatively large blocks of information while watermarking tools embed/hide less information in images or sounds or videos or texts.

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING

Both techniques belong to the category of information hiding, but the objectives and embeddings of these techniques are just opposite.

In watermarking, the important information is in the cover data. The embedded data - watermarks - are usually only/mainly for protection or detection of the cover data origins.

In steganography, the cover data is not important. It mostly serves as a diversion from **the most important information that is in the embedded data.**

Comment: Steganography tools typically embed/hide relatively large blocks of information while watermarking tools embed/hide less information in images or sounds or videos or texts.

Data hiding dilemma: to find the best trade-off between three quantities of embeddings: **robustness, capacity and security.**

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING again

Technically, differences between steganography and watermarking are both subtle and quite essential.

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING again

Technically, differences between steganography and watermarking are both subtle and quite essential.

The main goal of **steganography** is **to hide** a to-be hidden message **m** in some audio or video (cover) data **d**, to obtain some new data **d'**, not much different from **d**, in such a way that an eavesdropper **cannot detect** the presence of **m** in **d'**.

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING again

Technically, differences between steganography and watermarking are both subtle and quite essential.

The main goal of **steganography** is **to hide** a to-be hidden message **m** in some audio or video (cover) data **d**, to obtain some new data **d'**, not much different from **d**, in such a way that an eavesdropper **cannot detect** the presence of **m** in **d'**.

The main goal of **watermarking** is **to hide** a message (watermark) **wm** in some audio or video (cover) data **d**, to obtain new data **d'**, practically indistinguishable from **d** by people, in such a way that an eavesdropper **cannot remove or replace wm** in **d'**.

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING again

Technically, differences between steganography and watermarking are both subtle and quite essential.

The main goal of **steganography** is **to hide** a to-be hidden message **m** in some audio or video (cover) data **d**, to obtain some new data **d'**, not much different from **d**, in such a way that an eavesdropper **cannot detect** the presence of **m** in **d'**.

The main goal of **watermarking** is **to hide** a message (watermark) **wm** in some audio or video (cover) data **d**, to obtain new data **d'**, practically indistinguishable from **d** by people, in such a way that an eavesdropper **cannot remove or replace wm** in **d'**.

Shortly, one can say that **cryptology is about protecting** the content of messages, **steganography is about concealing** their very existence.

STEGANOGRAPHY versus WATERMARKING again

Technically, differences between steganography and watermarking are both subtle and quite essential.

The main goal of **steganography** is **to hide** a to-be hidden message **m** in some audio or video (cover) data **d**, to obtain some new data **d'**, not much different from **d**, in such a way that an eavesdropper **cannot detect** the presence of **m** in **d'**.

The main goal of **watermarking** is **to hide** a message (watermark) **wm** in some audio or video (cover) data **d**, to obtain new data **d'**, practically indistinguishable from **d** by people, in such a way that an eavesdropper **cannot remove or replace wm** in **d'**.

Shortly, one can say that **cryptography is about protecting** the content of messages, **steganography is about concealing** their very existence.

Steganography methods usually do not need to provide strong security against removing or modification of the hidden message. Watermarking methods need to be very robust to attempts to remove or modify watermarks.

- **Cryptography is art, science and technology of presenting information through secret codes.**
- **Steganography is art, science and technology of hiding information.**
- **The goal of cryptography is to make the data unreadable by a third party.**
- **The goal of steganography is to hide the data from a third party.**

Steganography is often used with cryptography to create a double protection. Data are first encrypted using a cryptography system and then hidden using a steganography tool.

BASIC QUESTIONS

- Where and how can be secret data undetectably hidden in various media?

BASIC QUESTIONS

- Where and how can be secret data undetectably hidden in various media?
- **Who, when and why needs steganography or watermarking?**

- Where and how can be secret data undetectably hidden in various media?
- **Who, when and why needs steganography or watermarking?**
- What is the maximum amount of information that can be hidden, given a level of degradation, to various digital media?

BASIC QUESTIONS

- Where and how can be secret data undetectably hidden in various media?
- **Who, when and why needs steganography or watermarking?**
- What is the maximum amount of information that can be hidden, given a level of degradation, to various digital media?
- **How one chooses good cover media for given stego messages?**

BASIC QUESTIONS

- Where and how can be secret data undetectably hidden in various media?
- **Who, when and why needs steganography or watermarking?**
- What is the maximum amount of information that can be hidden, given a level of degradation, to various digital media?
- **How one chooses good cover media for given stego messages?**
- How to detect, localize and/or remove stego messages?

SOME APPLICATIONS of STEGANOGRAPHY

SOME APPLICATIONS of STEGANOGRAPHY

- To have secure secret communications where cryptographic encryption methods are not available.

SOME APPLICATIONS of STEGANOGRAPHY

- To have secure secret communications where cryptographic encryption methods are not available.
- To have secure secret communication where strong cryptography is impossible.

SOME APPLICATIONS of STEGANOGRAPHY

- To have secure secret communications where cryptographic encryption methods are not available.
- To have secure secret communication where strong cryptography is impossible.
- In some cases, for example in military applications, even the knowledge that two parties communicate can be of large importance.

SOME APPLICATIONS of STEGANOGRAPHY

- To have secure secret communications where cryptographic encryption methods are not available.
- To have secure secret communication where strong cryptography is impossible.
- In some cases, for example in military applications, even the knowledge that two parties communicate can be of large importance.
- The health care, and especially medical imaging systems, may very much benefit from information hiding techniques.

SOME APPLICATIONS of STEGANOGRAPHY

- To have secure secret communications where cryptographic encryption methods are not available.
- To have secure secret communication where strong cryptography is impossible.
- In some cases, for example in military applications, even the knowledge that two parties communicate can be of large importance.
- The health care, and especially medical imaging systems, may very much benefit from information hiding techniques.
- Various secret religious groups and terrorist groups have been reported to use steganography to communicate in public.

SOME APPLICATIONS of STEGANOGRAPHY

- To have secure secret communications where cryptographic encryption methods are not available.
- To have secure secret communication where strong cryptography is impossible.
- In some cases, for example in military applications, even the knowledge that two parties communicate can be of large importance.
- The health care, and especially medical imaging systems, may very much benefit from information hiding techniques.
- Various secret religious groups and terrorist groups have been reported to use steganography to communicate in public.
- Methods and tools of steganography are considered of increasing importance for national security of world-powers and their developments and study is seen as being of increasing importance.

SOME APPLICATIONS of WATERMARKING

A basic application of watermarking techniques is to provide ownership information of digital data (images, video and audio products) by embedding copyright information into them.

SOME APPLICATIONS of WATERMARKING

A basic application of watermarking techniques is to provide ownership information of digital data (images, video and audio products) by embedding copyright information into them.

Other applications:

SOME APPLICATIONS of WATERMARKING

A basic application of watermarking techniques is to provide ownership information of digital data (images, video and audio products) by embedding copyright information into them.

Other applications:

- **Automatic monitoring and tracking of copyright material** on WEB. (For example, a robot searches the Web for watermarked material and thereby identifies potential illegal uses of it.)

SOME APPLICATIONS of WATERMARKING

A basic application of watermarking techniques is to provide ownership information of digital data (images, video and audio products) by embedding copyright information into them.

Other applications:

- **Automatic monitoring and tracking of copyright material** on WEB. (For example, a robot searches the Web for watermarked material and thereby identifies potential illegal uses of it.)
- **Automatic audit of radio transmissions:** (A robot can “listen” to a radio station and look for marks, which indicate that a particular piece of music, or advertisement, has been broadcast.)

SOME APPLICATIONS of WATERMARKING

A basic application of watermarking techniques is to provide ownership information of digital data (images, video and audio products) by embedding copyright information into them.

Other applications:

- **Automatic monitoring and tracking of copyright material** on WEB. (For example, a robot searches the Web for watermarked material and thereby identifies potential illegal uses of it.)
- **Automatic audit of radio transmissions:** (A robot can “listen” to a radio station and look for marks, which indicate that a particular piece of music, or advertisement, has been broadcast.)
- **Data augmentation** – to add information that increases the value of the carrier - for example information in röntgen pictures.

SOME APPLICATIONS of WATERMARKING

A basic application of watermarking techniques is to provide ownership information of digital data (images, video and audio products) by embedding copyright information into them.

Other applications:

- **Automatic monitoring and tracking of copyright material** on WEB. (For example, a robot searches the Web for watermarked material and thereby identifies potential illegal uses of it.)
- **Automatic audit of radio transmissions:** (A robot can “listen” to a radio station and look for marks, which indicate that a particular piece of music, or advertisement, has been broadcast.)
- **Data augmentation** – to add information that increases the value of the carrier - for example information in röntgen pictures.
- **Fingerprinting applications** (in order to distinguish distributed data)

SOME APPLICATIONS of WATERMARKING

A basic application of watermarking techniques is to provide ownership information of digital data (images, video and audio products) by embedding copyright information into them.

Other applications:

- **Automatic monitoring and tracking of copyright material** on WEB. (For example, a robot searches the Web for watermarked material and thereby identifies potential illegal uses of it.)
- **Automatic audit of radio transmissions:** (A robot can “listen” to a radio station and look for marks, which indicate that a particular piece of music, or advertisement, has been broadcast.)
- **Data augmentation** – to add information that increases the value of the carrier - for example information in röntgen pictures.
- **Fingerprinting applications** (in order to distinguish distributed data)

Actually, watermarking has recently emerged as the leading technology to solve the above very important problems.

SOME APPLICATIONS of WATERMARKING

A basic application of watermarking techniques is to provide ownership information of digital data (images, video and audio products) by embedding copyright information into them.

Other applications:

- **Automatic monitoring and tracking of copyright material** on WEB. (For example, a robot searches the Web for watermarked material and thereby identifies potential illegal uses of it.)
- **Automatic audit of radio transmissions:** (A robot can “listen” to a radio station and look for marks, which indicate that a particular piece of music, or advertisement, has been broadcast.)
- **Data augmentation** – to add information that increases the value of the carrier - for example information in röntgen pictures.
- **Fingerprinting applications** (in order to distinguish distributed data)

Actually, watermarking has recently emerged as the leading technology to solve the above very important problems.

All kind of data can be watermarked: audio, images, video, formatted text, 3D models, ...

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

Steganography/watermarking even hide the very existence of the message in the communicated data.

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

Steganography/watermarking even hide the very existence of the message in the communicated data.

Consequently, **the concept of breaking the system** is different for **cryptosystems** and **stegosystems (watermarking systems)**.

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

Steganography/watermarking even hide the very existence of the message in the communicated data.

Consequently, **the concept of breaking the system** is different for **cryptosystems** and **stegosystems (watermarking systems)**.

- A cryptographic system is broken when the attacker can read the secret message.

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

Steganography/watermarking even hide the very existence of the message in the communicated data.

Consequently, **the concept of breaking the system** is different for **cryptosystems** and **stegosystems (watermarking systems)**.

- A cryptographic system is broken when the attacker can read the secret message.
- Breaking of a steganographic/watermarking system has two stages:

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

Steganography/watermarking even hide the very existence of the message in the communicated data.

Consequently, **the concept of breaking the system** is different for **cryptosystems** and **stegosystems (watermarking systems)**.

- A cryptographic system is broken when the attacker can read the secret message.
- Breaking of a steganographic/watermarking system has two stages:
 - The attacker can detect that steganography/watermarking has been used;

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

Steganography/watermarking even hide the very existence of the message in the communicated data.

Consequently, **the concept of breaking the system** is different for **cryptosystems** and **stegosystems (watermarking systems)**.

- A cryptographic system is broken when the attacker can read the secret message.
- Breaking of a steganographic/watermarking system has two stages:
 - The attacker can detect that steganography/watermarking has been used;
 - The attacker is able to read, modify or remove the hidden message.

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

Steganography/watermarking even hide the very existence of the message in the communicated data.

Consequently, **the concept of breaking the system** is different for **cryptosystems** and **stegosystems (watermarking systems)**.

- A cryptographic system is broken when the attacker can read the secret message.
- Breaking of a steganographic/watermarking system has two stages:
 - The attacker can detect that steganography/watermarking has been used;
 - The attacker is able to read, modify or remove the hidden message.

A steganography/watermarking system is considered as insecure already if the detection of steganography/watermarking is possible.

BREAKING STEGANOGRAPHY-WATERMARKING-CRYPTOGRAPHY

The purpose of both is to provide secret communication.

Cryptography hides the contents of the message from an attacker, but not the existence of the message.

Steganography/watermarking even hide the very existence of the message in the communicated data.

Consequently, **the concept of breaking the system** is different for **cryptosystems** and **stegosystems (watermarking systems)**.

- A cryptographic system is broken when the attacker can read the secret message.
- Breaking of a steganographic/watermarking system has two stages:
 - The attacker can detect that steganography/watermarking has been used;
 - The attacker is able to read, modify or remove the hidden message.

A steganography/watermarking system is considered as insecure already if the detection of steganography/watermarking is possible.

The advantage of steganography over cryptography is that messages do not attract attention by themselves.

Steganography can be also used to increase secrecy that can be provided by cryptographical methods.

Steganography can be also used to increase secrecy that can be provided by cryptographical methods.

Indeed, when steganography is used to hide the encrypted communication, an enemy is not only faced with a difficult decryption problem, but also with the problem of finding the communicated data.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

- First recorded use of steganographic methods was traced to 440 BC.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

- First recorded use of steganographic methods was traced to 440 BC. Greek Demaratus sent a warning about an attack by writing it on a wooden desk and then covering desk by wax and writing on that an innocent message.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

- First recorded use of steganographic methods was traced to 440 BC. Greek Demaratus sent a warning about an attack by writing it on a wooden desk and then covering desk by wax and writing on that an innocent message.
- Ancient Chinese wrote messages on fine silk, which was then crunched into a tiny ball and covered by wax. The messenger then swallowed the ball of wax.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

- First recorded use of steganographic methods was traced to 440 BC. Greek Demaratus sent a warning about an attack by writing it on a wooden desk and then covering desk by wax and writing on that an innocent message.
- Ancient Chinese wrote messages on fine silk, which was then crunched into a tiny ball and covered by wax. The messenger then swallowed the ball of wax.
- A variety of steganographic methods was used also in Roman times and then in 15-16 century (ranging from coding messages in music writings, in string knots, or using invisible inks).

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

- First recorded use of steganographic methods was traced to 440 BC. Greek Demaratus sent a warning about an attack by writing it on a wooden desk and then covering desk by wax and writing on that an innocent message.
- Ancient Chinese wrote messages on fine silk, which was then crunched into a tiny ball and covered by wax. The messenger then swallowed the ball of wax.
- A variety of steganographic methods was used also in Roman times and then in 15-16 century (ranging from coding messages in music writings, in string knots, or using invisible inks).
- In the sixteenth century, the Italian scientist Giovanni Porta described how to conceal a message within a hard-boiled egg. He made a special ink and then used ink to write secret message on the shell of the boiled egg. The ink penetrated the shell of the egg, and left the message on the surface of the hardened egg albumen, which could be read after and only when the shell was removed.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

- First recorded use of steganographic methods was traced to 440 BC. Greek Demaratus sent a warning about an attack by writing it on a wooden desk and then covering desk by wax and writing on that an innocent message.
- Ancient Chinese wrote messages on fine silk, which was then crunched into a tiny ball and covered by wax. The messenger then swallowed the ball of wax.
- A variety of steganographic methods was used also in Roman times and then in 15-16 century (ranging from coding messages in music writings, in string knots, or using invisible inks).
- In the sixteenth century, the Italian scientist Giovanni Porta described how to conceal a message within a hard-boiled egg. He made a special ink and then used ink to write secret message on the shell of the boiled egg. The ink penetrated the shell of the egg, and left the message on the surface of the hardened egg albumen, which could be read after and only when the shell was removed.
- Special invisible "inks" (milk, urine,...) were important steganographic tools since middle ages and even during the Second World War.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

- First recorded use of steganographic methods was traced to 440 BC. Greek Demaratus sent a warning about an attack by writing it on a wooden desk and then covering desk by wax and writing on that an innocent message.
- Ancient Chinese wrote messages on fine silk, which was then crunched into a tiny ball and covered by wax. The messenger then swallowed the ball of wax.
- A variety of steganographic methods was used also in Roman times and then in 15-16 century (ranging from coding messages in music writings, in string knots, or using invisible inks).
- In the sixteenth century, the Italian scientist Giovanni Porta described how to conceal a message within a hard-boiled egg. He made a special ink and then used ink to write secret message on the shell of the boiled egg. The ink penetrated the shell of the egg, and left the message on the surface of the hardened egg albumen, which could be read after and only when the shell was removed.
- Special invisible "inks" (milk, urine,...) were important steganographic tools since middle ages and even during the Second World War.
- Acrostic - hiding messages in first, last or other letters of words was popular steganographic method since middle ages.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

- First recorded use of steganographic methods was traced to 440 BC. Greek Demaratus sent a warning about an attack by writing it on a wooden desk and then covering desk by wax and writing on that an innocent message.
- Ancient Chinese wrote messages on fine silk, which was then crunched into a tiny ball and covered by wax. The messenger then swallowed the ball of wax.
- A variety of steganographic methods was used also in Roman times and then in 15-16 century (ranging from coding messages in music writings, in string knots, or using invisible inks).
- In the sixteenth century, the Italian scientist Giovanni Porta described how to conceal a message within a hard-boiled egg. He made a special ink and then used ink to write secret message on the shell of the boiled egg. The ink penetrated the shell of the egg, and left the message on the surface of the hardened egg albumen, which could be read after and only when the shell was removed.
- Special invisible "inks" (milk, urine,...) were important steganographic tools since middle ages and even during the Second World War.
- Acrostic - hiding messages in first, last or other letters of words was popular steganographic method since middle ages.
- During the Second World War a technique was developed to shrink photographically a page of text into a dot less than one millimeter in diameter, and then hide this microdot in an apparently innocent letter. (The first microdot has been spotted by FBI in 1941.)

- In 1857, Brewster suggested hiding secret messages "in spaces not larger than a full stop or small dot of ink".

HISTORY of MICRODOTS

- In 1857, Brewster suggested hiding secret messages "in spaces not larger than a full stop or small dot of ink".
- In 1860 the problem of making tiny images was solved by French photographer Dragon.

HISTORY of MICRODOTS

- In 1857, Brewster suggested hiding secret messages "in spaces not larger than a full stop or small dot of ink".
- In 1860 the problem of making tiny images was solved by French photographer Dragon.
- During Franco-Prussian war (1870-1881) from besieged Paris messages were sent on microfilms using pigeon post.

HISTORY of MICRODOTS

- In 1857, Brewster suggested hiding secret messages "in spaces not larger than a full stop or small dot of ink".
- In 1860 the problem of making tiny images was solved by French photographer Dragon.
- During Franco-Prussian war (1870-1881) from besieged Paris messages were sent on microfilms using pigeon post.
- During the Russo-Japanese war (1905) microscopic images were hidden in ears, nostrils, and under fingernails.

HISTORY of MICRODOTS

- In 1857, Brewster suggested hiding secret messages "in spaces not larger than a full stop or small dot of ink".
- In 1860 the problem of making tiny images was solved by French photographer Dragon.
- During Franco-Prussian war (1870-1881) from besieged Paris messages were sent on microfilms using pigeon post.
- During the Russo-Japanese war (1905) microscopic images were hidden in ears, nostrils, and under fingernails.
- During the First World War messages to and from spies were reduced to microdots, by several stages of photographic reductions, and then stuck on top of printed periods or commas (in innocuous cover materials, such as magazines).

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHY BOOKS

In the fourth century BC, the Greek Aeneas Tacticus, wrote a book on military techniques, [On the defence of fortification](#) in which the whole chapter is devoted to steganographic methods.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHY BOOKS

In the fourth century BC, the Greek Aeneas Tacticus, wrote a book on military techniques, [On the defence of fortification](#) in which the whole chapter is devoted to steganographic methods.

In 1499 Johannes Trithemius, abbot from Würzburg, wrote 3 out of 8 planned books "Steganographie".

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHY BOOKS

In the fourth century BC, the Greek Aeneas Tacticus, wrote a book on military techniques, *On the defence of fortification* in which the whole chapter is devoted to steganographic methods.

In 1499 Johannes Trithemius, abbot from Würzburg, wrote 3 out of 8 planned books "Steganographie".

In 1518 Trithemius printed 6 books, 540 pages, on cryptography and steganography called **Polygraphiae**.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHY BOOKS

In the fourth century BC, the Greek Aeneas Tacticus, wrote a book on military techniques, [On the defence of fortification](#) in which the whole chapter is devoted to steganographic methods.

In 1499 Johannes Trithemius, abbot from Würzburg, wrote 3 out of 8 planned books "Steganographie".

In 1518 Trithemius printed 6 books, 540 pages, on cryptography and steganography called **Polygraphiae**.

This is Trithemius' most notorious work. It includes a sophisticated system of steganography, as well as angel magic. It also contains a synthesis of the science of knowledge, the art of memory, magic, an accelerated language learning system, and a method of sending messages without symbols.

FIRST STEGANOGRAPHY BOOKS

In the fourth century BC, the Greek Aeneas Tacticus, wrote a book on military techniques, [On the defence of fortification](#) in which the whole chapter is devoted to steganographic methods.

In 1499 Johannes Trithemius, abbot from Würzburg, wrote 3 out of 8 planned books "Steganographie".

In 1518 Trithemius printed 6 books, 540 pages, on cryptography and steganography called **Polygraphiae**.

This is Trithemius' most notorious work. It includes a sophisticated system of steganography, as well as angel magic. It also contains a synthesis of the science of knowledge, the art of memory, magic, an accelerated language learning system, and a method of sending messages without symbols.

In 1665 Gaspari Schotti published the book "Steganographica", 400pages. (New presentation of Trithemius.)

- Born on February 1, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectuals of his time.

- Born on February 1, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectuals of his time.
- His book STEGANOGRAPHIA was published in 1606.

- Born on February 1, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectuals of his time.
- His book STEGANOGRAPHIA was published in 1606.
- In 1609 catholic church has put the book on the list of forbidden books (to be there for more than 200 years).

- Born on February 1, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectuals of his time.
- His book STEGANOGRAPHIA was published in 1606.
- In 1609 catholic church has put the book on the list of forbidden books (to be there for more than 200 years).
- His books are obscured by his strong belief in occult powers.

- Born on February 1, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectuals of his time.
- His book STEGANOGRAPHIA was published in 1606.
- In 1609 catholic church has put the book on the list of forbidden books (to be there for more than 200 years).
- His books are obscured by his strong belief in occult powers.
- He classified witches into four categories.


- Born on February 1, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectuals of his time.
- His book STEGANOGRAPHIA was published in 1606.
- In 1609 catholic church has put the book on the list of forbidden books (to be there for more than 200 years).
- His books are obscured by his strong belief in occult powers.
- He classified witches into four categories.
- He fixed creation of the world at 5206 B.C.

- Born on February 1, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectuals of his time.
- His book STEGANOGRAPHIA was published in 1606.
- In 1609 catholic church has put the book on the list of forbidden books (to be there for more than 200 years).
- His books are obscured by his strong belief in occult powers.
- He classified witches into four categories.
- He fixed creation of the world at 5206 B.C.
- He described how to perform telepathy.

- Born on February 1, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectuals of his time.
- His book STEGANOGRAPHIA was published in 1606.
- In 1609 catholic church has put the book on the list of forbidden books (to be there for more than 200 years).
- His books are obscured by his strong belief in occult powers.
- He classified witches into four categories.
- He fixed creation of the world at 5206 B.C.
- He described how to perform telepathy.
- Trithemius died on December 13, 1516.

- Born on February 1, 1462 and considered as one of the main intellectuals of his time.
- His book STEGANOGRAPHIA was published in 1606.
- In 1609 catholic church has put the book on the list of forbidden books (to be there for more than 200 years).
- His books are obscured by his strong belief in occult powers.
- He classified witches into four categories.
- He fixed creation of the world at 5206 B.C.
- He described how to perform telepathy.
- Trithemius died on December 13, 1516.

FRONT PAGE of the TRITHEMIUS BOOK



PHYSICAL versus DIGITAL STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganography that was used before the computer era is usually called **physical steganography** because physical carriers have been used to embed secret messages.

Steganography that was used before the computer era is usually called **physical steganography** because physical carriers have been used to embed secret messages.

Steganography using enormous potential of digitalization and of modern computers is usually called **digital steganography**.

MODERN DIGITAL STEGANOGRAPHY

THEORY and METHODS

ORIGIN of MODERN - DIGITAL - STEGANOGRAPHY - I.

ORIGIN of MODERN - DIGITAL - STEGANOGRAPHY - I.

The main goal of steganography is to hide messages/secrets without making it apparent that a message/secret is being communicated.

ORIGIN of MODERN - DIGITAL - STEGANOGRAPHY - I.

The main goal of steganography is to hide messages/secrets without making it apparent that a message/secret is being communicated.

The origin of modern (digital) steganography has been dated to around 1985 - after personal computers started to be applied to classical steganographic problems.

ORIGIN of MODERN - DIGITAL - STEGANOGRAPHY - I.

The main goal of steganography is to hide messages/secrets without making it apparent that a message/secret is being communicated.

The origin of modern (digital) steganography has been dated to around 1985 - after personal computers started to be applied to classical steganographic problems.

This was related to new problems at which information needed to be sent securely and safely between parties across restrictive communication channels.

ORIGIN of MODERN - DIGITAL - STEGANOGRAPHY - I.

The main goal of steganography is to hide messages/secrets without making it apparent that a message/secret is being communicated.

The origin of modern (digital) steganography has been dated to around 1985 - after personal computers started to be applied to classical steganographic problems.

This was related to new problems at which information needed to be sent securely and safely between parties across restrictive communication channels.

B. Morgen and M. Bary, from a small Dallas based company created and made public first two steganographic systems.

ORIGIN of MODERN - DIGITAL - STEGANOGRAPHY - I.

The main goal of steganography is to hide messages/secrets without making it apparent that a message/secret is being communicated.

The origin of modern (digital) steganography has been dated to around 1985 - after personal computers started to be applied to classical steganographic problems.

This was related to new problems at which information needed to be sent securely and safely between parties across restrictive communication channels.

B. Morgen and M. Bary, from a small Dallas based company created and made public first two steganographic systems.

Since then a huge spectrum of methods and tools have been discovered and developed for digital steganography.

ORIGIN of MODERN - DIGITAL - STEGANOGRAPHY - I.

The main goal of steganography is to hide messages/secrets without making it apparent that a message/secret is being communicated.

The origin of modern (digital) steganography has been dated to around 1985 - after personal computers started to be applied to classical steganographic problems.

This was related to new problems at which information needed to be sent securely and safely between parties across restrictive communication channels.

B. Morgen and M. Bary, from a small Dallas based company created and made public first two steganographic systems.

Since then a huge spectrum of methods and tools have been discovered and developed for digital steganography.

Some examples:

- Network steganography
- Echo steganography

- The first steganographic techniques were constructed using only intuition and heuristic rather than specific fundamental principles.

ORIGIN of MODERN - DIGITAL - STEGANOGRAPHY - II.

- The first steganographic techniques were constructed using only intuition and heuristic rather than specific fundamental principles.
- The designers focused on making embeddings imperceptible rather than undetectable.

ORIGIN of MODERN - DIGITAL - STEGANOGRAPHY - II.

- The first steganographic techniques were constructed using only intuition and heuristic rather than specific fundamental principles.
- The designers focused on making embeddings imperceptible rather than undetectable.
- That was undoubtedly caused by the lack of steganalytic methods that used statistical properties of images.

- The first steganographic techniques were constructed using only intuition and heuristic rather than specific fundamental principles.
- The designers focused on making embeddings imperceptible rather than undetectable.
- That was undoubtedly caused by the lack of steganalytic methods that used statistical properties of images.
- Consequently, virtually all early naive data-hiding schemes were successfully attacked later.

- The first steganographic techniques were constructed using only intuition and heuristic rather than specific fundamental principles.
- The designers focused on making embeddings imperceptible rather than undetectable.
- That was undoubtedly caused by the lack of steganalytic methods that used statistical properties of images.
- Consequently, virtually all early naive data-hiding schemes were successfully attacked later.
- With the advancement of steganalytic techniques, steganographic methods became more and more sophisticated, which in turn initiated another wave of research in steganalysis.

- The first steganographic techniques were constructed using only intuition and heuristic rather than specific fundamental principles.
- The designers focused on making embeddings imperceptible rather than undetectable.
- That was undoubtedly caused by the lack of steganalytic methods that used statistical properties of images.
- Consequently, virtually all early naive data-hiding schemes were successfully attacked later.
- With the advancement of steganalytic techniques, steganographic methods became more and more sophisticated, which in turn initiated another wave of research in steganalysis.
- One can therefore say: **Steganography is advanced through steganalysis.**

ELEMENTS of STAGANOGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS

Set of covers: that will be used to send messages..

ELEMENTS of STGANOGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS

Set of covers: that will be used to send messages..

Set of messages: to be communicated - their length can be important

ELEMENTS of STGANOGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS

Set of covers: that will be used to send messages..

Set of messages: to be communicated - their length can be important

ELEMENTS of STGANOGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS

Set of covers: that will be used to send messages..

Set of messages: to be communicated - their length can be important

Set of shared stego-keys:

Messages embedding/hiding algorithm: depending on shared secret keys

ELEMENTS of STGANOGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS

Set of covers: that will be used to send messages..

Set of messages: to be communicated - their length can be important

Set of shared stego-keys:

Messages embedding/hiding algorithm: depending on shared secret keys

Messages extracting algorithm: depending on shared secret keys.

For formal analysis and security considerations it is usually expected that covers, keys and messages are assumed by random variables.

GENERAL STEGANOGRAPHIC MODEL

A general model of a steganographic system:




Figure 1: Model of steganographic systems

GENERAL STEGANOGRAPHIC MODEL

A general model of a steganographic system:




Figure 1: Model of steganographic systems

Steganographic algorithms are in general based on replacing noise component of a digital object with a to-be-hidden message.

GENERAL STEGANOGRAPHIC MODEL

A general model of a steganographic system:




Figure 1: Model of steganographic systems

Steganographic algorithms are in general based on replacing noise component of a digital object with a to-be-hidden message.

Kerckhoffs's principle holds also for steganography. Security of the system should not be based on hiding the embedding algorithm, but on hiding the key.

- **Coverttext (cover-data – cover-object)** is an original (unaltered) message.

BASIC CONCEPTS of STEGOSYSTEMS

- **Coverttext (cover-data – cover-object)** is an original (unaltered) message.
- **Embedding process** in which the sender, Alice, tries to hide a message by embedding it into a (randomly chosen) **coverttext**, usually using a key, to obtain a **stegotext (stego-data or stego-object)**.

BASIC CONCEPTS of STEGOSYSTEMS

- **Coverttext (cover-data – cover-object)** is an original (unaltered) message.
- **Embedding process** in which the sender, Alice, tries to hide a message by embedding it into a (randomly chosen) **coverttext**, usually using a key, to obtain a **stegotext (stego-data or stego-object)**. The embedding process can be described by the mapping $E : C \times K \times M \rightarrow C$, where **C** is the set of possible cover – and stegotexts, **K** is the set of keys, and **M** is the set of messages.

BASIC CONCEPTS of STEGOSYSTEMS

- **Coverttext (cover-data – cover-object)** is an original (unaltered) message.
- **Embedding process** in which the sender, Alice, tries to hide a message by embedding it into a (randomly chosen) **coverttext**, usually using a key, to obtain a **stegotext (stego-data or stego-object)**. The embedding process can be described by the mapping $E : C \times K \times M \rightarrow C$, where C is the set of possible cover – and stegotexts, K is the set of keys, and M is the set of messages.
- **Stegotext (stego-data – stego-object)** is the message that comes out of the embedding process and contains the hidden message.

BASIC CONCEPTS of STEGOSYSTEMS

- **Coverttext (cover-data – cover-object)** is an original (unaltered) message.
- **Embedding process** in which the sender, Alice, tries to hide a message by embedding it into a (randomly chosen) **coverttext**, usually using a key, to obtain a **stegotext (stego-data or stego-object)**. The embedding process can be described by the mapping $E : C \times K \times M \rightarrow C$, where C is the set of possible cover – and stegotexts, K is the set of keys, and M is the set of messages.
- **Stegotext (stego-data – stego-object)** is the message that comes out of the embedding process and contains the hidden message.
- **Recovering process** (or extraction process) in which the receiver, Bob, tries to get, using the key only but not the coverttext, the hidden message in the stegotext.

BASIC CONCEPTS of STEGOSYSTEMS

- **Coverttext (cover-data – cover-object)** is an original (unaltered) message.
- **Embedding process** in which the sender, Alice, tries to hide a message by embedding it into a (randomly chosen) **coverttext**, usually using a key, to obtain a **stegotext (stego-data or stego-object)**. The embedding process can be described by the mapping $E : C \times K \times M \rightarrow C$, where C is the set of possible cover – and stegotexts, K is the set of keys, and M is the set of messages.
- **Stegotext (stego-data – stego-object)** is the message that comes out of the embedding process and contains the hidden message.
- **Recovering process** (or extraction process) in which the receiver, Bob, tries to get, using the key only but not the coverttext, the hidden message in the stegotext. The recovery (decoding) process D can be seen as a mapping $D : C \times K \rightarrow C$.

BASIC CONCEPTS of STEGOSYSTEMS

- **Coverttext (cover-data – cover-object)** is an original (unaltered) message.
- **Embedding process** in which the sender, Alice, tries to hide a message by embedding it into a (randomly chosen) **coverttext**, usually using a key, to obtain a **stegotext (stego-data or stego-object)**. The embedding process can be described by the mapping $E : C \times K \times M \rightarrow C$, where C is the set of possible cover – and stegotexts, K is the set of keys, and M is the set of messages.
- **Stegotext (stego-data – stego-object)** is the message that comes out of the embedding process and contains the hidden message.
- **Recovering process** (or extraction process) in which the receiver, Bob, tries to get, using the key only but not the coverttext, the hidden message in the stegotext. The recovery (decoding) process D can be seen as a mapping $D : C \times K \rightarrow C$.
- **Security requirement** is that a third person watching such a communication should not be able to find out whether the sender has been active, and when, in the sense that he really embedded a message in the coverttext. **In other words, stegotexts should be indistinguishable from coverttexts.**

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - I

Steganography by cover selection: Examples: (1) landscape or portret orientation of an image can represents 0 or 1;

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - I

Steganography by cover selection: Examples: (1) landscape or portret orientation of an image can represents 0 or 1; (2) An inclusion of some object in the image (for example of an animal) can represent a special text - say - "attack tomorrow".

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - I

Steganography by cover selection: Examples: (1) landscape or portret orientation of an image can represents 0 or 1; (2) An inclusion of some object in the image (for example of an animal) can represent a special text - say - "attack tomorrow".

Steganography by cover synthesis: Cover is created that it conveys the desired message. Example: Speculation were made that Bin Ladin videos contained messages hidden in his dress, standings, gestures, wordings, . . .

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - I

Steganography by cover selection: Examples: (1) landscape or portret orientation of an image can represents 0 or 1; (2) An inclusion of some object in the image (for example of an animal) can represent a special text - say - "attack tomorrow".

Steganography by cover synthesis: Cover is created that it conveys the desired message. Example: Speculation were made that Bin Ladin videos contained messages hidden in his dress, standings, gestures, wordings, . . .

Steganography by cover modifications: Example. Least significant bits of pixels are replaced by bits of the to-be-embedding message using some pseudorandom algorithm for choosing pixels.

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - I

Steganography by cover selection: Examples: (1) landscape or portret orientation of an image can represents 0 or 1; (2) An inclusion of some object in the image (for example of an animal) can represent a special text - say - "attack tomorrow".

Steganography by cover synthesis: Cover is created that it conveys the desired message. Example: Speculation were made that Bin Ladin videos contained messages hidden in his dress, standings, gestures, wordings, . . .

Steganography by cover modifications: Example. Least significant bits of pixels are replaced by bits of the to-be-embedding message using some pseudorandom algorithm for choosing pixels. If the set of covers is the set of all 512×512 grayscale images and one bit of to-be-message is embedded by a pixel, then $2^{12 \times 512}$ messages can be embedded in all covers.

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

- **Pure stegosystems** – no key is used.

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

- **Pure stegosystems** – no key is used.
- **Secret-key stegosystems** – shared secret key is used.

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

- **Pure stegosystems** – no key is used.
- **Secret-key stegosystems** – shared secret key is used.
- **Public-key stegosystems** – public and secret keys are used.

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

- **Pure stegosystems** – no key is used.
- **Secret-key stegosystems** – shared secret key is used.
- **Public-key stegosystems** – public and secret keys are used.

Definition: **Pure stegosystem** is defined as $S = \langle C, M, E, D \rangle$, where C is the set of possible **coverttexts**,

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

- **Pure stegosystems** – no key is used.
- **Secret-key stegosystems** – shared secret key is used.
- **Public-key stegosystems** – public and secret keys are used.

Definition: **Pure stegosystem** is defined as $S = \langle C, M, E, D \rangle$, where C is the set of possible **coverttexts**, M is the set of secret **messages**,

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

- **Pure stegosystems** – no key is used.
- **Secret-key stegosystems** – shared secret key is used.
- **Public-key stegosystems** – public and secret keys are used.

Definition: Pure stegosystem is defined as $S = \langle C, M, E, D \rangle$, where C is the set of possible **coverttexts**, M is the set of secret **messages**, $|C| \geq |M|$, $E : C \times M \rightarrow C$ is the **embedding function**

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

- **Pure stegosystems** – no key is used.
- **Secret-key stegosystems** – shared secret key is used.
- **Public-key stegosystems** – public and secret keys are used.

Definition: Pure stegosystem is defined as $S = \langle C, M, E, D \rangle$, where C is the set of possible **coverttexts**, M is the set of secret **messages**, $|C| \geq |M|$, $E : C \times M \rightarrow C$ is the **embedding function** and $D : C \rightarrow M$, is the **extraction function**, with the property that $D(E(c,m)) = m$, for all $m \in M$ and $c \in C$.

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

- **Pure stegosystems** – no key is used.
- **Secret-key stegosystems** – shared secret key is used.
- **Public-key stegosystems** – public and secret keys are used.

Definition: Pure stegosystem is defined as $S = \langle C, M, E, D \rangle$, where C is the set of possible **coverttexts**, M is the set of secret **messages**, $|C| \geq |M|$, $E : C \times M \rightarrow C$ is the **embedding function** and $D : C \rightarrow M$, is the **extraction function**, with the property that $D(E(c,m)) = m$, for all $m \in M$ and $c \in C$.

Security of the pure stegosystems depends completely on its secrecy. On the other hand, security of other two stegosystems depends on the secrecy of the key(s) used.

BASIC TYPES of STEGOSYSTEMS - II

There are three basic types of stegosystems:

- **Pure stegosystems** – no key is used.
- **Secret-key stegosystems** – shared secret key is used.
- **Public-key stegosystems** – public and secret keys are used.

Definition: Pure stegosystem is defined as $S = \langle C, M, E, D \rangle$, where C is the set of possible **coverttexts**, M is the set of secret **messages**, $|C| \geq |M|$, $E : C \times M \rightarrow C$ is the **embedding function** and $D : C \rightarrow M$, is the **extraction function**, with the property that $D(E(c,m)) = m$, for all $m \in M$ and $c \in C$.

Security of the pure stegosystems depends completely on its secrecy. On the other hand, security of other two stegosystems depends on the secrecy of the key(s) used.

Definition: Secret-key (asymmetric) stegosystem $S = \langle C, M, K, E_K, D_K \rangle$, where C is the set of possible **coverttexts**, M is the set of secret **messages** with $|C| \geq |M|$, K is the set of secret **keys**, $E_K : C \times M \times K \rightarrow C$, $D_K : C \times K \rightarrow M$ with the property that $D_K(E_K(c, m, k), k) = m$ for all $m \in M$, $c \in C$ and $k \in K$.

Similarly as in the case of the public-key cryptography, two keys are used: a **public-key E** for embedding and a **private-key D** for recovering.

Similarly as in the case of the public-key cryptography, two keys are used: a **public-key E** for embedding and a **private-key D** for recovering.

It is often useful to combine such a public-key stegosystem with a public-key cryptosystem.

Similarly as in the case of the public-key cryptography, two keys are used: a **public-key** E for embedding and a **private-key** D for recovering.

It is often useful to combine such a **public-key stegosystem** with a **public-key cryptosystem**.

For example, in case Alice wants to send a message m to Bob, she encrypts first m using Bob's public key e_B , then embeds of $e_B(m)$ using process E into a cover and then sends the resulting stegotext to Bob, who recovers $e_B(m)$ using D and then decrypts it, using his decryption function d_B .

TEXT STEGANOGRAPHY

A variety of steganography techniques allow to hide messages in formatted texts.

- **Acrostic.** A message is hidden into certain letters of the text, for example into the first letters of some words.

Tables have been produced, the first one by Trithemius, called Ave Maria, how to replace plaintext letters by words.

A variety of steganography techniques allow to hide messages in formatted texts.

- **Acrostic.** A message is hidden into certain letters of the text, for example into the first letters of some words.

Tables have been produced, the first one by Trithemius, called Ave Maria, how to replace plaintext letters by words.

- An improvement of the previous method is to distribute plaintext letters randomly in the cover-text and then use a mask to read it.

A variety of steganography techniques allow to hide messages in formatted texts.

- **Acrostic.** A message is hidden into certain letters of the text, for example into the first letters of some words.
Tables have been produced, the first one by Trithemius, called Ave Maria, how to replace plaintext letters by words.
- An improvement of the previous method is to distribute plaintext letters randomly in the cover-text and then use a mask to read it.
- The presence of errors or stylistic features at predetermined points in the cover data is another way to select the location of the embedded information.

TEXT STEGANOGRAPHY

A variety of steganography techniques allow to hide messages in formatted texts.

- **Acrostic.** A message is hidden into certain letters of the text, for example into the first letters of some words.
Tables have been produced, the first one by Trithemius, called Ave Maria, how to replace plaintext letters by words.
- An improvement of the previous method is to distribute plaintext letters randomly in the cover-text and then use a mask to read it.
- The presence of errors or stylistic features at predetermined points in the cover data is another way to select the location of the embedded information.
- **Line shifting encodings.**

TEXT STEGANOGRAPHY

A variety of steganography techniques allow to hide messages in formatted texts.

- **Acrostic.** A message is hidden into certain letters of the text, for example into the first letters of some words.
Tables have been produced, the first one by Trithemius, called Ave Maria, how to replace plaintext letters by words.
- An improvement of the previous method is to distribute plaintext letters randomly in the cover-text and then use a mask to read it.
- The presence of errors or stylistic features at predetermined points in the cover data is another way to select the location of the embedded information.
- **Line shifting encodings.**
- **Word shifting encodings.**

TEXT STEGANOGRAPHY

A variety of steganography techniques allow to hide messages in formatted texts.

- **Acrostic.** A message is hidden into certain letters of the text, for example into the first letters of some words.
Tables have been produced, the first one by Trithemius, called Ave Maria, how to replace plaintext letters by words.
- An improvement of the previous method is to distribute plaintext letters randomly in the cover-text and then use a mask to read it.
- The presence of errors or stylistic features at predetermined points in the cover data is another way to select the location of the embedded information.
- **Line shifting encodings.**
- **Word shifting encodings.**
- **Data hiding through justifications.**

TEXT STEGANOGRAPHY

A variety of steganography techniques allow to hide messages in formatted texts.

- **Acrostic.** A message is hidden into certain letters of the text, for example into the first letters of some words.
Tables have been produced, the first one by Trithemius, called Ave Maria, how to replace plaintext letters by words.
- An improvement of the previous method is to distribute plaintext letters randomly in the cover-text and then use a mask to read it.
- The presence of errors or stylistic features at predetermined points in the cover data is another way to select the location of the embedded information.
- **Line shifting encodings.**
- **Word shifting encodings.**
- **Data hiding through justifications.**
- Through features encoding (for example in the vertical lines of letters **b, d, h, k**).

TEXT STEGANOGRAPHY

A variety of steganography techniques allow to hide messages in formatted texts.

- **Acrostic.** A message is hidden into certain letters of the text, for example into the first letters of some words.
Tables have been produced, the first one by Trithemius, called Ave Maria, how to replace plaintext letters by words.
- An improvement of the previous method is to distribute plaintext letters randomly in the cover-text and then use a mask to read it.
- The presence of errors or stylistic features at predetermined points in the cover data is another way to select the location of the embedded information.
- **Line shifting encodings.**
- **Word shifting encodings.**
- **Data hiding through justifications.**
- Through features encoding (for example in the vertical lines of letters **b, d, h, k**).

Text steganography (a really good one) is considered to be very difficult kind of steganography due to the lack of redundancy in texts comparing to images or audio.

Amorosa visione by Giovanni Boccaccio (1313-1375) is said to be the **world largest acrostic.**

Amorosa visione by **Giovanni Boccaccio** (1313-1375) is said to be the **world largest acrostic**.

Boccaccio first wrote three sonnets (1500 letters together) and then he wrote other poems such that the initials of the successive tercets correspond exactly to the letters of the sonnets.

Amorosa visione by **Giovanni Boccaccio** (1313-1375) is said to be the **world largest acrostic**.

Boccaccio first wrote three sonnets (1500 letters together) and then he wrote other poems such that the initials of the successive tercets correspond exactly to the letters of the sonnets.

In the book **Hypnerotomachia Poliphili**, published **by an anonymous** in 1499, and considered as one of the most beautiful books ever, the first letters of the 38 chapters spelled out as follows:

Poliam frater Franciscus Columna peramavit

Amorosa visione by **Giovanni Boccaccio** (1313-1375) is said to be the **world largest acrostic**.

Boccaccio first wrote three sonnets (1500 letters together) and then he wrote other poems such that the initials of the successive tercets correspond exactly to the letters of the sonnets.

In the book **Hypnerotomachia Poliphili**, published **by an anonymous** in 1499, and considered as one of the most beautiful books ever, the first letters of the 38 chapters spelled out as follows:

Poliam frater Franciscus Columna peramavit

with the translation

Brother Francesco Colonna passionately loves Polia

Akrostichy 27/3/2003

Akrostichy na jména a přezdívky

Akrostichy (a jiné verše) na dívčí jména

"Kryptogram" na opomenuté jméno

*Věnováno Z. Š. a K. Krylovi s díky za inspiraci.
9/10/2000*

Zatmění slunce. Zatmění smyslů. Zatmění rozumu.
Ohnivá bouře naruby převrací vše.
Rozřála život na části "před Ní" a "po Ní"
A krátkou extázi, jež je od sebe dělí.

Lenka

*Lenka je na Písmákovi hodně, ale ta, kterou jsem
měl při psaní na mysli, bude vědět, o které to je.
No a pro ty ostatní to také trošku je, protože je to
moc hezké jméno.
13/12/2000*

Láskyplná
Eroticky přitažlivá
Něžná
Kamarádká
A moc hezká...

Akrostichy na další ženská jména

18/1/2001

Mužské srdce -
A nejenom srdce -
Rádo pookřeje,
Když se nablízku vynoří
Ěterická bytost s
Tak starobylým a přítom
Atraktivním jménem.

Když na tebe pomyslím...

23/2/2001

Krychle je kulatá
Lednička hraje tango
Ábel je bratrovrah
Rozum se choulí v koutku
A srdci neporučí

Akrostichy pro Lucii

4/5/2001

Bridžový:

Licituji slam
Uklouznutí bude drahé
City netolerují ztrátové zdvihy
Impas na srdcovou dámu
Efektní, ale riskantní

Geriatrický:

Lodyhy lučních květin

PERFECT SECRECY of STEGOSYSTEMS

In order to define secrecy of a stegosystem we need to consider

- probability distribution P_C on the set C of covertexts;
- probability distribution P_M on the set M of secret messages;
- probability distribution P_K on the set K of keys;
- probability distribution P_S on the set $\{E_K(c, m, k), |c \in C, m \in M, k \in K\}$ of stegotexts.

PERFECT SECRECY of STEGOSYSTEMS

In order to define secrecy of a stegosystem we need to consider

- probability distribution P_C on the set C of covertexts;
- probability distribution P_M on the set M of secret messages;
- probability distribution P_K on the set K of keys;
- probability distribution P_S on the set $\{E_K(c, m, k), | c \in C, m \in M, k \in K\}$ of stegotexts.

The basic related concept is that of the **relative entropy**, or **KL-distance**, $D(P_1 || P_2)$ of two probability distributions P_1 and P_2 defined on a set Q by

$$D(P_1 || P_2) = \sum_{q \in Q} P_1(q) \lg \frac{P_1(q)}{P_2(q)},$$

which measures the inefficiency of assuming that the distribution on Q is P_2 if it is really P_1 .

PERFECT SECRECY of STEGOSYSTEMS

In order to define secrecy of a stegosystem we need to consider

- probability distribution P_C on the set C of covertexts;
- probability distribution P_M on the set M of secret messages;
- probability distribution P_K on the set K of keys;
- probability distribution P_S on the set $\{E_K(c, m, k), | c \in C, m \in M, k \in K\}$ of stegotexts.

The basic related concept is that of the **relative entropy**, or **KL-distance**, $D(P_1 || P_2)$ of two probability distributions P_1 and P_2 defined on a set Q by

$$D(P_1 || P_2) = \sum_{q \in Q} P_1(q) \lg \frac{P_1(q)}{P_2(q)},$$

which measures the inefficiency of assuming that the distribution on Q is P_2 if it is really P_1 .

Definition Let S be a stegosystem, P_C the probability distribution on covertexts C and P_S the probability distribution of the stegotexts and $\varepsilon > 0$. Stegosystem S is called **ε -secure** against passive attackers, if

$$D(P_C || P_S) \leq \varepsilon$$

and **perfectly secure** if $\varepsilon = 0$.

PERFECTLY SECURE STEGOSYSTEMS

A perfectly secure stegosystem can be constructed out of the ONE TIME-PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

PERFECTLY SECURE STEGOSYSTEMS

A perfectly secure stegosystem can be constructed out of the ONE TIME-PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

Theorem There exist perfectly secure stegosystems.

PERFECTLY SECURE STEGOSYSTEMS

A perfectly secure stegosystem can be constructed out of the ONE TIME-PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

Theorem There exist perfectly secure stegosystems.

Proof. Let n be an integer, $C_n = \{0, 1\}^n$ and P_C be the uniform distribution on C_n , and let $m \in C_n$ be a secret message.

PERFECTLY SECURE STEGOSYSTEMS

A perfectly secure stegosystem can be constructed out of the ONE TIME-PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

Theorem There exist perfectly secure stegosystems.

Proof. Let n be an integer, $C_n = \{0, 1\}^n$ and P_C be the uniform distribution on C_n , and let $m \in C_n$ be a secret message.

The sender selects randomly $c \in C_n$, computes $c \oplus m = s$. The resulting stegotexts are uniformly distributed on C_n and therefore $P_C = P_S$ from what it follows that

PERFECTLY SECURE STEGOSYSTEMS

A perfectly secure stegosystem can be constructed out of the ONE TIME-PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

Theorem There exist perfectly secure stegosystems.

Proof. Let n be an integer, $C_n = \{0, 1\}^n$ and P_C be the uniform distribution on C_n , and let $m \in C_n$ be a secret message.

The sender selects randomly $c \in C_n$, computes $c \oplus m = s$. The resulting stegotexts are uniformly distributed on C_n and therefore $P_C = P_S$ from what it follows that

$$D(P_{C_n} \| P_S) = 0.$$

PERFECTLY SECURE STEGOSYSTEMS

A perfectly secure stegosystem can be constructed out of the ONE TIME-PAD CRYPTOSYSTEM

Theorem There exist perfectly secure stegosystems.

Proof. Let n be an integer, $C_n = \{0, 1\}^n$ and P_C be the uniform distribution on C_n , and let $m \in C_n$ be a secret message.

The sender selects randomly $c \in C_n$, computes $c \oplus m = s$. The resulting stegotexts are uniformly distributed on C_n and therefore $P_C = P_S$ from what it follows that

$$D(P_{C_n} \| P_S) = 0.$$

In the extraction process, the message m can be extracted from s by the computation

$$m = s \oplus c.$$

INFORMATION HIDING in NOISY DATA

INFORMATION HIDING in NOISY DATA

Perhaps the most basic methods of steganography is to utilize the existence of redundant information in communication channels/media.

INFORMATION HIDING in NOISY DATA

Perhaps the most basic methods of steganography is to utilize the existence of redundant information in communication channels/media.

Images and digital sounds naturally contain such redundancies in the form of noise components.

INFORMATION HIDING in NOISY DATA

Perhaps the most basic methods of steganography is to utilize the existence of redundant information in communication channels/media.

Images and digital sounds naturally contain such redundancies in the form of noise components.

For images and digital sounds it is natural to assume that a cover-data are represented by a sequence of numbers and their least significant bits (LSB) represent noise.

INFORMATION HIDING in NOISY DATA

Perhaps the most basic methods of steganography is to utilize the existence of redundant information in communication channels/media.

Images and digital sounds naturally contain such redundancies in the form of noise components.

For images and digital sounds it is natural to assume that a cover-data are represented by a sequence of numbers and their least significant bits (LSB) represent noise.

If cover-data are represented by numbers

$$c_1, c_2, c_3, \dots,$$

then one of the most basic steganographic methods is to replace,

INFORMATION HIDING in NOISY DATA

Perhaps the most basic methods of steganography is to utilize the existence of redundant information in communication channels/media.

Images and digital sounds naturally contain such redundancies in the form of noise components.

For images and digital sounds it is natural to assume that a cover-data are represented by a sequence of numbers and their least significant bits (LSB) represent noise.

If cover-data are represented by numbers

$$c_1, c_2, c_3, \dots,$$

then one of the most basic steganographic methods is to replace, in some of c_i 's, that are chosen using an algorithm and a key,

INFORMATION HIDING in NOISY DATA

Perhaps the most basic methods of steganography is to utilize the existence of redundant information in communication channels/media.

Images and digital sounds naturally contain such redundancies in the form of noise components.

For images and digital sounds it is natural to assume that a cover-data are represented by a sequence of numbers and their least significant bits (LSB) represent noise.

If cover-data are represented by numbers

$$c_1, c_2, c_3, \dots,$$

then one of the most basic steganographic methods is to replace, in some of c_i 's, that are chosen using an algorithm and a key, the least significant bits by the bits of the message that should be hidden.

INFORMATION HIDING in NOISY DATA

Perhaps the most basic methods of steganography is to utilize the existence of redundant information in communication channels/media.

Images and digital sounds naturally contain such redundancies in the form of noise components.

For images and digital sounds it is natural to assume that a cover-data are represented by a sequence of numbers and their least significant bits (LSB) represent noise.

If cover-data are represented by numbers

$$c_1, c_2, c_3, \dots,$$

then one of the most basic steganographic methods is to replace, in some of c_i 's, that are chosen using an algorithm and a key, the least significant bits by the bits of the message that should be hidden.

Unfortunately, this method does not provide high level of security,

INFORMATION HIDING in NOISY DATA

Perhaps the most basic methods of steganography is to utilize the existence of redundant information in communication channels/media.

Images and digital sounds naturally contain such redundancies in the form of noise components.

For images and digital sounds it is natural to assume that a cover-data are represented by a sequence of numbers and their least significant bits (LSB) represent noise.

If cover-data are represented by numbers

$$c_1, c_2, c_3, \dots,$$

then one of the most basic steganographic methods is to replace, in some of c_i 's, that are chosen using an algorithm and a key, the least significant bits by the bits of the message that should be hidden.

Unfortunately, this method does not provide high level of security, because it can change significantly statistical properties of the cover-data.

ACTIVE and MALICIOUS ATTACKS

ACTIVE and MALICIOUS ATTACKS

At the design of stegosystems special attention has to be paid to the presence of active and malicious attackers.

ACTIVE and MALICIOUS ATTACKS

At the design of stegosystems special attention has to be paid to the presence of active and malicious attackers.

- Active attackers can change cover during the communication process.
- An attacker is malicious if he forges messages or initiates a steganography protocol under the name of one of the communicating parties.

ACTIVE and MALICIOUS ATTACKS

At the design of stegosystems special attention has to be paid to the presence of active and malicious attackers.

- Active attackers can change cover during the communication process.
- An attacker is malicious if he forges messages or initiates a steganography protocol under the name of one of the communicating parties.

In the presence of a malicious attacker, it is not enough that stegosystem is robust.

ACTIVE and MALICIOUS ATTACKS

At the design of stegosystems special attention has to be paid to the presence of active and malicious attackers.

- Active attackers can change cover during the communication process.
- An attacker is malicious if he forges messages or initiates a steganography protocol under the name of one of the communicating parties.

In the presence of a malicious attacker, it is not enough that stegosystem is robust.

If the embedding method does not depend on a key shared by the sender and receiver, then an attacker can forge messages, since the recipient is not able to verify sender's identity.

Definition A steganographic algorithm is called secure if

- Messages are hidden using a public algorithm and a secret key. The secret key must identify the sender uniquely.

Definition A steganographic algorithm is called secure if

- Messages are hidden using a public algorithm and a secret key. The secret key must identify the sender uniquely.
- Only the holder of the secret key can detect, extract and prove the existence of the hidden message. (Nobody else should be able to find any statistical evidence of a message's existence.)

Definition A steganographic algorithm is called secure if

- Messages are hidden using a public algorithm and a secret key. The secret key must identify the sender uniquely.
- Only the holder of the secret key can detect, extract and prove the existence of the hidden message. (Nobody else should be able to find any statistical evidence of a message's existence.)
- Even if an enemy gets the contents of one hidden message, he should have no chance of detecting others.

Definition A steganographic algorithm is called secure if

- Messages are hidden using a public algorithm and a secret key. The secret key must identify the sender uniquely.
- Only the holder of the secret key can detect, extract and prove the existence of the hidden message. (Nobody else should be able to find any statistical evidence of a message's existence.)
- Even if an enemy gets the contents of one hidden message, he should have no chance of detecting others.
- It is computationally unfeasible to detect hidden messages.

Stego-only attack: Only the stego-object is available for stegoanalysis.

STEGO – ATTACKS

Stego-only attack: Only the stego-object is available for stegoanalysis.

Known-cover attack: The original cover-object and stego-object are both available.

Stego-only attack: Only the stego-object is available for stegoanalysis.

Known-cover attack: The original cover-object and stego-object are both available.

Known-message attack: Sometimes the hidden message may become known to the stegoanalyser. Analyzing the stego-object for patterns that correspond to the hidden message may be beneficial for future attacks against that system. (Even with the message, this may be very difficult and may even be considered equivalent to the stego-analysis.)

Stego-only attack: Only the stego-object is available for stegoanalysis.

Known-cover attack: The original cover-object and stego-object are both available.

Known-message attack: Sometimes the hidden message may become known to the stegoanalyser. Analyzing the stego-object for patterns that correspond to the hidden message may be beneficial for future attacks against that system. (Even with the message, this may be very difficult and may even be considered equivalent to the stego-analysis.)

Chosen-stego attack: The stegoanalysis generates a stego-object from some steganography tool or algorithm from a chosen message.

Stego-only attack: Only the stego-object is available for stegoanalysis.

Known-cover attack: The original cover-object and stego-object are both available.

Known-message attack: Sometimes the hidden message may become known to the stegoanalyser. Analyzing the stego-object for patterns that correspond to the hidden message may be beneficial for future attacks against that system. (Even with the message, this may be very difficult and may even be considered equivalent to the stego-analysis.)

Chosen-stego attack: The stegoanalysis generates a stego-object from some steganography tool or algorithm from a chosen message. The goal in this attack is to determine corresponding patterns in the stego-object that may point to the use of specific steganography tools or algorithms.

Stego-only attack: Only the stego-object is available for stegoanalysis.

Known-cover attack: The original cover-object and stego-object are both available.

Known-message attack: Sometimes the hidden message may become known to the stegoanalyser. Analyzing the stego-object for patterns that correspond to the hidden message may be beneficial for future attacks against that system. (Even with the message, this may be very difficult and may even be considered equivalent to the stego-analysis.)

Chosen-stego attack: The stegoanalysis generates a stego-object from some steganography tool or algorithm from a chosen message. The goal in this attack is to determine corresponding patterns in the stego-object that may point to the use of specific steganography tools or algorithms.

Known-stego attack The steganography algorithm is known and both the original and stego-objects are available.

BASIC STEGANOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES

Substitution techniques: substitute a redundant part of the cover-object with the secret message.

BASIC STEGANOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES

Substitution techniques: substitute a redundant part of the cover-object with the secret message.

Transformed domain techniques: embed the secret message in a transform space of the signal (e.g. in the frequency domain).

BASIC STEGANOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES

Substitution techniques: substitute a redundant part of the cover-object with the secret message.

Transformed domain techniques: embed the secret message in a transform space of the signal (e.g. in the frequency domain).

Spread spectrum techniques: embed the secret messages adopting ideas from the spread spectrum communications.

BASIC STEGANOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES

Substitution techniques: substitute a redundant part of the cover-object with the secret message.

Transformed domain techniques: embed the secret message in a transform space of the signal (e.g. in the frequency domain).

Spread spectrum techniques: embed the secret messages adopting ideas from the spread spectrum communications.

Statistical techniques: embed messages by changing some statistical properties of the cover-objects and use hypothesis-testing methods in the extraction process.

BASIC STEGANOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES

Substitution techniques: substitute a redundant part of the cover-object with the secret message.

Transformed domain techniques: embed the secret message in a transform space of the signal (e.g. in the frequency domain).

Spread spectrum techniques: embed the secret messages adopting ideas from the spread spectrum communications.

Statistical techniques: embed messages by changing some statistical properties of the cover-objects and use hypothesis-testing methods in the extraction process.

Cover generation techniques: do not embed the message in randomly chosen cover-objects, but create covers that fit a message that needs to be hidden.

DIGITAL COVER DATA

A **cover-object** or, shortly, a **cover \mathbf{c}** is a sequence of numbers $c_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, |\mathbf{c}|$.

Such a sequence can represent digital sounds in different time moments, or a linear (vectorized) version of an image.

$c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ in case of binary images and, usually, $0 \leq c_i \leq 256$ in case of quantized images or sounds.

DIGITAL COVER DATA

A **cover-object** or, shortly, a **cover c** is a sequence of numbers $c_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, |c|$.

Such a sequence can represent digital sounds in different time moments, or a linear (vectorized) version of an image.

$c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ in case of binary images and, usually, $0 \leq c_i \leq 256$ in case of quantized images or sounds.

An **image representation C** can be seen as a discrete function assigning a color vector $c(x,y)$ to each pixel $p(x,y)$.

DIGITAL COVER DATA

A **cover-object** or, shortly, a **cover c** is a sequence of numbers $c_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, |c|$.

Such a sequence can represent digital sounds in different time moments, or a linear (vectorized) version of an image.

$c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ in case of binary images and, usually, $0 \leq c_i \leq 256$ in case of quantized images or sounds.

An **image representation C** can be seen as a discrete function assigning a color vector $c(x,y)$ to each pixel $p(x,y)$.

A color vector is normally a three-component vector in a **color space**. Often used are the following color spaces:

DIGITAL COVER DATA

A **cover-object** or, shortly, a **cover c** is a sequence of numbers $c_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, |c|$.

Such a sequence can represent digital sounds in different time moments, or a linear (vectorized) version of an image.

$c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ in case of binary images and, usually, $0 \leq c_i \leq 256$ in case of quantized images or sounds.

An **image representation C** can be seen as a discrete function assigning a color vector $c(x,y)$ to each pixel $p(x,y)$.

A color vector is normally a three-component vector in a **color space**. Often used are the following color spaces:

RGB-space – every color is specified as a weighted sum of a **red**, **green** and a **blue** components. An **RGB- vector** specifies intensities of these three components.

DIGITAL COVER DATA

A **cover-object** or, shortly, a **cover c** is a sequence of numbers $c_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, |c|$.

Such a sequence can represent digital sounds in different time moments, or a linear (vectorized) version of an image.

$c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ in case of binary images and, usually, $0 \leq c_i \leq 256$ in case of quantized images or sounds.

An **image representation C** can be seen as a discrete function assigning a color vector $c(x,y)$ to each pixel $p(x,y)$.

A color vector is normally a three-component vector in a **color space**. Often used are the following color spaces:

RGB-space – every color is specified as a weighted sum of a **red**, **green** and a **blue** components. An **RGB- vector** specifies intensities of these three components.

YCbCr-space – every colour is specified by a **luminance Y** and two **chrominance** components (**Cb**, **Cr**). (Y,Cb,Cr) vector is used also in JPEG image format.

DIGITAL COVER DATA

A **cover-object** or, shortly, a **cover c** is a sequence of numbers $c_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, |c|$.

Such a sequence can represent digital sounds in different time moments, or a linear (vectorized) version of an image.

$c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ in case of binary images and, usually, $0 \leq c_i \leq 256$ in case of quantized images or sounds.

An **image representation C** can be seen as a discrete function assigning a color vector $c(x,y)$ to each pixel $p(x,y)$.

A color vector is normally a three-component vector in a **color space**. Often used are the following color spaces:

RGB-space – every color is specified as a weighted sum of a **red**, **green** and a **blue** components. An **RGB-vector** specifies intensities of these three components.

YCbCr-space – every colour is specified by a **luminance Y** and two **chrominance** components (**Cb**, **Cr**). (Y,Cb,Cr) vector is used also in JPEG image format.

Note An **RGB-vector** can be converted to **YCbCr-vector** as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= 0.299 R + 0.587 G + 0.114 B \\ Cb &= 0.5 + \frac{(B - Y)}{2} \\ Cr &= 0.5 + \frac{(R - Y)}{1.6} \end{aligned}$$

BASIC SUBSTITUTION TECHNIQUES

BASIC SUBSTITUTION TECHNIQUES

- **LSB substitution** – the LSB of an binary block c_{k_i} is replaced by the bit m_i of the secret message.

The methods differ by techniques how to determine k_i for a given i .

For example, $k_{i+1} = k_i + r_i$, where r_i is a sequence of numbers generated by a specific pseudo-random generator.

BASIC SUBSTITUTION TECHNIQUES

- **LSB substitution** – the LSB of an binary block c_{k_i} is replaced by the bit m_i of the secret message.

The methods differ by techniques how to determine k_i for a given i .

For example, $k_{i+1} = k_i + r_i$, where r_i is a sequence of numbers generated by a specific pseudo-random generator.

- **Substitution into parity bits of blocks.** If the parity bit of block c_{k_i} is m_i , then the block c_{k_i} is not changed; otherwise one of its bits is changed.

BASIC SUBSTITUTION TECHNIQUES

- **LSB substitution** – the LSB of an binary block c_{k_i} is replaced by the bit m_i of the secret message.

The methods differ by techniques how to determine k_i for a given i .

For example, $k_{i+1} = k_i + r_i$, where r_i is a sequence of numbers generated by a specific pseudo-random generator.

- **Substitution into parity bits of blocks.** If the parity bit of block c_{k_i} is m_i , then the block c_{k_i} is not changed; otherwise one of its bits is changed.
- **Substitution in binary images.** If image c_i has more (less) black pixels than white pixels and $m_i = 1$ ($m_i = 0$), then c_i is not changed; otherwise the portion of black and white pixels is changed (by making changes at those pixels that are neighbors of pixels of the opposite color).

BASIC SUBSTITUTION TECHNIQUES

- **LSB substitution** – the LSB of an binary block c_{k_i} is replaced by the bit m_i of the secret message.

The methods differ by techniques how to determine k_i for a given i .

For example, $k_{i+1} = k_i + r_i$, where r_i is a sequence of numbers generated by a specific pseudo-random generator.

- **Substitution into parity bits of blocks.** If the parity bit of block c_{k_i} is m_i , then the block c_{k_i} is not changed; otherwise one of its bits is changed.
- **Substitution in binary images.** If image c_i has more (less) black pixels than white pixels and $m_i = 1$ ($m_i = 0$), then c_i is not changed; otherwise the portion of black and white pixels is changed (by making changes at those pixels that are neighbors of pixels of the opposite color).
- **Substitution in unused or reserved space in computer systems.**

LSB SUBSTITUTION in IMAGES - EXAMPLE

LSB SUBSTITUTION in IMAGES - EXAMPLE

As already mentioned, representation of images usually use for each pixel either 8-bit representation of a palette of 256 colors, or 24-bit representation of three bytes representing RGB coloring.

LSB SUBSTITUTION in IMAGES - EXAMPLE

As already mentioned, representation of images usually use for each pixel either 8-bit representation of a palette of 256 colors, or 24-bit representation of three bytes representing RGB coloring.

Example: Let LSB technique be used to hide "101101101" in RGB representation of three pixels:

10010101 00001101 11001001

10010110 00001111 11001010

10011111 00010000 11001011

LSB SUBSTITUTION in IMAGES - EXAMPLE

As already mentioned, representation of images usually use for each pixel either 8-bit representation of a palette of 256 colors, or 24-bit representation of three bytes representing RGB coloring.

Example: Let LSB technique be used to hide "101101101" in RGB representation of three pixels:

```
10010101 00001101 11001001
10010110 00001111 11001010
10011111 00010000 11001011
```

The outcome will be the following representation of these three pixels

```
10010101 00001100 11001001
10010111 00001110 11001011
10011111 00010000 11001011
```

LSB SUBSTITUTION in IMAGES - EXAMPLE

As already mentioned, representation of images usually use for each pixel either 8-bit representation of a palette of 256 colors, or 24-bit representation of three bytes representing RGB coloring.

Example: Let LSB technique be used to hide "101101101" in RGB representation of three pixels:

```
10010101 00001101 11001001
```

```
10010110 00001111 11001010
```

```
10011111 00010000 11001011
```

The outcome will be the following representation of these three pixels

```
10010101 00001100 11001001
```

```
10010111 00001110 11001011
```

```
10011111 00010000 11001011
```

Observe that actually only 4 LSB have been changed – less than 50%

CAT in a TREE



Image of a tree with a steganographically hidden image. The hidden image is revealed by removing all but the two least significant bits of each color component and a subsequent normalization.

CAT in a TREE





Image of a tree with a steganographically hidden image. The hidden image is revealed by removing all but the two least significant bits of each color component and a subsequent normalization.



Image of a cat extracted from the tree image above.

PROFESSIONAL EMBEDDINGS

Cover figure and stego figure:



LSB SUBSTITUTION PLUSES and MINUSES

LSB SUBSTITUTION PLUSES and MINUSES

Bits for substitution can be chosen (a) randomly; (b) adaptively according to local properties of the digital media that is used.

LSB SUBSTITUTION PLUSES and MINUSES

Bits for substitution can be chosen (a) randomly; (b) adaptively according to local properties of the digital media that is used.

Advantages:

- (a) LSB substitution is the simplest and most common stego technique and it can be used also for different color models.

LSB SUBSTITUTION PLUSES and MINUSES

Bits for substitution can be chosen (a) randomly; (b) adaptively according to local properties of the digital media that is used.

Advantages:

- (a) LSB substitution is the simplest and most common stego technique and it can be used also for different color models.
- (b) This method can reach a very high capacity with little, if any, visible impact to the cover digital media.

Bits for substitution can be chosen (a) randomly; (b) adaptively according to local properties of the digital media that is used.

Advantages:

- (a) LSB substitution is the simplest and most common stego technique and it can be used also for different color models.
- (b) This method can reach a very high capacity with little, if any, visible impact to the cover digital media.
- (c) It is relatively easy to apply LSB substitution on images and radio data.

Bits for substitution can be chosen (a) randomly; (b) adaptively according to local properties of the digital media that is used.

Advantages:

- (a) LSB substitution is the simplest and most common stego technique and it can be used also for different color models.
- (b) This method can reach a very high capacity with little, if any, visible impact to the cover digital media.
- (c) It is relatively easy to apply LSB substitution on images and radio data.
- (d) Many tools for LSB substitutions are available on the internet

LSB SUBSTITUTION PLUSES and MINUSES

Bits for substitution can be chosen (a) randomly; (b) adaptively according to local properties of the digital media that is used.

Advantages:

- (a) LSB substitution is the simplest and most common stego technique and it can be used also for different color models.
- (b) This method can reach a very high capacity with little, if any, visible impact to the cover digital media.
- (c) It is relatively easy to apply LSB substitution on images and radio data.
- (d) Many tools for LSB substitutions are available on the internet

Disadvantages:

LSB SUBSTITUTION PLUSES and MINUSES

Bits for substitution can be chosen (a) randomly; (b) adaptively according to local properties of the digital media that is used.

Advantages:

- (a) LSB substitution is the simplest and most common stego technique and it can be used also for different color models.
- (b) This method can reach a very high capacity with little, if any, visible impact to the cover digital media.
- (c) It is relatively easy to apply LSB substitution on images and radio data.
- (d) Many tools for LSB substitutions are available on the internet

Disadvantages:

- (a) It is relatively simple to detect the hidden data;

LSB SUBSTITUTION PLUSES and MINUSES

Bits for substitution can be chosen (a) randomly; (b) adaptively according to local properties of the digital media that is used.

Advantages:

- (a) LSB substitution is the simplest and most common stego technique and it can be used also for different color models.
- (b) This method can reach a very high capacity with little, if any, visible impact to the cover digital media.
- (c) It is relatively easy to apply LSB substitution on images and radio data.
- (d) Many tools for LSB substitutions are available on the internet

Disadvantages:

- (a) It is relatively simple to detect the hidden data;
- (b) It does not offer robustness against small modifications (including compression) at the stego images.

LSB METHOD TECHNICALITIES - simple case

Setting: Let $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be a message to be embedded in the cover $c \in C^n$, $C = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ for some k and π be a pseudorandom permutation of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$

LSB METHOD TECHNICALITIES - simple case

Setting: Let $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be a message to be embedded in the cover $c \in C^n$, $C = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ for some k and π be a pseudorandom permutation of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$

Embedding of the message:

LSB METHOD TECHNICALITIES - simple case

Setting: Let $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be a message to be embedded in the cover $c \in C^n$, $C = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ for some k and π be a pseudorandom permutation of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$

Embedding of the message:

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$c[\pi(i)] := c[\pi(i)] + m[i] - (c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2)$$

LSB METHOD TECHNICALITIES - simple case

Setting: Let $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be a message to be embedded in the cover $c \in C^n$, $C = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ for some k and π be a pseudorandom permutation of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$

Embedding of the message:

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$c[\pi(i)] := c[\pi(i)] + m[i] - (c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2)$$

Extraction of the message

LSB METHOD TECHNICALITIES - simple case

Setting: Let $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be a message to be embedded in the cover $c \in C^n$, $C = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ for some k and π be a pseudorandom permutation of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$

Embedding of the message:

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$c[\pi(i)] := c[\pi(i)] + m[i] - (c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2)$$

Extraction of the message

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$m[i] := c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2$$

LSB METHOD TECHNICALITIES - simple case

Setting: Let $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be a message to be embedded in the cover $c \in C^n$, $C = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ for some k and π be a pseudorandom permutation of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$

Embedding of the message:

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$c[\pi(i)] := c[\pi(i)] + m[i] - (c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2)$$

Extraction of the message

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$m[i] := c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2$$

Steganalysis: basic tool is **histogram** $\{h[j] \mid j = 0, \dots, 2^m - 1\}$, of elements from the cover

$$h[j] = \sum_{i=1}^n \delta(c[i] - j)$$

where δ is the Kronecker delta

LSB METHOD TECHNICALITIES - simple case

Setting: Let $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be a message to be embedded in the cover $c \in C^n$, $C = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ for some k and π be a pseudorandom permutation of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$

Embedding of the message:

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$c[\pi(i)] := c[\pi(i)] + m[i] - (c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2)$$

Extraction of the message

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$m[i] := c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2$$

Steganalysis: basic tool is **histogram** $\{h[j] \mid j = 0, \dots, 2^m - 1\}$, of elements from the cover

$$h[j] = \sum_{i=1}^n \delta(c[i] - j)$$

where δ is the Kronecker delta

and some basic statistical hypothesis testing tools.

LSB METHOD TECHNICALITIES - simple case

Setting: Let $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be a message to be embedded in the cover $c \in C^n$, $C = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ for some k and π be a pseudorandom permutation of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$

Embedding of the message:

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$c[\pi(i)] := c[\pi(i)] + m[i] - (c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2)$$

Extraction of the message

for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**

$$m[i] := c[\pi(i)] \bmod 2$$

Steganalysis: basic tool is **histogram** $\{h[j] \mid j = 0, \dots, 2^m - 1\}$, of elements from the cover

$$h[j] = \sum_{i=1}^n \delta(c[i] - j)$$

where δ is the Kronecker delta

and some basic statistical hypothesis testing tools.

In general, sophisticated statistical tools are used in modern steganalysis attacks.

AUDIO STEGANOGRAPHY

Audio based steganography has several advantages:

- Audio files are generally much larger than files for images.

Audio based steganography has several advantages:

- Audio files are generally much larger than files for images.
- Our hearing can be easily fooled.

Audio based steganography has several advantages:

- Audio files are generally much larger than files for images.
- Our hearing can be easily fooled.
- Slight changes in amplitudes can store vast amounts of information.

Audio based steganography has several advantages:

- Audio files are generally much larger than files for images.
- Our hearing can be easily fooled.
- Slight changes in amplitudes can store vast amounts of information.

Examples of audio steganography:

Audio based steganography has several advantages:

- Audio files are generally much larger than files for images.
- Our hearing can be easily fooled.
- Slight changes in amplitudes can store vast amounts of information.

Examples of audio steganography:

- Into echo hiding. It embeds data by creating an artificial echo to the source audio.

AUDIO STEGANOGRAPHY

Audio based steganography has several advantages:

- Audio files are generally much larger than files for images.
- Our hearing can be easily fooled.
- Slight changes in amplitudes can store vast amounts of information.

Examples of audio steganography:

- Into echo hiding. It embeds data by creating an artificial echo to the source audio.
- Into phase hiding. It embeds data into phase.

SHOW EXAMPLE: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;
- compression techniques.

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;
- compression techniques.

Informally, a stegosystem is **robust** if the embedded information cannot be altered without making substantial changes to the stego-objects.

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;
- compression techniques.

Informally, a stegosystem is **robust** if the embedded information cannot be altered without making substantial changes to the stego-objects.

Definition: Let S be a stegosystem and P be a class of mappings $C \rightarrow C$. S is P -robust, if for all $p \in P$

$$D_K(p(E_K(c, m, k)), k) = D_K(E_K(c, m, k), k) = m$$

in the case of a secret-key stegosystem and

$$D(p(E(c, m))) = D(E(c, m)) = m$$

in the case of pure stegosystem, for any message m , cover c , and key k .

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;
- compression techniques.

Informally, a stegosystem is **robust** if the embedded information cannot be altered without making substantial changes to the stego-objects.

Definition: Let S be a stegosystem and P be a class of mappings $C \rightarrow C$. S is P -robust, if for all $p \in P$

$$D_K(p(E_K(c, m, k)), k) = D_K(E_K(c, m, k), k) = m$$

in the case of a secret-key stegosystem and

$$D(p(E(c, m))) = D(E(c, m)) = m$$

in the case of pure stegosystem, for any message m , cover c , and key k .

- There is a clear tradeoff between *security* and *robustness*.

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;
- compression techniques.

Informally, a stegosystem is **robust** if the embedded information cannot be altered without making substantial changes to the stego-objects.

Definition: Let S be a stegosystem and P be a class of mappings $C \rightarrow C$. S is P -robust, if for all $p \in P$

$$D_K(p(E_K(c, m, k)), k) = D_K(E_K(c, m, k), k) = m$$

in the case of a secret-key stegosystem and

$$D(p(E(c, m))) = D(E(c, m)) = m$$

in the case of pure stegosystem, for any message m , cover c , and key k .

- There is a clear tradeoff between *security* and *robustness*.
- Some stegosystems are designed to be robust against a specific class of mappings (for example JPEG compression/decompression).

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;
- compression techniques.

Informally, a stegosystem is **robust** if the embedded information cannot be altered without making substantial changes to the stego-objects.

Definition: Let S be a stegosystem and P be a class of mappings $C \rightarrow C$. S is P -robust, if for all $p \in P$

$$D_K(p(E_K(c, m, k)), k) = D_K(E_K(c, m, k), k) = m$$

in the case of a secret-key stegosystem and

$$D(p(E(c, m))) = D(E(c, m)) = m$$

in the case of pure stegosystem, for any message m , cover c , and key k .

- There is a clear tradeoff between *security* and *robustness*.
- Some stegosystems are designed to be robust against a specific class of mappings (for example JPEG compression/decompression).
- There are two basic approaches to make stegosystems robust:

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;
- compression techniques.

Informally, a stegosystem is **robust** if the embedded information cannot be altered without making substantial changes to the stego-objects.

Definition: Let S be a stegosystem and P be a class of mappings $C \rightarrow C$. S is P -robust, if for all $p \in P$

$$D_K(p(E_K(c, m, k)), k) = D_K(E_K(c, m, k), k) = m$$

in the case of a secret-key stegosystem and

$$D(p(E(c, m))) = D(E(c, m)) = m$$

in the case of pure stegosystem, for any message m , cover c , and key k .

- There is a clear tradeoff between *security* and *robustness*.
- Some stegosystems are designed to be robust against a specific class of mappings (for example JPEG compression/decompression).
- There are two basic approaches to make stegosystems robust:
 - By foreseeing possible cover modifications, the embedding process can be robust so that possible modifications do not entirely destroy embedded information.

ROBUSTNESS of STEGANOGRAPHY

Steganographic systems are extremely sensitive to cover modifications, such as

- image processing techniques (smoothing, filtering, image transformations, ...);
- filtering of digital sounds;
- compression techniques.

Informally, a stegosystem is **robust** if the embedded information cannot be altered without making substantial changes to the stego-objects.

Definition: Let S be a stegosystem and P be a class of mappings $C \rightarrow C$. S is P -robust, if for all $p \in P$

$$D_K(p(E_K(c, m, k)), k) = D_K(E_K(c, m, k), k) = m$$

in the case of a secret-key stegosystem and

$$D(p(E(c, m))) = D(E(c, m)) = m$$

in the case of pure stegosystem, for any message m , cover c , and key k .

- There is a clear tradeoff between *security* and *robustness*.
- Some stegosystems are designed to be robust against a specific class of mappings (for example JPEG compression/decompression).
- There are two basic approaches to make stegosystems robust:
 - By foreseeing possible cover modifications, the embedding process can be robust so that possible modifications do not entirely destroy embedded information.
 - Reversing operations that has been made by an active attacker.

STEGANALYSIS - ART of DETECTING HIDDEN MESSAGES

STEGANALYSIS - ART of DETECTING HIDDEN MESSAGES

The main goal of a passive attacker is to decide whether data sent to Bob by Alice contain secret message or not.

STEGANALYSIS - ART of DETECTING HIDDEN MESSAGES

The main goal of a passive attacker is to decide whether data sent to Bob by Alice contain secret message or not.

The detection task can be formalized as a statistical hypothesis-testing problem with the test function $f : C \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$:

$$f(c) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } c \text{ contains a secret message;} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

STEGANALYSIS - ART of DETECTING HIDDEN MESSAGES

The main goal of a passive attacker is to decide whether data sent to Bob by Alice contain secret message or not.

The detection task can be formalized as a statistical hypothesis-testing problem with the test function $f : C \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$:

$$f(c) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } c \text{ contains a secret message;} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

There are two types of errors possible:

- Type-I error - a secret message is detected in data with no secret message;

STEGANALYSIS - ART of DETECTING HIDDEN MESSAGES

The main goal of a passive attacker is to decide whether data sent to Bob by Alice contain secret message or not.

The detection task can be formalized as a statistical hypothesis-testing problem with the test function $f : C \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$:

$$f(c) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } c \text{ contains a secret message;} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

There are two types of errors possible:

- Type-I error - a secret message is detected in data with no secret message;
- Type-II error - a hidden secret message is not detected

STEGANALYSIS - ART of DETECTING HIDDEN MESSAGES

The main goal of a passive attacker is to decide whether data sent to Bob by Alice contain secret message or not.

The detection task can be formalized as a statistical hypothesis-testing problem with the test function $f : C \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$:

$$f(c) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } c \text{ contains a secret message;} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

There are two types of errors possible:

- Type-I error - a secret message is detected in data with no secret message;
- Type-II error - a hidden secret message is not detected

In the case of ε -secure stegosystems there is well know relation between the probability β of the type II error and probability α of the type I error.

STEGANALYSIS - ART of DETECTING HIDDEN MESSAGES

The main goal of a passive attacker is to decide whether data sent to Bob by Alice contain secret message or not.

The detection task can be formalized as a statistical hypothesis-testing problem with the test function $f : C \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$:

$$f(c) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } c \text{ contains a secret message;} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

There are two types of errors possible:

- Type-I error - a secret message is detected in data with no secret message;
- Type-II error - a hidden secret message is not detected

In the case of ϵ -secure stegosystems there is well know relation between the probability β of the type II error and probability α of the type I error.

Let S be a stegosystem which is ϵ -secure against passive attackers, β the probability that the attacker does not detect a hidden message and α the probability that the attacker falsely detects a hidden message. Then

$$d(\alpha, \beta) \leq \epsilon,$$

where $d(\alpha, \beta)$ is the binary relative entropy defined by

$$d(\alpha, \beta) = \alpha \lg \frac{\alpha}{1 - \beta} + (1 - \alpha) \lg \frac{1 - \alpha}{\beta}.$$

Network steganography utilizes communication protocol's elements and their basic functionality as a cover for hidden data.

Network steganography utilizes communication protocol's elements and their basic functionality as a cover for hidden data.

Typical network steganography methods involve modification of the properties of a single network protocol or a relation between several network protocols to enable secret communication.

Network steganography utilizes communication protocol's elements and their basic functionality as a cover for hidden data.

Typical network steganography methods involve modification of the properties of a single network protocol or a relation between several network protocols to enable secret communication.

A use of network steganography is usually very hard to detect.

WATERMARKING

Historically, **physical watermarking** is a replication of an image, logo, or text on paper stock so that the source of the document can be, at least partially, authenticated.

Historically, **physical watermarking** is a replication of an image, logo, or text on paper stock so that the source of the document can be, at least partially, authenticated.

Nowadays, **digital watermarking** is embedding information (a digital watermark) into digital data (image, video or text - called often "signal") which may be used to verify of the signal's author or the identity of its owner.

Historically, **physical watermarking** is a replication of an image, logo, or text on paper stock so that the source of the document can be, at least partially, authenticated.

Nowadays, **digital watermarking** is embedding information (a digital watermark) into digital data (image, video or text - called often "signal") which may be used to verify of the signal's author or the identity of its owner. This should be done in such a way that if a signal is copied so is the embedded watermark.

Digital watermarking seems to be a promising technique to deal with the following problem:

Digital watermarking seems to be a promising technique to deal with the following problem:

Problem: Digitalization allows to make unlimited number of copies of intellectual products (books, art products, music, video,...). How to make use of this enormous potential digitalization has and, at the same time, to protect intellectual rights of authors (copyrights, protection against modifications and insertion into other products), in a way that is legally accepted?

Digital watermarking seems to be a promising technique to deal with the following problem:

Problem: Digitalization allows to make unlimited number of copies of intellectual products (books, art products, music, video,...). How to make use of this enormous potential digitalization has and, at the same time, to protect intellectual rights of authors (copyrights, protection against modifications and insertion into other products), in a way that is legally accepted?

Solution: Digital watermarking tries to solve the above problem using a variety of methods of informatics, cryptography, signal processing, ... and in order to achieve that tries to insert specific information (watermarks) into data/carrier/signal in such a way that watermarks cannot be extracted or even detected and if data with one or several watermarks are copied, watermarks should not change.

- **Copyright protection - ownership assertion** For example, if a watermark is embedded into a music (or video) product, then each time music (video) is played in public information about author is extracted and tandem are established. Another example: annotation of digital photographs

- **Copyright protection - ownership assertion** For example, if a watermark is embedded into a music (or video) product, then each time music (video) is played in public information about author is extracted and tandem are established. Another example: annotation of digital photographs
- **Source tracing.** Watermarks can be used to trace or verify the source of digital data.

- **Copyright protection - ownership assertion** For example, if a watermark is embedded into a music (or video) product, then each time music (video) is played in public information about author is extracted and tandem are established. Another example: annotation of digital photographs
- **Source tracing.** Watermarks can be used to trace or verify the source of digital data.
- **Insertion of additional (sensitive) information** For example, personal data into röntgen photos r of keywords into multimedia products.

HISTORY of WATERMARKING

HISTORY of WATERMARKING

Paper watermarks appeared in the art of handmade paper marking 700 hundred years ago.

HISTORY of WATERMARKING

Paper watermarks appeared in the art of handmade paper marking 700 hundred years ago.

Watermarks were mainly used to identify the mill producing the paper and paper format, quality and strength.

HISTORY of WATERMARKING

Paper watermarks appeared in the art of handmade paper marking 700 hundred years ago.

Watermarks were mainly used to identify the mill producing the paper and paper format, quality and strength.

Paper watermarks was a perfect technique to eliminate confusion from which mill paper is and what are its parameters.

HISTORY of WATERMARKING

Paper watermarks appeared in the art of handmade paper marking 700 hundred years ago.

Watermarks were mainly used to identify the mill producing the paper and paper format, quality and strength.

Paper watermarks was a perfect technique to eliminate confusion from which mill paper is and what are its parameters.

Legal power of watermarks has been demonstrated in 1887 in France when watermarks of two letters, presented as a piece of evidence in a trial, proved that the letters had been predated, what resulted in the downfall of a cabinet and, finally, the resignation of the president Grévy.

HISTORY of WATERMARKING

Paper watermarks appeared in the art of handmade paper marking 700 hundred years ago.

Watermarks were mainly used to identify the mill producing the paper and paper format, quality and strength.

Paper watermarks was a perfect technique to eliminate confusion from which mill paper is and what are its parameters.

Legal power of watermarks has been demonstrated in 1887 in France when watermarks of two letters, presented as a piece of evidence in a trial, proved that the letters had been predated, what resulted in the downfall of a cabinet and, finally, the resignation of the president Grévy.

Paper watermarks in bank notes or stamps inspired the first use of the term watermark in the context of digital data.

HISTORY of WATERMARKING

Paper watermarks appeared in the art of handmade paper marking 700 hundred years ago.

Watermarks were mainly used to identify the mill producing the paper and paper format, quality and strength.

Paper watermarks was a perfect technique to eliminate confusion from which mill paper is and what are its parameters.

Legal power of watermarks has been demonstrated in 1887 in France when watermarks of two letters, presented as a piece of evidence in a trial, proved that the letters had been predated, what resulted in the downfall of a cabinet and, finally, the resignation of the president Grévy.

Paper watermarks in bank notes or stamps inspired the first use of the term watermark in the context of digital data.

The first publications that really focused on watermarking of digital images were from 1990 and then in 1993.

in WATERMARKING SYSTEMS

Figure 2 shows the basic scheme of the **watermarks embedding systems**.





Figure 2: Watermark embedding scheme

Inputs to the scheme are the **watermark**, the **cover data** and an optional **public or secret key**. The **output** are **watermarked data**. The key is used to enforce security.

in WATERMARKING SYSTEMS

Figure 2 shows the basic scheme of the **watermarks embedding systems**.



Inputs to the scheme are the **watermark**, the **cover data** and an optional **public or secret key**. The **output** are **watermarked data**. The key is used to enforce security.

Figure 3 shows the basic scheme for **watermark recovery schemes**.




Figure 3: Watermark recovery scheme

Inputs to the scheme are the **watermarked data**, the **secret or public key** and, depending on the method, the **original data and/or the original watermark**. The **output** is the **recovered watermark W** or some kind of **confidence measure indicating how likely it is for the given watermark at the input to be present in the data**.

Private (non-blind) watermarking systems require for extraction/detection the original cover-data.

- Type I systems use the original cover-data to determine where a watermark is and how to extract the watermark from stego-data.
- Type II systems require a copy of the embedded watermark for extraction and just yield a yes/no answer to the question whether the stego-data contains a watermark.

TYPES of WATERMARKING SCHEMES

Private (non-blind) watermarking systems require for extraction/detection the original cover-data.

- Type I systems use the original cover-data to determine where a watermark is and how to extract the watermark from stego-data.
- Type II systems require a copy of the embedded watermark for extraction and just yield a yes/no answer to the question whether the stego-data contains a watermark.

Semi-private (semi-blind) watermarking does not use the original cover-data for detection, but tries to answer the same question. (Potential application of blind and semi-blind watermarking is for evidence in court ownership, . . .)

Public (blind) watermarking – neither cover-data nor embedded watermarks are required for extraction – this is the most challenging problem.

A simple technique has been developed, by [Naor and Shamir](#), that allows for a given n and $t < n$ to hide any secret (image) message m in images on transparencies in such way that each of n parties receives one transparency and

- no $t - 1$ parties are able to obtain the message m from the transparencies they have.
- any t of the parties can easily get (read or see) the message m just by stacking their transparencies together and aligning them carefully.

APPENDIX

Historically, a watermark is a replication of an image, logo, or text on paper stock so that the source of the document can be, at least partially, determined.

There are a number of software packages that perform steganography on just about any software platform.

STEGANOGRAPHY TOOLS

There are a number of software packages that perform steganography on just about any software platform.

They usually hide information in image or audio files.

There are a number of software packages that perform steganography on just about any software platform.

They usually hide information in image or audio files.

In case of images, systems gets as input an image and text to be hidden (and key) and provide stego-image hiding a given text.

The intended receiver who knows the key takes corresponding stegoanalysis tool and for a given stego-image and stego-key gets the hidden data/message.

SIGNAL PROCESSING TERMINOLOGY

In some applications of steganography the following signal processing terminology is used.

- **Payload** - message to be secretly communicated;
- **Carrier** - data file or signal into which payload is embedded
- **Package - stego file - covert message** - the outcome of embedding of payload into carrier.
- **Encoding density** - the percentage of bytes or other signal elements into which the payload is embedded.

TO REMEMBER !!!

There is no use in trying, she said: one cannot believe impossible things.

I dare to say that you have not had much practice, said the queen,

When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day and sometimes I have believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.

Lewis Carroll: Through the Looking-glass, 1872