#### Part I

### Elliptic curves cryptography and factorization

# A cryptographic system is consider as sufficiently secure until someone finds an attack against it.

#### **ELLIPTIC CURVES - PRELIMINARIES**


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 $y^2 = x(x+1)(x-1)$   $y^2 = x^3 + 73$ Elliptic curves cryptography is based on a special operation of the addition of the points on elliptic curves at which it is easy to make addition of two points, but it is unfeasible to find first point given the sum of two points and second point.

#### ELLIPTIC CURVES CRYPTOGRAPHY and FACTORIZATION

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- In August 2015 NSA announced plans to replace ECC cryptography by, not yet determined post-quantum cryptography.

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- Both of these uses of elliptic curves, ECC cryptography and ECC based integer factorization are dealt with in this chapter.

#### COMMENTS II.

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- Abel has been considered, by his contemporaries, as mathematical genius that left enough for mathematicians to study for next 500 years.

#### COMMENTS III.

## It is amazing how practical is the elliptic curve cryptography that is based on very strangely looking and very theoretical concepts.

#### **ELLIPTIC CURVES**

An elliptic curve  ${\sf E}$  is the graph of points of the plane curve defined by the Weierstrass equation

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In case coefficients and x, y can be any rational numbers, a graph of an elliptic curve has one of the forms shown in the following figure. The graph depends on whether the polynomial  $x^3 + ax + b$  has three or only one real root.



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The graph of a non-singular curve has two components if its discriminant is positive, and one component if it is negative.

#### **EXAMPLES OF SINGULAR "ELLIPTIC CURVES"**

Types of singularities: on the left, a curve with a cusp  $(y^2 = x^3)$ . On the right, a curve with a self-intersection  $(y^2 = x^3 - 3x + 2)$ . None of them is a valid elliptic curve.

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
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It is now easy to verify that the above addition of points forms Abelian group with  $\infty$  as the identity (null) element.


# ADDITION of POINTS - EXAMPLES 1 and 2

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
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
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
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
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Since its two roots have coordinates  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  for the third,  $x_3$ , it has to hold

$$x_3 = \lambda^2 - (x_1 + x_2) = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$$

because  $-\lambda^2$  is the coefficient at  $x^2$  and therefore  $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = -(-\lambda^2) = \lambda^2$ .

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where a and b are integers, notation  $E_n(a, b)$  are such pairs of integers (x,y),  $|x| \le n$ ,  $|y| \le n$ , that satisfy the above equation, along with the point  $\infty$  at infinity.

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**Example:** For the curve  $E: y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 3 \mod 5$ , it holds (1,4) + (3,1) = (2,0); (1,4) + (2,0) = (?,?).

## **EXAMPLE OF AN ELLIPTIC CURVE OVER A PRIME**

Points of the elliptic curve  $y^2 = x^3 + x + 6$  over  $Z_{11}$ 

x	$x^3 + x + 6 \pmod{11}$	in $QR_{11}$	у
0	6	no	
1	8	no	
23	5	yes	4,7
3	3	yes	5,6
4	8	no	
5	4	yes	2,9
6	8	no	
7	4	yes	2,9
8	9	yes	3,8
9	7	no	
10	4	yes	2,9

The number of points of an elliptic curve over  $Z_p$  is in the interval

$$(p+1-2\sqrt{p}, p+1+2\sqrt{p})$$

Addition of points  $P_1 = (x_1, y_1)$  and  $P_2 = (x_2, y_2)$  of an elliptic curve  $E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$  can be easily computed using the following formulas:

$$P_1 + P_2 = P_3 = (x_3, y_3)$$

where

$$x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$$
  
 $y_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$ 

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#### Formulas

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and

$$\lambda = \begin{cases} \frac{(y_2 - y_1)}{(x_2 - x_1)} & \text{if } P_1 \neq P_2, \\ \frac{(3x_1^2 + a)}{(2y_1)} & \text{if } P_1 = P_2. \end{cases}$$

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All that holds for the case that  $\lambda \neq \infty$ ; otherwise  $P_3 = \infty$ . Example For curve  $y^2 = x^3 + 73$  and  $P_1 = (2,9)$ ,  $P_2 = (3,10)$  we have  $\lambda = 1$ ,  $P_1 + P_2 = P_3 = (-4, -3)$  and  $P_3 + P_3 = (72, 611)$ .  $-\{\lambda = -8\}$  In case of modular computation of coordinates of the sum of two points of an elliptic curve  $E_n(a, b)$  one needs, in order to determine value of  $\lambda$  to compute  $u^{-1}(\mod n)$  for various u.

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Observe that if this gcd-value is between 1 and n we have a factor of n.

			l		
x	y²	Y <sub>1,2</sub>	P(x,y)	P'(x,y)	
0	6	-			
1	8	-			
2	5	4,7	(2,4)	(2,7)	
3	3	5,6	(3,5)	(3,6)	
4	8	-			
5	4	2,9	(5,2)	(5,9)	
6	8	-			
7	4	2,9	(7,2)	(7,9)	
8	9	3,8	(8,3)	(8,8)	
9	7	-			
10	4	2,9	(10,2)	(10,9)	

There are 12 points lying

on the elliptic curve.

Together with the point O at infinity, the points on the elliptic curve form a group with n=13 elements.

n is called the order of the elliptic curve group and depends on the choice of the curve parameters a and b.

On the elliptic curve

$$y^2 \equiv x^3 + x + 6 \pmod{11}$$

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$$y_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \equiv 8(2 - 5) - 7 \equiv -31 \equiv -9 \equiv 2 \mod 11$$

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- Hasse's theorem If an elliptic curve  $E_p$  has  $|E_p|$  points then  $||E_p| p 1| < 2\sqrt{p}$

In other words, the number of points of a curve grows roughly as the number of elements in the field. The exact number of such points is, however, rather difficult to calculate.

### **SECURITY** of **ECC**

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- However, no proof of security of ECC has been published so far.

### **USE OF ELLIPTIC CURVES IN CRYPTOGRAPHY**

Let *E* be an elliptic curve and *A*, *B* be its points such that B = kA = (A + A + ... A + A) - k times – for some *k*. The task to find (given *A* and *B*) such a *k* is called the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves. Let *E* be an elliptic curve and *A*, *B* be its points such that B = kA = (A + A + ... A + A) - k times – for some *k*. The task to find (given *A* and *B*) such a *k* is called the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves.

No efficient algorithm to compute discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves is known and also no good general attacks. Elliptic curves based cryptography is based on these facts.

There is the following general procedure for changing a discrete logarithm based crypto graphic protocols P to a crypto graphic protocols based on elliptic curves:

Assign to a given message (plaintext) a point on the given elliptic curve *E*.

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- To the point of the elliptic curve E that results from such a protocol assign a message (cryptotext).

### POWERS of POINTS

The following table shows powers of various points of the curve

k	$\mathbf{P}^{\mathbf{k}}$	s	Y <sub>0</sub>					
1	(2,4)	3	9	Given an elliptic curve				
2	(5,9)	9	8	$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \mod p$				
3	(8,8)	8	10	and a basis point P, we can compute				
4	(10,9)	2	0	$Q = P^k$				
5	(3,5)	1	2	through k-1 iterative point additions.				
6	(7,2)	4	7	Fast algorithms for this task exist. Unfortunately most of them are patented by Certicom and others.				
7	(7,9)	1	2					
8	(3,6)	2	0					
9	(10,2)	8	10	Question: Is it possible to compute k				
10	(8,3)	9	8	when the point Q is known?				
11	(5,2)	3	9	Answer: This is a hard problem known				
12	(2,7)	œ	-	as the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm.				

where instead of  $\lambda$  an  $\boldsymbol{s}$  is written.

 $v^2 = x^3 + x + 6 \mod 11$ 

### Problem and basic idea

The problem of assigning messages to points on elliptic curves is difficult because there are no polynomial-time algorithms to write down points of an arbitrary elliptic curve.

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**Basic idea:** Given an elliptic curve E(mod p), the problem is that not to every x there is an y such that (x, y) is a point of E.

Given a message (number) m we adjoin to m few bits at the end of m and adjust them until we get a number x such that  $x^3 + ax + b$  is a square mod p.

The following pictures show how many bits need keys of different crypto graphic systems to achieve the same security.

Equivalent Cryptographic Strength

Symmetric	56	80	112	128	192	256
RSA n	512	1024	2048	3072	7680	15360
ECC p	112	161	224	256	384	512
Key size ratio	5:1	6:1	9:1	12:1	20:1	30:1



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- Alice chooses an integer  $n_a$ , computes  $n_A P$  and sends it to Bob.
- Bob chooses an integer  $n_b$ , computes  $n_B P$  and sends it to Alice.
- Alice computes  $n_a(n_B P)$  and Bob computes  $n_b(n_A P)$ . This way they have the same key.

To send a message m Alice chooses a random r, computes:

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and sends it to Bob who decrypts by calculating  $m = ba^{-x} \pmod{p}$ 

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To send a message m ALice expresses m as a point X on  $E_{\rho}$ , chooses a random number r, computes

$$A = rP$$
;  $B = X + rQ$ 

and sends the pair (A, B) to Bob who decrypts by calculating X = B - xA.

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  - There is no deterministic method known to generate points (plaintexts) on the curve.

**Elliptic curves version of ElGamal digital signatures** has the following form for signing (a message) m, an integer, by Alice and to have the signature verified by Bob:

**Elliptic curves version of ElGamal digital signatures** has the following form for signing (a message) m, an integer, by Alice and to have the signature verified by Bob: Alice chooses a prime p, an elliptic curve  $E_p(a, b)$ , a point P on  $E_p$  and calculates the number of points n on  $E_p$  – what can be done, and we assume that 0 < m < n.

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Warning Observe that actually  $rr^{-1} = 1 + tn$  for some t. For the above verification procedure to work we then have to use the fact that  $nP = \infty$  and therefore  $P + t \cdot \infty = P$ 

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- Elliptic curve method was used to factor Fermat numbers  $F_{10}$  (308 digits) and  $F_{11}$  (610 digits).

#### DOMAIN PARAMETERS for ELLIPTIC CURVES

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To use ECC, all parties involved have to agree on all basic elements concerning the elliptic curve E being used:

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To determine domain parameters (especially n and h) may be much time consuming task. That is why mostly so called "standard or "named' elliptic curves are used that have been published by some standardization bodies.

#### SECURITY of ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY

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- The square root method and Silver-Pohling-Hellman (SPH) method.
- SPH method factors the order of a curve into small primes and solves the discrete logarithm problem as a combination of discrete logarithms for small numbers.
- Computation time of the square root method is proportional to  $O(\sqrt{e^n})$  where *n* is the order of the based element of the curve.

#### **KEY SIZE**

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- For example, for 128-bit security one needs a curve over  $\underline{F}_q$ , where  $q \approx 2^{256}$ .
- This can be contrasted with RSA cryptography that requires 3072-bit public and private keys to keep the same level of security.

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- The binary field case was broken in April 2004 using 2600 computers for 17 months.

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# **INTEGER FACTORIZATION**

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is unique when primes  $p_i$  are ordered. However, theorem provides no clue how to find such a factorization and till now no classical polynomial factorization algorithm is know.

In 2002 a deterministic, so called ASK, polynomial time algorithm for primality testing, with complexity  $O(n^{12})$  were discovered by three scientists from IIT Kanpur.

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Factorization could be done in polynomial time using Shor's algorithm and a powerful quantum computer, as discussed later.

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- The fastest known factorization algorithm has time

 $e^{(1.9 \ln n)^{1/3}(\ln \ln n)^{2/3})}$ 

and with it we can factor 140 digit numbers in reasonable time.

# **BASIC FACTORIZATION METHODS**

These methods are actually heuristics, and for each of them a variety of modifications is known.

# **TRIAL DIVISION**

**Algorithm** Consider the list of all integers and a integer *n* to factorizeo. Divide *n* with all primes, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11,

13,.... up to  $\sqrt{n}$  until you find a factor. If you do not find it *n* is prime,

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Each time you divide **n** by a prime delete from the list of considered integers all multiples of that prime.

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**Notation**  $L(\varepsilon, c)$  is used to denote complexity

$$O(e^{(c+o(1))(\ln n)^{\varepsilon}(\ln \ln n)^{1-\varepsilon}})$$

#### **EULER's FACTORIZATION**

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Denote then

$$k = gcd(a - c, d - b) \qquad h = gcd(a + c, d + b)$$
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In such a case either both k and h are even or both m and l are even. In the first case

$$n = \left( \left(\frac{k}{2}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{h}{2}\right)^2 \right) \left( l^2 + m^2 \right)$$

Unfortunately, disadvantage of Euler's factorization method is that it cannot be applied to factor an integer with any prime factor of the form 4k + 3 occurring to an odd power in its prime factorization.

If n = pq, 
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Therefore, in order to find a factor of n, we need only to investigate the values

$$x = a^{2} - n$$
  
for  $a = \left\lceil \sqrt{n} \right\rceil + 1$ ,  $\left\lceil \sqrt{n} \right\rceil + 2, \dots, \frac{(n-1)}{2}$ 

until a perfect square is found.

To find a factor of a given integer *n* do the following
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The second method was used to factor 8-th Fermat number  $F_8$  with 78 digits.

## **JUSTIFICATION** of VERSION 1

# Let p be a non-trivial factor of n much smaller than n.

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Since there is a smaller number of congruence classes modulo p than modulo n, it is quite probable that there exist  $x_i$  and  $x_j$  such that

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In such a case  $n \not| (x_i - x_j)$  and therefore  $gcd(x_i - x_j, n)$  is a nontrivial factor of n.

## **JUSTIFICATION** of **VERSION** 2

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roughly  $\sqrt{p} = n^{1/4}$  of  $x_i$ . Time complexity is therefore  $O(e^{\frac{1}{4} \ln n})$ .

### **BASIC FACTS**

- Factorization using  $\rho\text{-algorithms}$  has its efficiency based on two facts.
  - **Fact 1** For a given prime p, as in birthday problem, two numbers are congruent modulo p, with probability 0.5 after  $1.177\sqrt{p}$  numbers have been randomly chosen.
  - **Fact 2** If p is a factor of an n, then p < gcd(x y, n) since p divides both n and x y.

## $\rho$ -ALGORITHM - EXAMPLE

$$f(x) = x^{2} + x + 1$$
  

$$n = 18923; \quad x = y = x_{0} = 2347$$
  

$$x \leftarrow f(x) \mod n; y \leftarrow f(f(y)) \mod n$$
  

$$gcd(x - y, n) = ?$$

x	=	4164	У	=	9593	gcd(x-y,n)	=	1
х	=	9593	У	=	2063	gcd	=	1
х	=	12694	У	=	14985	gcd	=	1
х	=	2063	У	=	14862	gcd	=	1
х	=	358	У	=	3231	gcd	=	1
х	=	14985	У	=	3772	gcd	=	1
х	=	5970	У	=	16748	gcd	=	1
х	=	14862	У	=	3586	gcd	=	1
х	=	5728	У	=	16158	gcd	=	149

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Algorithm was invented J. Pollard in 1987 and has time complexity  $O(B(\log n)^p)$ . It works well if both p|n and p-1 have only small prime factors.

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By Fermat's Little Theorem, this implies that  $p|(a^m - 1)$  for any integer *a* and therefore by computing

$$gcd(a^m-1,n)$$

(for some a) some factor p of n can be obtained.

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**Example:** If curve  $E: y^2 = x^3 + 4x + 4 \pmod{2773}$  and its point P = (1,3) are used, then 2P = (1771, 705) and in order to compute 3P one has to compute gcd(1770, 2773) = 59 – factorization is done.

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5. Try to compute mP.

#### **EXAMPLE**

Example: For elliptic curve

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + x - 1 \pmod{35}$$

and its point P = (1,1) we have

$$2P = (2, 32); 4P = (25, 12); 8P = (6, 9)$$

and at the attempt to compute 9P one needs to compute gcd(15, 35) = 5 and factorization is done.

It remains to be explored how efficient this method is and when it is more efficient than other methods. If n = pq for primes p, q, then an elliptic curve  $E_n$  can be seen as a pair of elliptic curves  $E_p$  and  $E_q$ .

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It can be shown that the density of smooth integers is so large that if we choose a random elliptic curve  $E_n$  then it is a reasonable chance that n is smooth.

Let us continue to discuss the following key problem for factorization using elliptic curves: Problem: How to choose an integer k such that for a given point P we should try to compute points iP or  $2^{i}P$  for all multiples of P smaller than kP?

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**Example:** In order to find a 6-digit factor one chooses B=147 and  $k = 2^7 \cdot 3^4 \cdot 5^3 \cdot 7^2 \cdot 11^2 \cdot 13 \cdot \ldots \cdot 139$ . The following table shows B and the number of elliptic curves one has to test:

Digits of to-be-factors	6	9	12	18	24
В	147	682	2462	23462	162730
Number of curves	10	24	55	231	833

Computation time by the elliptic curves method depends on the size of factors.

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# FACTORIZATION on QUANTUM COMPUTERS

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Quantum computers works with superpositions of basic quantum states on which very special (unitary) operations are applied and and very special quantum features (non-locality) are used.

Quantum computers work not with bits, that can take on any of two values 0 and 1, but with qubits (quantum bits) that can take on any of infinitely many states  $\alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$ , where  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are complex numbers such that  $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$ .

- Shor's polynomial time quantum factorization algorithm is based on an understanding that factorization problem can be reduced
  - first on the problem of solving a simple modular quadratic equation;
  - second on the problem of finding periods of functions  $f(x) = a^x \mod n$ .

Lemma If there is a polynomial time deterministic (randomized) [quantum] algorithm to find a nontrivial solution of the modular quadratic equations

 $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ ,

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By using Euclid's algorithm to compute

$$gcd(a+1,n)$$
 and  $gcd(a-1,n)$ 

we can find, in  $O(\lg n)$  steps, a prime factor of n.

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If this algorithm stops, then  $a^{r/2}$  is a non-trivial solution of the equation

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.

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Choose a = 11. Values of  $11^{\times} \mod 15$  are then

11, 1, 11, 1, 11, 1

which gives r = 2.

Hence  $a^{r/2} = 11 \pmod{15}$ . Therefore

gcd(15, 12) = 3, gcd(15, 10) = 5

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Lemma If 1 < a < n satisfying gcd(n, a) = 1 is selected in the above algorithm randomly and n is not a power of prime, then

$${\it Pr}\{r ext{ is even and } a^{r/2} 
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**Theorem 7** Choose randomly 1 < a < n.

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### **EFFICIENCY** of **REDUCTION**

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$$Pr\{r ext{ is even and } a^{r/2} 
ot\equiv \pm 1\} \geq rac{9}{16}.$$

Choose randomly 1 < a < n.</li>
 Compute gcd(a, n). If gcd(a, n) ≠ 1 we have a factor.
 Find period r of function a<sup>k</sup> mod n.
 If r is odd or a<sup>r/2</sup> ≡ ±1 (mod n),then go to step 1; otherwise stop.


**Corollary** If there is a polynomial time randomized [quantum] algorithm to compute the period of the function

$$f_{n,a}(k) = a^k \mod n,$$

then there is a polynomial time randomized [quantum] algorithm to find non-trivial solution of the equation  $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$  (and therefore also to factorize integers).


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Example 83<sup>2</sup>-7429 = -540 = 
$$(-1) \cdot 2^2 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 5$$
  
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Therefore:

IV054 1. Elliptic curves cryptography and factorization

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One then tries to factor all  $(m + u)^2 - n$  with primes from the factor basis, from the smallest to the largest - see table for n=7429 and m=86.

u	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
$(m+u)^2 - n$	-540	-373	-204	-33	140	315	492
Sieve with 2	-135		-51		35		123
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In order to factor a 129-digit number from the RSA challenge they used

8 424 486 relations 569 466 equations 544 939 elements in the factor base

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The current record of QS is a 135-digit co-factor of  $2^{803} - 2^{402} - 1$ .

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$$M=\prod_{j=1}^{l}p_{j}^{a}$$

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 $\blacksquare$  Calculate  $p_j P$ .

Computing gcd.

If 
$$p_j P \neq O \pmod{n}$$
, then set  $P = p_j P$  and reset  $k \leftarrow k + 1$   
III If  $k \leq a_{p_j}$ , then go to step (3).

- If  $k > a_j$ , then reset  $j \leftarrow j + 1$ ,  $k \leftarrow 1$ . If  $j \le I$ , then go to step (3); otherwise go to step (5)
- If  $p_j P \equiv O(\mod n)$  and no factor of n was found at the computation of inverse elements, then go to step (5)
- Solution Reset  $r \leftarrow r 1$ . If r > 0 go to step (1); otherwise terminate with "failure". The "smoothness bound" B is recommended to be chosen as

$$B = e^{\sqrt{\frac{\ln F(\ln \ln F)}{2}}}$$

and in such a case the running time is

$$O(e^{\sqrt{2+o(1\ln F(\ln\ln F))}\ln^2 n})$$

Let p denote the smallest factor of an integer n and  $p^*$  the largest prime factor of p-1.

Pollard's Rho algorithm

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- Pollard's Rho algorithm
- **Pollard's** p-1 algorithm
- Elliptic curve method

 $O(\sqrt{p})$   $O(p^*)$   $\emptyset(e^{(1+o(1))\sqrt{2\ln p \ln \ln p}})$ 

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Image: Pollard's Rho algorithm $O(\sqrt{p})$ Image: Pollard's p-1 algorithm $O(p^*)$ Image: Elliptic curve method $\emptyset(e^{(1+o(1))\sqrt{2 \ln p \ln \ln p}})$ Image: Quadratic sieve method $\emptyset(e^{1+o(1))\sqrt{(\ln n \ln \ln n)}})$ 

## FACTORING ALGORITHMS RUNNING TIMES

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The most efficient factorization method, for factorization of integers with more than 100 digits, is the general number field sieve method (superpolynomial but sub-exponential); The second fastest is the quadratic sieve method.



# **APPENDIX**

#### HISTORICAL REMARKS on ELLIPTIC CURVES

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$$\int_{x1}^{x2} \frac{dx}{\sqrt{x^3 + ax + b}} \qquad \qquad \int_{x1}^{x2} \frac{xdx}{\sqrt{x^3 + ax + b}}$$

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The reason is that if we are working with rational coefficients or mod p, where p > 3 is a prime, then such a general equation can be transformed to our special case of equation. In other cases, it may be indeed necessary to consider the most general form of equation.

A general elliptic curve over  $Z_{p^m}$  where p is a prime is the set of points (x, y) satisfying so-called Weierstrass equation

$$y^2 + uxy + vy = x^3 + ax^2 + bx + c$$

for some constants u, v, a, b, c together with a single element **0**, called the point of infinity.

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$$x \rightarrow x - \frac{d}{3}$$
  
to get equation  
 $y^2 = x^3 + fx + g$ 

## HISTORY of ELLIPTIC CURVES CRYPTOGRAPHY

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- There are patents in force covering certain aspects of ECC technology.
- Elliptic curves have been first used for factorization by Lenstra.
- Elliptic curves played an important role in perhaps most celebrated mathematical proof of the last hundred years - in the proof of Fermat's Last Theorem - due to A. Wiles and R. Taylor.

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$$E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

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Choose integer bounds A,B,M such that

$$M = \prod_{j=1}^{l} p_j^{a_{p_j}}$$

for some primes  $p_1 < p_2 < \ldots < p_l \leq B$  and  $a_{p_j}$ , being the largest exponent such that  $p_i^{a_j} \leq A$ .

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- **G** Calculate  $p_j P$ .
- Computing gcd. If  $p_j P \neq O \pmod{n}$ , then set  $P = p_j P$  and reset  $k \leftarrow k + 1$ If  $k \leq a_{p_j}$ , then go to step (3).

If  $k > a_{p_j}$ , then reset  $j \leftarrow j + 1$ ,  $k \leftarrow 1$ . If  $j \le l$ , then go to step (3); otherwise go to step (5)

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- If  $p_j P \equiv O(\mod n)$  and no factor of n was found at the computation of inverse elements, then go to step (5)
- Solution Reset  $r \leftarrow r 1$ . If r > 0 go to step (1); otherwise terminate with "failure". The "smoothness bound" B is recommended to be chosen as

$$B = e^{\sqrt{\frac{\ln F(\ln \ln F)}{2}}}$$

and in such a case running time is

$$O(e^{\sqrt{2+o(1\ln F(\ln\ln F))}\ln^2 n})$$

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- For example, for 128-bit security one needs a curve over  $\underline{F}_q$ , where  $q \approx 2^{256}$ .
- This can be contrasted with RSA cryptography that requires 3072 public and private keys.

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- The square root method and Silver-Pohling-Hellman (SPH) method.
- SPH method factors the order of a curve into small primes and solves the discrete logarithm problem as a combination of discrete logarithms for small numbers.
- Computation time of the square root method is proportional to O(√e<sup>n</sup>) where n is the order of the based element of the curve.

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- The binary field case was broken in April 2004 using 2600 computers for 17 months.

NIST recommended 5 elliptic curves for prime fields, one for prime sizes 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521 bits.
 NIST also recommended five elliptic curves for binary fields F<sub>2<sup>m</sup></sub> one for *m* equal 163, 233, 283, 409 and 571.